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Chapter 4 
Retirement Decisions 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the factors contributing to the retirement decisions of 
the middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan. As previously mentioned, life expectancies in 
Taiwan have been increasing in the last decade and are expected to continue rising. 
The post-war baby boom generation has gradually reached retirement age and, as a 
result, retirement issues wil l become more important in the next decade, especially for 
policy makers. For instance, i f workers retire earlier and also live longer than in the 
past, more resources wi l l be required to support an extended period of retirement. 
Some workers may amass enough personal savings to support themselves through old 
age. Other workers may be forced to retire because of i l l health, economic downturn, 
or reaching a mandatory retirement age. This group will probably need additional 
resources to support them in their old age, either from younger members of their 
families or from a social security or pension system. In traditional Taiwanese societies, 
the elderly live in extended, multigenerational households and rely primarily on their 
adult children for financial support and personal care. However, this traditional family 
support system is under pressure from demographic, social, and economic changes. In 
particular, fertility has been low for decades, the elderly have few adult children to 
provide support, and many of these children have moved away from their family 
homes. For instance, the percentage of elderly living with children declined from 67% 
in 1976 to 51% in 1996 (Hermalin, 2000). Therefore, better government social 
welfare policies are needed to provide more financial help to elderly people. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature by focusing attention on the retirement 
decision of the middle-aged and elderly. Most previous studies on retirement 
behaviour in Taiwan have focused on living arrangements (Chen, 1994; Chang, 1999), 
the economic well-being (Hermalin et al, 1999), and health status and health-care 
utilisation of the elderly (Chen, 1999). Furthermore, Taiwan is a unique country with 
a different social system from most developed countries. Contemporary labour studies 
have often focused on the effects of retirement age, health, and pensions on retirement 
(Gustman and Steinmeicr, 1986; Stock and Wise, 1990; Berkovec and Stern, 1991). 
However, straightforward application of these studies to Taiwan is inappropriate 
because of the social differences.' For example, according to the Taiwanese Labour 
Standards Law, individuals who worked for more than 25 years could apply for 
voluntary retirement and obtain occupational pension entitlement even before they 
reached 65. As such, using retirement age as an explanatory variable here is not 
always appropriate since it may vary across individuals due to different ages of 
starting work. Taiwanese workers who started working at an early age retire earlier, 
and those who start later retire later. Furthermore, until now, Taiwan's government has 
not provided a public or state pension system for the elderly, even after they were 65 
and over. Many relied on personal savings and family welfare. To take into account 
these considerations, this Chapter uses the concept of employment duration to analyse 
retirement decisions in Taiwan. 
Duration analysis has been developed in the field of bio-statistics to describe the 
1 Due to the limitations of the SHLS data, the different social security system and specific retirement 
law in Taiwan, standard models such as the life cycle model (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986), option 
value model (Stock and Wise, 1990) or stochastic dynamic programming model (Berkovec and Stern, 
1991) are not suitable for analysing the retirement decisions of the middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan. 
In particular, the above models depended on sufficient data on wages, income, pension benefit, and 
other assets. 
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timing of events. It has become a subject of increasing interest to labour economists -
notably to issues on unemployment, retirement, and absence from the workplace. 
Most methods for analyzing duration models are based on time as a continuously 
measured variate. For example, Lancaster (1979) used the continuous-time parametric 
models to estimate the effects of regressors on the expected duration of individuals' 
unemployment, Diamond and Hausman (1984) applied the Cox proportional hazard 
model to analyse the continuous-time hazards of retirement, Barmby, Orme and 
Treble (1991) considered a dynamic model of worker decisions under the sick-pay 
scheme and used the discrete panel data and Weibull hazard models to analyse the 
duration of absence. Although the observed data are discrete, time is obviously 
continuous. Therefore, this study specifies that employment durations are continuous 
and uses the continuous-time hazard models, including parametric and 
semi-parametric approaches to assess individuals' retirement behaviour. The former 
approach is guided by the assumed distribution for the hazard function while the latter 
is more flexible with no assumed distribution for the hazard function. 
Previous empirical studies have often tested the hypothesis that higher wages 
lead to delayed retirement, and higher pension benefits from social security or private 
pensions lead to earlier retirement (Mitchell and Fields, 1981). To judge the adequacy 
of social security payments, they often compared current benefits to a recipient's 
previous wages to find the optimal replacement rate2 (Steuerle et al, 2000). However, 
the main limitation of the SHLS surveys lies with the fact that insufficient data have 
been collected on wages and assets, and the response rates to these questions were 
2 According to Wang (2000), the optimal replacement rate can be calculated as follows: the 
employment duration is divided by the sum of employment duration and retirement duration. For 
example, if the employment duration is 45 years, and retirement is 15 years, then the optimal 
replacement rate is 75%. If, other things being equal, the employment duration is longer, then the 
optimal replacement rate increases. 
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low (Mete and Schultz, 2002). Furthermore, annual income wi l l vary with age, of 
course, especially between individuals of working age and those of retirement age. To 
address these problems, this chapter constructs a predicted earnings variable to 
approximate the wage level, particularly as an indicator of income from work, and a 
predicted pension income variable to estimate the pension benefits as an indicator of 
income during retirement. This approach is not new but it has been infrequently 
adopted in economic studies. The problem is that the estimated standard errors of such 
constructed variables typically wi l l under-estimate the true standard errors. Pagan 
(1984) demonstrated this and showed how the standard error should be adjusted. 
Empirical studies that employed predicted variables include Diamond and Hausman 
(1984), Slade (1987), Arulampalam and Stewart (1995), and Buckley et al. (2004), 
who estimated the effect of predicted income on retirement and unemployment 
duration studies. Diamond and Hausman (1984), for example, noted that predicted 
pension income has a positive effect on the hazard rate of retirement. Slade (1987) 
found that predicted earnings have a significant negative effect on labour force exit, 
and Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) stated that predicted earnings can increase the 
probability of entering full-time work but this effect falls with age. Buckley et al. 
(2004) suggested that predicted lifetime income or wealth has a positive effect on 
good health among older people. 
Consequently, two predicted variables, namely predicted earnings as an indicator 
of income from work and predicted pension income as an indicator of income during 
retirement, are used to test the following hypotheses on the duration models: I f 
workers have higher predicted earnings, they have a lower hazard rate of retirement. 
I f people have higher predicted pension income, they have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. In general, two alternative specifications for the duration models are 
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adopted in this Chapter. (1) Case 1: the hazard function excludes predicted earnings 
and predicted pension income as explanatory variables, (2) Case 2: the hazard 
function includes predicted earnings and predicted pension income as explanatory 
variables. Other explanatory variables, such as Age, Gender, and Health, are also 
considered to examine the determinants of retirement behaviour. 
Further, i f the study did not consider the influence of unobserved heterogeneity 
on estimated duration model, they might produce incorrect results (Lancaster, 1990). 
The theoretical literature also suggested that the non-frailty model might 
over-estimate the degree of negative duration dependence in the true baseline hazard, 
and under-estimate the degree of positive duration dependence in the true baseline 
hazard (Jenkins, 2005). Hence, this chapter considers the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity into the duration model for testing the above theoretical suggestions on 
retirement behaviour. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical 
framework, including related literature, and outlines a model of the retirement 
decision. Section 4.3 describes the empirical specification, including specifying 
employment durations by continuous-time, rather than discrete-time hazard models, 
the distribution of employment duration, and the estimation of the hazard function. 
Parametric and semi-parametric approaches, including the exponential, Weibull, and 
Cox proportional hazard models, are used to estimate the hazard rate of retirement. 
Section 4.4 presents the data sources and variables used in this analysis. This is 
followed by the major empirical results in Section 4.5. In particular, the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity on retirement decision are also tested by using duration 
models. Lastly, Section 4.6 discusses the results and section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Theoretical Framework of Retirement Decisions 
This section develops a simple retirement framework for the middle-aged and 
elderly. First we review some literature on retirement issues and secondly build up an 
employment duration model to account for the independent variables and data 
structure. Several hypotheses are proposed relating to the retirement hazard. 
4.2.1 Literature Review on Employment Duration Models 
This section reviews some literature on retirement behaviour using the 
employment duration model, including Diamond and Hausman (1984), Antolin and 
Scarpetta (1998), and An et al. (1999). Diamond and Hausman (1984) were the first to 
employ the regression-type hazard model to examine the determinants of individual 
retirement and savings. Their specification of the model solved three problems: 
censoring, dynamic regressor variables, and dynamic self-selection. For instance, to 
resolve the sample-censoring problem, hazard models are used instead of the more 
traditional regression-type models. They divided their sample into three groups, 
including left censoring (individuals who retired before the beginning of the sample 
period), right censoring (individuals who do not retire during the sample period), and 
event or failure time (individuals who retire during the sample period). From these 
three sets of individuals, they calculated the likelihood of retirement. The data in their 
empirical study was obtained from the US National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) over 
the period 1966-1976. Diamond and Hausman (1984) found that the presence of 
pension and social security benefits had a significant positive effect on retirement 
duration. They also pointed out that the proposed increase in the minimum age for 
receipt of social security benefits could slow down the retirement rate but had not 
stopped the trend of decreased male labour force participation in the US over the past 
20 years, and that individuals with larger permanent incomes or with high earnings 
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capacity were less likely to retire. Diamond and Hausman further found that the 
demographic variable with the largest effect was poor health, and single males were 
much more likely to retire earlier. The effects o f education and number of dependents 
were negligible. 
Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) analysed the determinants of retirement decisions 
in Germany using micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) over 
the period 1985-1995. Their non-parametric estimates suggested that the incentive 
structure generated by different social security schemes played a powerful role in 
individual retirement decisions. Their semi-parametric analysis was conducted using a 
piece-wise constant hazard model with multiple destinations and time-varying 
covariates, and they found that socio-demographic factors such as poor health have a 
strong impact on retirement decisions contributing to early withdrawal from the 
labour market. Financial incentives offered in the pension system are powerful 
influences in shaping the age profile of retirement. In particular, they used pension 
wealth and an estimate of retirement option values to allow for the planning behaviour 
of individuals. They found that older people tended to maximise the net value of their 
pension wealth and retire as soon as the option value of postponing retirement became 
small. Finally, the results of the hazard model were used to simulate the effects of a 
reform towards an age-neutral pension system. The results of this simulation 
suggested a significant shift in the age profile of retirement, with the average 
retirement age rising by about one year. 
An et al. (1999) introduced the Cox proportional hazard model to analyse the 
retirement behaviour of married couples in the US. Their model generalised the 
traditional univariate duration analysis to include a family-wide joint retirement 
158 
process that induced both spouses to retire at the same time. The data was obtained 
from the 1969 US Retirement History Survey (RHS), which contained observations 
on 978 couples aged between 58 and 63. They confirmed the asymmetric effects 
between a husband's and a wife's income on their retirement hazards. Regarding the 
cross-effects of health, their empirical analysis differed from that obtained using a 
traditional univariate analysis. The univariate analysis suggested that the husband 
tended to stay longer at work i f the wife was in poor health, possibly to cover the high 
health costs, whereas the wife tended to retire earlier i f the husband was in poor health, 
possibly to take care of him. On the other hand, results from their model indicated 
symmetry across genders: both the wife's and the husband's retirement hazard was 
lowered when their spouse was in poor health. 
4.2.2 A Model of the Retirement Decisions 
The number of studies devoted to understanding when and why workers retire in 
Western developed countries is enormous.3 The theoretical framework in these 
studies conceptualises retirement as a trade-off between work and leisure within the 
constraints of health and economics. For example, studies have examined how 
retirement decisions are influenced by individual factors, such as age, gender, race, 
education, and health (Diamond and Hausman, 1984), others have used family factors, 
such as marital status, the number of children, and family size (Chen, 1994; Chang 
1999), and yet another group of researchers focused on social factors such as the 
pension and social security systems (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986; Stock and Wise, 
1990; Berkovec and Stern, 1991). 
The general framework of this chapter follows Mitchell and Fields (1981) and 
3 For example, see, Lazear (1986), Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for a survey on this area. 
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assumes that the individual can choose the optimal labour supply path or optimal 
duration in employment for their lifetime. An individual's income possibilities are 
constrained by lifetime earning capacity and pension opportunities (including both 
employer-provided benefits and social security payments). This life cycle framework 
leads directly to a structure in which the optimal labour supply path or employment 
duration (D) is a function of the lifetime streams of E a r n i n g s , Pensions^) , 
and other pertinent explanatory variables (X,) such as Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Health, Marital and Residence Status. 
D = D(E„Pi,Xi) / = l,2,--,/7 (4.1) 
where n is the number of observations. (D) represents the optimal labour supply 
path or employment duration and is a dependent variable. The explanatory variables 
in equation (4.1) must be expressed for their lifetime and not just in terms of their 
current levels. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the definition of retirement in Taiwan is as 
follows: workers who stopped working ful l time permanently or government 
employees who have received pension benefits. This definition and an employment 
duration model are used to examine the influences on individual retirement 
behaviours. 
Specific hypotheses about the above factors are described as follows: 
(i) Personal factors: except for retirement law, the coefficients for Age variables 
from ages 50 to 70 are expected to have a positive sign for retirement, because as 
workers become older their productivity declines and fewer job opportunities are 
available to them. For instance, as previously mentioned and shown in Table 3.1, the 
labour force participation rates declined with age from 65.3 percent by aged 50-54, to 
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55.1 percent by aged 55-59, 39.7 percent by aged 60-64, and 8.9 percent by aged 65 
and over in 1996. This implies that as workers become older their productivity 
declines and they gradually lose their jobs. In addition, the marginal utility o f leisure 
time might be an increasing function of age, so that even i f productivity and wage 
rates do not decline with age individuals may be more likely to retire as they become 
older. 
Further, for the Gender variable, female workers have a higher hazard rate o f 
retirement than males. Given the tradition that females typically bear the greater share 
of the burden of household duties, this might imply that females place a higher 
valuation on the marginal unit of leisure than their male counterparts. Hence, the 
reservation wage of females is likely to be higher than that for males and thus faced 
with the same earnings opportunities in paid employment females may be more likely 
to retire than males. 
For the Race variables, due to the differences in cultural attitudes to work, family 
support arrangements, and the special political situation in Taiwan, the coefficient of 
the Mainlander variable is expected to have a positive sign with a negative sign for 
other Taiwanese ethnic groups. Since most Mainlanders moving from China in 1949 
have been in the army or working in the government sectors, they have a regular 
income and more security benefits for their retirement. Hence, they have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement than other Taiwanese. In contrast, other Taiwanese, being 
farmers, self-employed, or working in the private sectors, have an irregular income. 
Hence, they need to work hard and maintain family support arrangements, so they 
have a lower hazard rate of retirement, especially Hakka people (Shih, 1999). 
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For the Health variable, i f a worker's health is poor, he or she tends to have 
reduced ability and opportunities to work, and perhaps a reduced desire or need for 
employment. Hence, the coefficient of poor health is expected to have a positive sign 
for retirement; when their health declines, workers are more likely to retire. In 
contrast, since workers with better education have a higher productivity and more 
employment opportunities, so the coefficients of education are expected to have a 
negative sign. The hazard rate of retirement would be lower and they are less likely to 
retire. 
(ii) Family factors: For Marital Status, i f a man is married, he has a greater 
responsibility and tends to work to earn money for his family. Thus, married male 
workers are expected to have a lower hazard rate of retirement. However, this 
marriage effect might be different for females; they might depend on their family and 
have a higher hazard rate of retirement. 
(ii i) Employment opportunity: For Residence Status, in urban areas employment 
opportunities for the middle-aged and elderly are more limited than in rural areas. One 
might therefore expect that states having a larger proportion of the population living 
in urban areas might have a higher retirement rate. On the other hand, rural workers 
tend to help out by feeding livestock and poultry and doing other farm chores, so there 
are greater self-employment opportunities and more low skilled jobs for the 
middle-aged and elderly. Hence, rural workers are expected to have a lower hazard 
rate of retirement. 
(iv) Economic factors: This is a measure of the incentive to retire or not retire. 
Workers with higher earnings are expected to have a lower hazard rate of retirement, 
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while workers with higher pension income are expected to have a higher hazard rate 
of retirement. For instance, Diamond and Hausman (1984), Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986) and Stock and Wise (1990) noted that workers eligible for a pension have a 
higher hazard rate of retirement. However, the pension system in Taiwan only 
provides occupational pensions, specifically for government employees and workers 
in large private companies. Section 2.5 presented some conditional results about 
pensions, that is, i f the employment duration is less than 35 years, then workers have a 
lower hazard rate of retirement, and i f greater than 35 years, they wil l have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement. Therefore, the above hypothesis wi l l be likely to be true i f 
the employment duration is greater than 35 years. 
4.3 Empirical Specifications 
In order to examine the determinants of individual retirement behaviour, this 
study uses continuous-time parametric models for analysis. This method may have 
some differences with the results of Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) and Nolan 
(2000), which use discrete-time models for estimation. For instance, Narendranathan 
and Stewart (1993) focus on the time in weeks and unemployment durations are only 
observed in terms of completed whole weeks. Further, they estimate the parameters o f 
the models only for those who were unemployed for at least four weeks. Therefore, 
they use the discrete-time, grouped hazard modelsj and binary response models to 
examine the determinants of unemployment duration. Moreover, Nolan (2000) 
employs weeks and days of length for examining absence durations. He also considers 
the effect of censoring of the weekend on Barmby, Orme and Treble's (1991) estimate 
of duration dependence in these absence spells. His focus is a grouped hazard 
specification for multiple-spells. 
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In contrast, this study specifies that employment durations are continuous to 
estimate the retirement hazard. In particular, the definition of length of employment 
durations is deducted from the answer to the question from the SHLS data: for the 
current employees, "When did you start your present job?" and the retirees, "When 
did you start your last job?" and "When did you stop doing your last job?" The 
employment durations can be calculated by years and months. Therefore, this study 
can get the precise working life durations of individuals from 1 to 55 years, with a 
mean of 21.876 years as shown in Table 4.3. 
4.3.1 Distribution of Employment Duration 
Let us start by assuming the dependent variable of interest to be continuous 
employment duration, the length of time to retirement from the start of work. Let the 
duration distribution function (or failure function) F(t) represent the probability of 
retirement from employment by time / , defined as:4 
Basically, (4.2) specifies the probability that the random variable Ti is less than 
some value t. The corresponding density function is: 
F(t) = Pr(T,<t)= \ f(v)d v. 
0 
(4.2) 
f ( t ) = dF(t)/dt (4.3) 
The probability of survival S(t) in employment to at least time t is: 
4 See Klein and Moeschberger (1997, Chapter 2) and Lancaster (1990, p.7-10). 
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S(/) = Pr(7; >t)=\-F(t). (4.4) 
The basic building block in duration models is the hazard function, denoted h(t), at 
time / . In this study, the continuous-time hazard rate represents the instantaneous 
retirement rate from employment at time / . The probability that an individual who 
has been in employment until time t retires in a short interval of length dt after / 
is Pr(z < T: < t + dt | T: > t), giving an average probability of retirement per unit of 
time within the short interval dt of ?r((<Ti <t + dt\T: >t)/dt. The hazard rate, 
h{t), is defined as the time limit of this expression:5 
. . . .. Pr(/<r,. <l + dt \T,>t) 
h(t) = h m — • — -. (4.5) 
dt 
Applying conditional probabilities to (4.5) yields:6 
. . . .. ?x{t<Tj<t + dt\Ti>t) 
h{t) = l i m — '• — -
= —— lim 
5(0 *-»<> 
-M 
~s(ty 
Changes in the hazard function over time give information about the duration 
dependence of an underlying stochastic process. I f dh(t)/dt>0, then the process 
5 In the discrete-time or grouped hazard model, t may be measured in years and durations only 
observed in terms of whole years completed, an observed duration of / whole years indicates a 
duration on the continuous time scale of t and t + 1 years. Then, the discrete-time hazard function 
can be rewritten as h (t) = p ( j . <t + \\ t<Tj). See, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993). 
6 See Fleming and Harrington (1991, p.3). 
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\F(t + dt)-F(l)\ 
exhibits positive duration dependence, the hazard rate increases over the time of 
duration in employment. I f dh{t)l dt < 0, then the process exhibits negative duration 
dependence, the hazard rate decreases over the time of duration in employment. 
4.3.2 Estimation of Hazard Function 
Previous studies have focused on the use of either non-parametric or 
semi-parametric approaches for the analysis of retirement behaviour (Diamond and 
Hausman, 1984; Antolin and Scarpetta, 1998; An et al, 1999). However, a parametric 
model has some advantages over a nonparametric approach, so this chapter uses both 
parametric and semi-parametric approaches to estimate the hazard rate of retirement. 
First of all, parametric models make explicit assumptions about the distribution 
of the hazard or survival functions, so full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) 7 
can be used to estimate the relevant parameters. Furthermore, a semi-parametric 
approach analyses duration data where no parametric form of the hazard or survival 
functions is specified. The effects of covariates are parameterised to alter the baseline 
hazard or survival function (for which all covariates are equal to zero) in a certain way. 
For simplification, assume the values of the explanatory variables do not vary with 
survival time. That is, there are no time-varying covariates. This assumption, however, 
is changed in Chapter 5, where the effects of time-varying covariates for retirement 
decisions are analysed. 
4.3.2.1 Parametric Approach 
According to Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999), a parametric approach has the 
following advantages: (1) Full information maximum likelihood may be used to 
7 For an introduction to the FIML, see Hayashi (2000, Section 8.5). 
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estimate the parameters, (2) The fitted values from the model can provide estimates of 
survival time, (3) The residuals can be computed from the differences between the 
actual and predicted values of time, and (4) It uses a continuous distribution, rather 
than a discrete grouped hazard. This section presents some of the specific functional 
forms, including exponential and Weibull distributions. 
4.3.2.1.1 Exponential Model 
Exponential distributions are widely used as models for duration data. The 
hazard function is constant and it has no duration dependence. One of the main 
advantages of this approach is that it is relatively simple to calculate a constant hazard 
rate. For this exponential model, the hazard function of employment duration is 
specified as 
h(t\xt) = A = e[p°*p<x'\ (4.7) 
where h is the hazard rate, t is an employment duration, x, is the explanatory 
variables. That is, let the retirement occurring in a continuous time purely random 
process of hazard function, so that the probability of an offer in the short interval / , 
t + dt is h(t)dt, and let the hazard function, survival function, probability density 
function, failure function and expected mean employment duration are specified in 
Table 4.1. 
4.3.2.1.2 Weibull Model 
Extending the exponential distribution, the Weibull distribution has two 
parameters, A > 0 and a > 0. The hazard function is defined to be 
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h(t\x,) = at"-1 -A = at (4.8) 
Empirically, the parameters A and a in the exponential distribution and Weibull 
distribution can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The parameter A depends on 
the explanatory variables xj, thus providing us with a more flexible hazard function. 
For example, the hazard function is increasing i f a > 1, decreasing i f a < 1, and 
constant i f a = 1. The last case corresponds exactly to the exponential distribution. 
The survival function, density function and distribution function are specified in Table 
4.1. For observed duration data,/,,?,,...,/,, the log-likelihood function can be 
formulated and maximized to include censored and uncensored observations. 
Combining these duration models into a general parametric likelihood yields: 
where j3 = (A,a) , and c, = 1 represents uncensored observations, c, = 0 
represents right-censored observations (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2004). To 
obtain the maximum likelihood with respect to the parameters o f interest, /?, then 
maximise the log-likelihood function: 8 
The procedure to obtain the values of maximum likelihood estimation requires taking 
Since the log function is monotone, maxima of (4.9) and (4.10) occur at the same value of/7; 
however, maximizing (4.10) is computationally simpler than maximizing (4.9). 
^)=n{[/ak^)] f '*NK^)] '" f ' i (4.9) 
l n l ( / ? ) = £ { c , l n [ / ( r , | * „ / ? ) ] + ( l - c , ) l n [ s ( / (4.10) 
1=1 
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derivatives of In L(J3) with respect to J3, the unknown parameters, setting these 
equations equal to zero, and solving for ft 9 
Table 4.1 Hazard and Survival Functions 
Exponential Model Weibull Model 
Hazard Function h(t\xi) = A h(t\x,) = ata-]A 
Survival Function S(t \xj) = exp(-A/) 
= e x p [ - e ( A + ^ ) 4 
5(0 = e x p [ - ( A / ) 8 ] 
Probability Density 
Function 
f ( t ) = h(t)S(t) 
= A exp(-A/) 
/ ( 0 = M0-5(0 
= ata-'A-exp[-(At)a] 
Failure Function F( / ) = 1-5(0 
= 1 -exp(-A0 
F(/) = 1-5(0 
= l -exp[ - ( / tO f f ] 
Mean £ ( / ) 
A 
£«) = r < l + „ l / a > 
Source: Klein and Moeschberger (1997), and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999). 
9 See Klein and Moeschberger (1997, Appendixes A and B), for a description of the numerical methods 
for implementing multivariate Newton-Raphson methods. 
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4.3.2.1.3 Weibull Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
It is well known that duration analysis produces incorrect results i f unobserved 
heterogeneity is ignored (Lancaster, 1990). However, most previous literature on 
individual retirement issues by duration analysis only focused on the influencing 
factors of socio-demographic status, health, marital status, pension system, and 
economic status; but never considered the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on 
estimated hazard rate of retirement (see, for example, Diamond and Hausman, 1984; 
Antolin and Scarpetta, 1998; and An et al., 1999). Therefore, this chapter uses the 
Weibull model and considers unobserved heterogeneity to fill this gap (see, Cleves, et 
al, 2004; Collett, 1994; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). 
According to Cleves et al. (2004), the unobserved heterogeneity models include 
unshared frailty and shared frailty models. The former are referred to as an 
over-dispersion/heterogeneity model, and the latter is a random-effects model where 
the frailties are common among groups of individuals or spells and are randomly 
distributed across groups (Gutierrez, 2002). Suppose the SHLS data belong to a 
random sample, and a "shared frailty" component is included in the model. Then, the 
shared frailty hazard function in the Weibull model may be written as: 
Ktji \ x j n u j ) = ujh{tjl \ x j j ) . (4.11) 
for data consisting of n groups with the j th group comprised of n. observations. 
The index j denotes the group ( j = \,...,n) and / denotes the observation within 
group, /' = l,. . . ,o.. The frailties, w y , are shared within each group and are assumed 
to follow either a gamma or inverse-Gaussian distribution. The frailty variance, 6, is 
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estimated from the data and measures the variability of the frailty across groups. 
For instance, for men and women eligible for a pension, not only might their 
observed employment duration be different, but under this model their individual 
retirement hazard functions could also be different. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 2, for the sample as a whole, workers eligible for a pension have a higher 
survival rate of employment duration before completing 35 years in work and a lower 
survival rate of employment duration after working for 35 years. However, male 
workers eligible for a pension generally have a lower survival rate of employment 
duration after working for 17 years, whereas women have a higher survival rate of 
employment duration before completing 47 years in work and a lower survival rate of 
employment duration after working for 47 years. Hence, men may be more " f ra i l " 
than women due to unobserved factors accounting for individual level differences in 
their retirement hazard functions. These unobserved factors may contribute an extra 
layer of heterogeneity, leading to greater variability in the time of employment 
duration than might be expected under the model without the frailty component. 
4.3.2.2 Semi-Parametric Approach 
Based on Klein and Moeschberger (1997), this chapter is also concerned with 
comparing two or more groups of continuous-time of employment duration. I f the 
groups are similar, the nonparametric method described in Chapter 2 may be used 
directly. More often than not, the subjects in the groups have some additional 
characteristics, such as age, gender, and other socioeconomic status that may affect 
their hazard rate of retirement. Hence, the semi-parametric approach can be used to 
estimate continuous-time of employment duration between groups being less biased 
and more precise than a simple comparison. 
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According to Cox (1972), the semi-parametric approach quantifies the 
relationship between employment duration and a set of explanatory variables, often 
called the proportional hazard model. In particular, this model does not need to make 
any assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard function. Therefore, the 
continuous-time hazard function can be parameterised as10 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function depending on / and not xn /?' is the 
parameter vector, (the prime mark ( ' ) denotes transposition) and x, is the 
time-constant covariate vector. Simply, h0(t) summarises the pattern of "duration 
dependence" common to all persons, exp(/7 x ( ) is the relative hazard function and a 
non-negative function of covariatesx,, which does not depend on / by construction. 
Hence, in the Cox model, h0(t) is simply left unparameterised, and through 
conditioning on failure times, estimates of /?' are obtained anyway. 
In general, the integrated continuous-time hazard function in a Cox proportional 
hazard model is produced by 
1 0 If time is measured in terms of whole years completely, the discrete-time hazard function can be 
/ 7 , ( f | x , ) = /7 0(/)exp(/?x,.). (4.12) 
H(t\Xi)= f o h ( v , X i ) d v 
= exp(j3xi)^h0(v)dv 
= exp ( / ?x i ) / / 0 ( / ) 
(4.13) 
rewritten as h(t) = P{Ti<t + \\t<Tl)=\-expf- h0 (t) exp(/?' x, )dt . See, Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1993). 
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As with the integrated hazard, the baseline survival function S0(t) is the survival 
function evaluated with all the covariates equal to zero. So the survival function can 
be derived as follows 
S(t *,.) = exp { - / / ( / 1 *,.)} 
= exp{-exp( / ?x , . ) / / 0 (0} (4.14) 
cxp(/J.v,.) 
Cox (1972) proposed a method for estimating /? without having to specify any 
functional form for h0(t), and this method uses partial likelihood." In general, the 
Cox partial likelihood function is 
where k represents observed failure times and R(t(j)) is the set of all observations 
function, and maximise it to give an estimate of /?' that is asymptotically normal 
with mean /?' and variance-covariance matrix equal to the inverse of the negative 
Hessian.12 
Partial likelihood works in terms of the ordering of events by contrast with the focus in maximum 
likelihood on spells. See Klein and Moeschberger (1997), pp.231-234. 
'" See Greene (2000) for an introduction to M L estimation and the necessary conditions that give 
maximum likelihood estimates. 
exp(/?'x ; 
z exp 
(4.15) 
still under study at the time just prior to Treat (4.15) as the usual likelihood 
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4.4 Data Description 
4.4.1 Data Source 
The data are from the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Middle Aged 
and Elderly in Taiwan (SHLS), a joint survey conducted by the Taiwan Provincial 
Institute of Family Planning and the Population Studies Centre, University of 
Michigan. The total sample has 2462 observations aged 50 to 70, and their spouses. 
The survey questionnaire contains eight distinct sections: (i) Background information, 
marital status, and living situation; (ii) Family structure, general circumstances, and 
living with kin; (iii) Health, use of medical services, and hygiene habits; (iv) Social 
support and exchange of support; (v) Employment history; (vi) Leisure, activities, and 
general attitudes; (vii) Economic status; (viii) Livelihood plans. The SHLS survey 
data are fairly comprehensive and thus allow for a detailed discussion of the 
retirement decisions of the middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan. 
4.4.2 Variables Specifications 
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
According to the SHLS data, the sample consists of two groups, namely the 
current workers and retirees. The former group did not retire during the sample period 
and are known as "right-censored" spells. The latter group retired during the sample 
period, and the date on which an individual started their last job and the exact age at 
which they retired were observed. These are known as the "uncensored" spells. 
Therefore, employment duration includes the date when an individual started working 
to when they completely retired for "uncensored" spells, and they continue working 
for "right-censored" spells. This variable can be categorized as a dependent variable. 
The uncensored variable is coded 1 for retirement and 0 otherwise. 
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4.4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables recorded in the SHLS data include (1) Personal factors: 
age, gender, race, educational attainment, marital status, health status, and residence 
status. (2) Economic factors: eligibility for a pension, predicted earnings as an 
indicator of income from work and predicted pension income as an indicator of 
income during retirement. The details of the above variables are described below. 
First, age is explored. As noted in Chapter 2, the effect of ageing alone is 
important in explaining why people retire. From the SHLS data, age can be 
categorised in four groups: Agel (aged 50 to 54), Age2 (aged 55 to 59), Age3 (aged 
60 to 64), and Age4 (aged 65 to 70). This corresponds to the normal retirement ages at 
50, 55, 60, or 65 years old in the Labour Standard Law in Taiwan. 1 3 Second, the 
Gender variable is coded 1 for female and 0 for male. Third, the Race variable has 
four groups, namely Race! (Fujianese), Race2 (Hakka), Race3 (Mainlander), and 
Race4 (Aboriginal). Fourth, for the Education variable, Gordon and Blinder (1980) 
suggested that people who acquire more schooling remain in the labour force longer 
to recoup the costs of their education investments. Holding other variables equal, the 
more educated people are, the less prone they are to retire. The education variable is 
divided into four levels of schooling, namely Edul (informal schooling), Edu2 
(primary level: 1 to 6 years), Edu3 (high school level: 7 to 12 years) and Edu4 
(college level: 13 to 17 years). Fifth, marital status includes married, single, divorced, 
separated, and widowed. The Married variable is coded 1 for married and 0 for 
otherwise. Sixth, for health assessment, the SHLS survey identifies five levels 
including excellent, good, average, not so good, and poor. The Health variable is 
1 3 According to the Labour Standard Law (Chapter 6 Retirement, Article 53 and 54) in Taiwan, 
workers can choose their retirement ages at 50, 55, 60 or 65. 
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coded 1 for poor health, including "not so good" and "poor" health, and 0 for 
otherwise. Finally, for the residence area status, Gunderson (1977) suggested that the 
residence factor could reflect employment opportunities and living environments for 
people in urban (Residl), town (Resid2) and rural (Resid3) areas. 
The economic factors include eligibility for a pension and other economic 
variables, but a limitation of the SHLS is the lack of data on the interviewees' wages 
and their assets. Predicted earnings (P-Eamings) as an indicator of income from work 
and predicted pension income (P-Pension) as an indicator of income during retirement 
are constructed to facilitate further analysis of retirement decisions. This approach is 
not new but it has been infrequently adopted in economic studies (see, Diamond and 
Hausman, 1984; Slade, 1987; Arulampalam and Stewart, 1995; and Buckley et al., 
2004). However, there are likely to be some selection problems1 4 at work in the 
equations estimated in order to generate values of predicted earnings and predicted 
pension income for the individuals in the sample. The eligibility for a pension dummy 
variable, which includes retirees who have received pension benefits and workers who 
expect to receive pension benefits, is coded 1 for those with benefits and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.2.2.1 Predicted Earnings as Income from Work 
The regression model uses 983 observations15 on those who are currently 
working to predict the effective sample of 2052 observations, except for the never 
1 4 The selection problems arise in the context of the regression equations for predicted earnings and 
predicted pension income because the individuals for whom we observe earnings and pension income 
are drawn non-randomly from the overall data sample. It is not easy to incorporate an allowance for 
selection effects in the models. In particular, there are no exact pension income data from the 
questionnaires of the SHLS survey; actual pension income is assumed to be equal to major sources of 
income from pension, retirement fund and insurance. 
1 5 According to the questionnaire of 1996 SHLS (E4a: how much did you earn last year?), the effective 
sample included 1072 observations working full-time and 124 observations working part-time. Only 
983 observations presented their actual earnings, 161 observations didn't know or found it hard to 
estimate, 29 observations refused to answer, and there were 23 missing for calculation. 
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worked group (410 observations). The estimated model is as follows (the standard 
errors are in parentheses): 
E = 43.929- 4.117* Age! - 8.673* Age3 -13.031* AgeA -15.176* Gender 
(5.835) (2 .909) (3. .304) (5.953) (2.969) 
- 4.328* Race! - 15.799* Race!-1.211* Race4- 1.391* Edul 
(3.185) (5.312) (9.157) (3.555) 
+ 19.051* Edu3 + 51.052* Edu4 + 5.369* Married- 2.696* Health ,A , 
(4.254) (5 .616) (3.801) (3.593) { ^ > - > ) 
+ 2.442* Pension - 7.639* Town - 13.925* Rural 
(2.958) (3.238) (3.044) 
F(15, 967) = 22.67 R2 =0.260 
It is clear from theF - statistic that we strongly reject the null hypothesis that all 
the regression coefficients except the constant term are zero. Comparing this with the 
standard errors presented above, we note that Age2, Race2, Race4, Edu2, Married, 
Health, and Pension are individually insignificant. Therefore, i f the restricted model 
only considers a significant effect on actual earnings, the resulting equation is as 
follows: 
E = 45.598 - 7.349* Ageb -11.610* AgeA -15.626* Gender 
(2.707) (3.061) (5.724) (2 .712) 
-15.133* /toce3+21.139* £ d t / 3 +53.773* £<fti4 
(5.089) (3.038) (4.468) 
- 7.784* Town -15.064* Rural (4.15)' 
(3.209) (2.953) 
F(8,974) = 41.58 /?2 = 0.255 
The coefficients of Age3 (aged 60 to 64), Age4 (aged 65 to 70), Gender, Race3 
(Mainlander), Town, and Rural variables are found to have a negative value and a 
statistically significant effect on predicted earnings in Table 4.2.1. Specifically, older 
workers, female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers living in town or rural 
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areas have lower predicted earnings. In contrast, the coefficients of the Edu3 (7 to 12 
years schooling) and Edu4 (13 to 17 years schooling) variables have a positive value 
and a statistically significant effect on predicted earnings. This means that workers 
with better education have higher predicted earnings. In general, workers with better 
education have higher productivity and better job prospects available to them in the 
government sector or large companies than people with lower education. 
Consequently, they would have higher earnings than others. The F value and R2 
value are 41.58 and 0.255 respectively.16 The average actual earnings of current 
workers are NT$408,410 (equal to £9,523), 1 7 and the average predicted earnings are 
NT$355,370 (equal to £8,287) - the latter are about 13.0% lower than the former as 
shown in Table 4.3. The average predicted earnings are lower than actual earnings 
because they took into account the proportion of people who retired or became 
unemployed, and who might have a lower income. 
4.4.2.2.2 Predicted Pension Income as Income during Retirement 
Due to the lack of exact pension income data from the questionnaires of the 
SHLS survey, actual pension income is assumed to be equal to major sources of 
income from pensions, retirement funds and insurance. The survey contained 222 of 
these cases. These individuals' incomes can be used to predict pension income for the 
effective sample, except for the never worked group. 
1 6 Predicted earnings of the effective sub-sample were only based on the particular values of the 
independent variables in equation (4.15)'. Some insignificant variables such as Age2, Race4, Edu2, 
Married, Health, and Pension in equation (4.15)' were dropped. See Slade (1982, p.9). 
1 7 The rate of foreign exchange was about NTS42.883 equals £1 in 1996. The website is (in Chinese): 
http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/zh-tw/env/stats/exchange rates.html. 
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P = 16.309- 4.659* Age! - 6.596* Age3-\ 0.073* Age4 + 4.642* Gender 
(8.026) (6.071) (5.830) (5.6S1) (4.716) 
+ 1.644* Race! + 2.342* Racel- 7.834* Race4+ .790* Edu2 
(5.177) (4 .374) (9.409) (4 .228) 
+ 16.800* Edu3 + 35.508* Edu4 + 11.653* Married-5.144* , , . A . 
(4 .777) (6 .719) (3.979) (3.625) ^ . 1 0 ^ 
+ 9.631* Pension - 4.718* Town +16.309* Rural 
(4.665) (3.238) (8.026) 
F(15, 206)-6.76 # 2 =0.330 
Further, for comparison of the effective sub-sample, this thesis uses the same set 
of explanatory variables in the equation for predicted earnings and predicted pension 
income. The estimated model is as follows (the standard errors are in parentheses): 
P = 27.964 - 6.371* Age! - 9.425* Age4 - 0.261* Gender 
(5.175) (4.451) (4.341) (4 .124) 
+ 2.677* Race3+ 20.805*Edul + 41.393* Edu4 
(4.162) (3.791) (5.980) 
-2.244* Town -0.158* Rural (4.16)' 
(3.915) (3.928) 
F(8,213) = 10.29 R2 = 0.279 
The coefficients of Edu3 (7 to 12 years schooling), and Edu4 (13 to 17 years 
schooling) variables are found to have a significant positive effect on average 
predicted pension income as shown in Table 4.2.2. That means workers with better 
education have a higher predicted pension income. Workers with better education are 
more likely to work in the government sectors and large private companies and thus 
be eligible for pensions. Therefore, educated people have a higher predicted pension 
income. In contrast, the coefficient of the Age4 (aged 65 to 70) variable has a 
significantly negative effect on average predicted pension income, which implies that 
elderly workers have a lower predicted pension income. Finally, the F value and 
R2 value are 10.29 and 0.279 respectively. The average actual pension income is 
179 
found to be NT$339,510 (equal to £7,917), and the average predicted pension income 
is NTS319,930 (equal to £7,461) - the latter is about 5.8% lower than the former from 
Table 4.3. The average predicted pension income is lower than actual pension income 
because it took into account the proportion of current workers who might not receive 
their pension benefits. 
4.4.3 Summary Statistics 
This chapter uses the data and variables described above to analyse retirement 
decisions in Taiwan. A ful l definition of the variables and summary statistics of the 
sample are given in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.2.1 Estimated Results for Predicted Earnings 
Model Distribution of General Regression Restricted Regression for 
Sub-sample Earnings 
Variables Mean Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Agel .393 (.489) - -
Age2 .343 (.475) -4.117 (2. 909) -
Age3 .208 (.406) -8.673** (3.304) -7.349** (3.061) 
Age4 .056 (.230) -13.031** (5.953) -11.610** (5.724) 
Gender .300 (.456) -15.176*** (2.969) -15.626*** (2.712) 
Racel .716 (.451) - -
Race2 .191 (.393) -4.328 (3.185) -
Race3 .076 (.266) -15.799*** (5.312) -15.132*** (5.089) 
Race4 .016 (.127) -1.211 (9.157) -
Edul .195 (.397) - -
Edu2 .467 (.499) -1.391 (3.555) -
Edu3 .244 (.430) 19.051*** (4.254) 21.138*** (3.038) 
Edu4 .094 (.291) 51.052*** (5.616) 53.773*** (4.468) 
Married .874 (.332) 5.369 (3.801) -
Health .136 (.343) -2.696 (3.593) -
Pension .322 (.468) 2.442 (2.958) -
Urban .385 (.487) - -
Town .242 (.428) -7.639** (3.238) -7.784*** (3.209) 
Rural .373 (.484) -13.925*** (3.044) -15.064*** (2.953) 
Constant 43.929*** (5.835) 45.598*** (2.706) 
N 983 983 983 
F (15, 967) 22.67 41.58 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.260 0.255 
Notes: 
1. The F distribution of restricted regression for earnings is F (8, 974). 
2. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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Table 4.2.2 Estimated Results for Predicted Pension Income 
Model Distribution of General Regression Restricted Regression for 
Sub-sample Pension Income 
Variables Mean Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Agel .117 (.322) - -
Age2 .162 (.369) -4.659 (6.071) -
Age3 .302 (.460) -6.596 (5.830) -6.371 (4.451) 
Age4 .419 (.494) -10.073* (5.681) -9.425** (4.341) 
Gender .468 (.500) 4.642 (4.716) -.261 (4.124) 
Racel .513 (.501) - -
Race2 .122 (.328) 1.644 (5.177) -
Race3 .333 (.472) 2.342 (4.374) 2.677 (4.162) 
Race4 .032 (.175) -7.834 (9.409) -
Edul .284 (.452) - -
Edu2 .320 (.467) .790 (4.228) -
Edu3 .302 (.460) 16.800*** (4.777) 20.805*** (3.791) 
Edu4 .095 (.293) 35.508*** (6.719) 41 3 9 3 * * * (5.980) 
Married .775 (.419) 11.653*** (3.979) -
Health .288 (.454) -5.144 (3.625) -
Pension .504 (.501) 9.631** (4.665) -
Urban .441 (.498) - -
Town .279 (.449) -4.718 (3.238) -2.244 (3.915) 
Rural .280 (.450) 1.317 (3.044) -.158 (3.928) 
Constant 16.309** (8.026) 27.964*** (5.175) 
N 222 222 222 
F (15, 206) 6.76 10.29 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.330 0.279 
Notes: 
1. The F distribution of restricted regression for pension income is F (8, 213). 
2. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Description Mean StdErr 
DURATION 1-55 Years. 21.876 
CENSOR 1 = Uncensored (retirement), .352 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE1 1 = Aged 50 to 54, .312 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE2 1 = Aged 55 to 59, .319 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE3 1 = Aged 60 to 64, .255 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE4 1 = Aged 65 to 70, .114 
0 = Otherwise. 
GENDER 1 = Female, .389 
0 = Male. 
RACE1 l=Fujianese, .724 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE2 l = H a k k a , .174 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE3 1 = Mainlander, .085 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE4 1 = Aboriginal, .016 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU1 1 = Informal schooling, .249 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU2 1 = 1 to 6 years of schooling, .473 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU3 1 = 7 to 12 years of schooling, .209 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU4 1 = 13 to 17 years of schooling, .069 
0 = Otherwise. 
MARRIED 1= Married, .841 
0 = Otherwise. 
(14.079) 
(.478) 
(.463) 
(.466) 
(.436) 
(.318) 
(.487) 
(.447) 
(.380) 
(.280) 
(.126) 
(.433) 
(.499) 
(.407) 
(.253) 
(.366) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
HEALTH 1 = Poor health, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.231 (.421) 
PENSION 1 = Eligible for a pension, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.267 (.443) 
URBAN 1 = Live in urban areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.380 (.486) 
TOWN 1 = Live in town areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.237 (.426) 
R U R A L 1 = Live in rural areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.383 (.486) 
EARNINGS Average actual earnings from current 
workers. 
40.841 (43.344) 
P-EARNINGS Average predicted earnings for 
working-time income. 
35.537 (20.789) 
PENSION Average actual pension income from 33.951 (29.964) 
INCOME pension, retirement fund and 
insurance. 
P-PENSION Average predicted pension income for 
retirement-time income. 
31.993 (13.404) 
Note: 
1. The effective sample of duration model only has 1732 observations, including 610 retirees (complete 
observations) and 1122 continuing work (right-censored observations). 
2. The units of EARNINGS, P-EARNINGS, PENSIONS, and P-PENSION are NTS 10,000. The rate of 
foreign exchange was about NTS42.883 equals £1 in 1996. 
3. However, the variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in 
the models. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
The hazard rates of retirement are estimated by continuous-time parametric 
models, including Exponential, Weibull, and Cox proportional hazard approaches. All 
models are estimated for the 1996 SHLS survey, considering two cases in each of the 
approaches. The gender effects and unobserved heterogeneity on retirement decisions 
are also tested. The details are described as follows. 
4.5.1 Exponential Models 
The empirical results of the Exponential models, tabulated in Tables 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2, present the maximum likelihood estimates (hereafter, M L E ) of the parameters. 
Simply, the estimated coefficient (5 can reflect the effect on retirement hazard. 
I f / ? > 0 , the retirement hazard increases. I f / ? < 0 , the retirement hazard decreases. 
lf/? = 0, then there is no effect on retirement hazard. In particular, the retirement 
hazard is constant and it has no duration dependence. 
4.5.1.1 Case 1: Without Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
Table 4.4.1 presents the estimated coefficients (with standard errors in 
parentheses) for Exponential model specifications, the case without predicted earnings 
and predicted pension income variables, and the dependent variable being 
continuous-time of employment duration. Based on these estimates, the hazard rate of 
retirement can be calculated for the benchmark individual and for other individuals 
with different demographic circumstances. 
For the benchmark individual, all explanatory variables take a value of zero. That 
is, the benchmark individual in all cases is an unmarried Fujianese man aged 50 to 54, 
who is in good health, is not eligible for a pension, and who lives in an urban area. 
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This benchmark case is reflected by the constant term in the estimation. For example, 
in Table 4.4.1, the benchmark estimates lead to the hazard rate of retirement estimates 
in the exponential model of 
A ( / ; J C . ) = A = e i P t t + / , , 0 ) = ep» = exp(-4.771) = 0.008. 
The effects on retirement hazard can be calculated for different demographic 
circumstances. How, for example, other things being equal, does the retirement hazard 
change for workers in Age2 (aged 55 to 59), Age3 (aged 60 to 64), and Age4 (aged 65 
to 70)? The first situation presents the hazard rate of retirement changes for workers 
in Age2 (aged 55 to 59): 
h{t-Agel) - A = e ( A + f l r U = exp(-4.771 + 0.307) = 0.012. 
The second situation presents the hazard rate of retirement changes for workers in 
Age3 (aged 60 to 64): 
/?(/; Ageh) = A- 0 = exp(-4.771 + 0.591) - 0.015. 
The third situation presents the hazard rate of retirement changes for workers in Age4 
(aged 65 to 70), other variables being constant: 
h(t;Age4) = A = = exp(-4.771 + 0.834) = 0.020. 
Therefore, if the coefficient, f3 > 0, the hazard rate of retirement will increase and be 
higher. So, older workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement than benchmark 
workers. 
In general, the coefficient of the Gender variable is significantly positive (at the 1 
percent level of significance). This means that female workers have a higher hazard 
rate of retirement. The variable Race3 (Mainlander) has a significantly positive effect 
on the retirement hazard, but the coefficients for Race2 (Hakka) and Race4 
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(Aboriginal) variables are negative and insignificant. This implies that Mainlander 
workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement, particularly if they retired from the 
army and government sectors, which might offer a number of pension, retirement 
fund and insurance benefits. In contrast, Hakka and Aboriginal workers have a lower 
hazard rate of retirement because they might have fewer pension benefits and need to 
work longer. These are consistent with the results reported in Shih (1999). 
Moreover, the coefficients for Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling) and Edu4 (13 to 
17 years of schooling) variables are significantly negative. This means that workers 
with better education have a lower hazard rate of retirement and are less likely to 
retire. This is similar to the results reported in Zimmer and Liu (1999), and Chang 
(1999). Similarly, the Married variable has the expected negative sign, but only 
significant at the 10% level. This means that married workers might have a higher 
economic burden from their family and lower hazard rate of retirement. Hence, they 
are more likely to retire later. 
Table 4.4.1 also notes that the Health variable is statistically significant in the 
model, in keeping with a priori expectations of a positive effect on retirement hazard. 
An explanation for workers with poor health is that this might reduce their 
productivity, time and ability to work and, consequently, they might quit their job to 
improve their health. Hence, workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. This finding is entirely consistent with the results reported in Diamond 
and Hausman (1984), An et al. (1999), and Mete and Schultz (2002). For instance, 
Diamond and Hausman (1984) used the NLS survey to examine the determinants of 
individual retirement and savings behaviour and found that the demographic variable 
with by far the largest effect is bad health. 
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For the economic factors, the variable Pension has a positive effect on retirement 
behaviour, which implies that workers eligible for an occupational pension have a 
higher hazard rate of retirement, but the coefficient is insignificant. Finally, for 
Residence Status, the variable Rural is negatively significant. Rural workers have a 
lower hazard rate of retirement. This is because most rural workers are engaged in 
agricultural work or are self-employed. Their earning capacities and opportunities are 
relatively lower and more spasmodic, and so they need to work longer and retire later. 
A further analysis for gender effects is estimated in Table 4.4.1. Some estimated 
effects of male and female retirement decisions are similar, such as Age groups and 
Health variables. Older people and workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate 
and are more likely to retire. However, other influencing factors of retirement have a 
different effect for men and women. For instance, the Race2, Edu3, and Married 
variables for men show a significantly negative effect on retirement duration, but 
insignificant for women. This implies that male Hakka workers, males with high 
school education and married male workers have a lower hazard rate of retirement. 
Further, the Town and Rural variables for women have a significantly negative effect 
on retirement duration, but insignificant for men. This means that female workers 
living in town and rural areas have a lower hazard rate of retirement. Furthermore, the 
Pension variable for men has a significantly positive effect on retirement, but negative 
effect for women. That is, males with eligible pension have a higher hazard rate, but 
females with eligible pension have a lower hazard rate. In particular, actual sample 
proportions from the 1996 SHLS data, 34.4% of male workers are eligible for a 
pension, but for females only 14.8% have a pension. Thus, the incentives of pension 
for women are stronger than men. 
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Table 4.4.1 Exponential Models without Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .307** (.130) .408* (.241) .364** (158) 
Age3 591*** (.126) 989* * * (.225) .400** (.159) 
Age4 (.141) 1.334*** (.242) 47 ] ** (.190) 
Gender 977*** (.091) - -
Race2 -.181 (.119) . 419** (.203) -.041 (.148) 
Race3 .596*** (.149) .369* (.193) -.011 (.321) 
Race4 -.123 (.311) -.385 (.724) -.150 (.349) 
Edu2 -.002 (.099) -.232 (.162) .136 (.125) 
Edu3 -.267* (.144) . 441* * (.203) .116 (213) 
Edu4 -.486** (.239) -.479 (.296) -.280 (.452) 
Married -.169* (.099) . 3 7 ] * * (.161) -.006 (.126) 
Health .522*** (.086) .677*** (.131) .319*** (.114) 
Pension .011 (.115) .259* (.154) -.652*** (.211) 
Town -.020 (.106) .191 (.155) -.286* (.148) 
Rural - 473*** (.103) -.225 (.156) 71?*** (.136) 
Constant -4.771*** (.186) _4 979*** (.295) -3 596*** (.197) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -1292.152 -592.035 -672.271 
L R chi2 (15) 311.58*** 165.93*** 59.48**" 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < . 10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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4.5.1.2 Case 2: With Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
The main limitation of the SHLS is the lack of data on the interviewees' wages 
and their pension benefits. This section follows Slade (1987) to construct predicted 
earnings and predicted pension income variables in equation (4.15) and equation (4.16) 
respectively. Then these two predicted variables can be added into the hazard function 
(4.7) to observe how lifetime income affects individual retirement decisions as shown 
in Table 4.4.2. 
Table 4.4.2 shows that most estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated 
by the model without predicted variables in Table 4.4.1. For instance, the estimated 
coefficients of Age2, Age3, Age4, Gender, and Health variables have a significantly 
positive effect on retirement duration, and the Married, Town, and Rural variables 
have a significant negative effect. This implies that older workers, female workers, 
and workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate of retirement; and married 
workers, workers who live in town and rural areas have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement. However, the Race3 and Edu4 variables are dropped due to col linearity, 
since they might have some relationship when calculating predicted earnings and 
predicted pension income variables. 
In particular, Table 4.4.2 highlights that the P-Earnings variable is statistically 
significant in the models, in keeping with a priori expectations of a negative effect on 
retirement hazard. An explanation is that higher predicted earnings might induce 
people to work longer and earn more; consequently, they are more likely to continue 
working and have a lower hazard rate of retirement. This is consistent with the results 
reported in Slade (1987), who used data from the Longitudinal Retirement History 
Study (LRHS) to examine the determinants of retirement status and state dependence 
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in the US, and found that predicted earnings had a significant negative effect on 
labour force exit and change in predicted earnings had a significant negative effect. 
Furthermore, Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) also used a predicted earnings variable 
to examine the determinants of individual unemployment duration. Using data from 
the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) in the UK, they found that the 
probability of entering full-time work falls with age, and increases with predicted 
earnings in employment. In particular, they demonstrated a more generalised result 
that the younger groups (aged under 20 and 25 to 34) are likely to have increasing 
earnings, and the middle-aged and old groups (ages 35 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 to 64) 
are likely to have decreasing earnings. Consequently, the estimated result of 
Taiwanese older workers with higher predicted earnings face two opposing effects on 
retirement hazard, since age has a positive link and predicted earnings have a negative 
link. 
On the other hand, Table 4.4.2 also indicates that the P-Pension variable has a 
significant positive effect on retirement hazard. This result highlights that workers 
with higher predicted pension incomes have a higher hazard rate of retirement and are 
more likely to retire. This is consistent with the result reported in Diamond and 
Hausman (1984). However, they focused on social security benefits such as public or 
state pensions rather than occupational pensions, which workers continue receiving 
after 65. Workers with higher predicted pension income had a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. Reduction in pension income caused by early retirement had a small effect. 
In particular, the predicted pension income in Taiwan is only based on occupational 
pensions, and only about 25% of retirees receive this pension benefit at their 
retirement age. However, this is somewhat different from the results reported in Slade 
(1987), who shows that the present values of social security benefits have a significant 
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negative effect on labour force exit, but the change in social security benefits was 
insignificant. This implied that a decrease in benefits would not discourage labour 
force exit by workers, but both effects were small. Hence, workers with higher 
predicted pension income have better economic status and they are more likely to 
retire earlier. 
Finally, the gender effects are estimated in Table 4.4.2. Most estimated effects 
are similar to those estimated by the model without predicted variables as shown in 
Table 4.4.1. For both men and women, older people and workers with poor health 
have a higher hazard rate and are more likely to retire, but rural workers have a lower 
hazard rate and are less likely to retire. In addition, there are some different results for 
gender. For instance, male Hakka workers, married male workers and workers with 
higher predicted earnings have a significantly lower hazard rate of retirement, but this 
is insignificant for females. The Pension variable for men has a significantly positive 
effect on retirement duration, but a negative effect for women. Furthermore, male and 
female workers with higher predicted earnings have a lower hazard rate of retirement 
and are less likely to retire. In the meantime, male workers with higher predicted 
pension incomes have a higher hazard rate of retirement and are more likely to retire, 
and this shows a negative effect for women, but all insignificant for males and 
females. 
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Table 4.4.2 Exponential Models with Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
A gel .307** (.130) .408* (.241) .364** (.158) 
Age3 .547*** (.132) .936*** (.231) .358** (.175) 
Age4 74^*** (.154) 1.238*** (.255) .408* (.219) 
Gender .458*** (.144) - -
Race2 -.181 (.119) -.419** (.203) -.041 (.148) 
Race3 - - -
Race4 -.123 (.311) -.385 (.724) -.150 ( 349) 
Edu2 -.002 (.099) -.232 (.162) .136 (.125) 
Edu3 -.221 (.161) -.326 (.203) .255 (.294) 
Edu4 - - -
Married -. 169* (.099) -.371** (.161) -.006 (.126) 
Health .522*** (.086) .677*** (.131) 2 j 9*** (.114) 
Pension .011 (.115) .259* (.154) -.652*** (.211) 
Town -.211* (.113) .061 (.166) -.303* (.169) 
Rural - 957*** (.153) -.546** (.219) . 7 | 9 * * (.282) 
P-Eamings .034*** (.008) -.022** (.010) -.001 (.017) 
P-Pension 032*** (.011) .016 (.015) -.006 (-023) 
Constant -4 129*** (.283) .4.456*** (.405) -3.410*** (.387) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -1292.152 -592.035 -672.271 
L R chi2(15) 311.58*** 165.93*** 59.48*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. The variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in the 
models. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is LR chi2 (14), respectively. 
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4.5.2 Weibull Models 
The estimations of the Weibull models are tabulated in Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. 
The estimated coefficient /? can reflect the effect on retirement hazard. If / ?>0 , 
the retirement hazard increases. If fl < 0, the retirement hazard decreases. If /? = 0, 
then there is no effect on retirement hazard. Furthermore, the hazard function 
increases in duration if a > 1, decreases if a < 1, and remains constant if a -1. The 
last, equality, is exactly the same as the exponential case. 
4.5.2.1 Case 1: Without Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
For the Weibull model with the hazard function (4.8) lacking predicted earnings 
and predicted pension income variables, most of the parameter values resemble the 
results reported in the exponential model in Table 4.4.1. For the benchmark individual, 
ceteris paribus, the hazard rate of retirement estimates can be derived from the 
Weibull model of 
h(r,xi) = ata-iA = ata-] . e ^ + l o ) 
= 1.5 3 7 * / 0 5 3 7 * exp(-6.456) > exp(-6.456). 
The Weibull model lacks a constant hazard rate of retirement, in particular, 
a = 1.537 >l andl<?<54, which indicates the hazard rate has positive duration 
dependence, > 0. And - ln(l/or) = 0.430, the estimate suggests that the hazard 
dt 
rate is increasing over time. As employment duration gets longer, the hazard rate 
increases and workers are more likely to retire. 
Table 4.5.1 indicates that the estimated coefficients of those in Age2 (aged 55 to 
194 
59), Age3 (aged 60 to 64), and Age4 (aged 65 to 70) are positive and statistically 
significant and have higher hazard rates ceteris paribus (i.e. higher conditional 
retirement rates and hence shorter employment survival times). In the meantime, the 
hazard ratios for age groups are larger than one in the hazard-ratio representation: 
Age2:exp(0.224) = 1.251, Age3: exp(0.424) = 1.528, and Age4:exp(0.642) = 1.900. 
This implies that older people are more likely to retire. Workers in Age2 (aged 55-59) 
are associated with a 25.1% higher hazard rate than Agel (aged 50-54), and Age3 
(aged 60 to 64) with 52.8% and Age4 (aged 65 to 70) with 90% higher hazard rates, 
ceteris paribus. Table 4.5.1 also presents other results in the Weibull model that 
female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers with poor health have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement. In contrast, workers with better education, married workers, 
and workers living in rural areas all have a lower hazard rate of retirement. 
For gender effects, most estimated coefficients in Table 4.5.1 are similar to those 
estimated by the Exponential model shown in Table 4.4.1. For both men and women, 
older people and workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate and are more 
likely to retire, but rural workers have a lower hazard rate and are less likely to retire. 
Moreover, there are some different results for gender. For instance, male Mainlander 
workers have a significantly higher hazard rate of retirement, but insignificant for 
females. The Pension variable has a significantly positive effect on retirement for men, 
but a negative effect for women. In addition, the estimated values of the a 
parameters of men and women are significantly above one, indicating that they all 
have positive duration dependence. In particular, aM - 2.044 and aH. =1.338, 
which indicates that the rate at which the retirement hazard rate of men increases with 
employment duration over time is faster than that of women. 
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Table 4.5.1 Weibull Models without Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .224* (.131) .221 (.242) .326** (.158) 
Age3 424*** (.127) .640*** (.229) .297* (.161) 
Age4 .642*** (.142) 9^7*** (.245) .346* (.191) 
Gender 1 079*** (.091) - -
Race2 -.193 (.119) -.486** (.204) -.031 (.148) 
Race3 .721*** (.149) .540*** (.196) .030 (.320) 
Race4 -.173 (.312) -.460 (.728) -.206 (.350) 
Edu2 -.017 (101) -.249 (.163) .162 (.126) 
Edu3 -.276* (.145) .424** (.206) .116 (.215) 
Edu4 -.521** (.241) -.462 (.301) -.333 (.456) 
Married -.188* (.099) .443*** (.163) -.006 (.126) 
Health .534*** (.086) .673*** (.132) .322*** (.114) 
Pension .012 (.117) .349** (.158) -.720*** (.216) 
Town -.066 (.106) .138 (.156) -.341** (.149) 
Rural -.593*** (.104) -.339** (.157) -.836*** (.139) 
Constant -6.456*** (.250) -8.280*** (.454) -4.566*** (.265) 
/ I n a .430*** (.034) 71 (.052) 29]*** (-045) 
a 1.537*** (.052) 2 044*** (.106) 1.338*** (.060) 
Ma .651*** (.022) .489*** (.025) 747*** (.033) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -1223.892 -518.975 -653.442 
L R chi2 (15) 336.29*** 158.63*** 68.52*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is LR chi2 (14), respectively. 
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4.5.2.2 Case 2: With Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
Table 4.5.2 shows that most estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated 
by the Exponential model with predicted variables shown in Table 4.4.2. The 
estimated coefficients of Age2, Age3, Age4, Gender, and Health variables show 
significantly positive effects on retirement duration, and the Married, Town, and Rural 
variables have significant negative effects. This means that older workers, female 
workers, and workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate of retirement; and 
married workers, workers who live in town and rural areas have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement. 
Table 4.5.2 also highlights that the P-Eamings variable is statistically significant 
in the models, in keeping with a priori expectations of a negative effect on retirement 
hazard. On the other hand, the P-Pension variable has a significant positive effect on 
retirement hazard. A possible reason for this is that higher predicted earnings might 
induce people to work longer and earn more; consequently, they are more likely to 
continue working and have a lower hazard rate of retirement. In contrast, workers 
with higher predicted pension income might have more opportunities to enjoy and 
manage their later life; so they are more likely to make their decision to retire. 
Finally, for the gender effects in Table 4.5.2, most estimated effects are similar to 
those estimated by the Exponential model as shown in Table 4.4.2. In particular, male 
and female workers with higher predicted earnings have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement. Furthermore, male workers with higher predicted pension incomes have a 
higher hazard rate of retirement and are more likely to retire. But the analyses 
reported here did not find a statistically significant response for women. 
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Table 4.5.2 Weibull Models with Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .224* (.131) .221 (.242) .326** (.158) 
Age3 .381*** (.127) .597** (.234) .248 (.177) 
Age4 549*** (.142) .881*** (.256) .272 (.222) 
Gender .456*** (.091) - -
Race2 -.193 (.119) -.486** (.204) -.031 (.148) 
Race3 - - -
Race4 -.173 (.312) -.460 (.728) -.206 (.350) 
Edu2 .017 (.101) -.249 (.163) .162 (.126) 
Edu3 -.253 (.145) -.371* (.204) .267 (.295) 
Edu4 - - -
Married -.188* (.099) . 443*** (.163) -.006 (.126) 
Health 534*** (.086) .673*** (.132) 322*** (.114) 
Pension .012 (.117) 349** (.158) 720*** (.216) 
Town - 291*** (.106) -.036 (.169) -.373** (.170) 
Rural - I 197*** (.104) -.796** (.222) -.878*** (.283) 
P-Earnings . 041 * * * (.008) - 031 * * * (011) -.003 (.017) 
P-Pension .040*** (.011) 029*** (.015) -.004 (.024) 
Constant -5.728*** (.250) -7.684*** (.528) -4.539*** (.429) 
/\n_a .430*** (.034) .715*** (.052) 29|*** (.045) 
a 1 537*** (.052) 2.044*** (.106) 1.338*** (.060) 
\la .651*** (.022) 4g9*** (.025) 747*** (.033) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -1223.892 -518.975 -653.442 
L R chi2 (15) 336.29*** 158.63*** 68.52*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. 
2. The variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in the 
models. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the LR chi2 of male and 
female samples is LR chi2 (14), respectively. 
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4.5.3 Weibull Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
In this section a "frailty" component is included in the model. Frailty is a random 
component designed to account for variability due to unobserved individual-level 
factors that are otherwise unaccounted for by the other predictors in the retirement 
model. In particular, suppose the SHLS data belong to a random sample, the shared 
frailty models can be used for examining the effects of unobserved heterogeneity on 
retirement behaviour. 
4.5.3.1 Case 1: Without Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
The estimated results of the models without predicted variables are shown in 
Table 4.6.1. First, without unobserved heterogeneity, most results are similar to the 
results previously reported in Table 4.5.1. That is, the estimated coefficients of those 
with Age3, Age4, Race3, Health variables are positive and statistically significant and 
have higher hazard rates ceteris paribus. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for 
Edu2, Edu3, Edu4, Married, and Rural variables are significantly negative. The 
estimate for the shape parameter is 1.479 suggesting an increasing hazard over time. 
Second, the frailty in the model is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with 
mean 1 and variance equal to theta(#). The estimate of theta is 0.262. A variance of 
zero (theta = 0) would indicate that the frailty component does not contribute to the 
model. A likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis theta = 0 is shown directly below the 
parameter estimates and indicates a chi-square value of 129.89 with 1 degree of 
freedom yielding a highly significant p-value of 0.000. 
Notice how all the parameter estimates are altered with the inclusion of the 
frailty. The estimate for the shape parameter is now 1.536, different from the estimate 
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1.478 obtained from the model without frailty. The inclusion of frailty not only has an 
impact on the parameter estimates but also complicates their interpretation. The other 
estimated coefficients on the regressors Age2, Age3, Age4, and Race3 are slightly 
larger in magnitude that the corresponding coefficients in the reference model. The 
Weibull distribution shape parameter a is also slightly larger in the frailty model 
than in the reference model: 1.536 and 1.478, respectively. The median duration for 
the person with mean characteristics and the median among the sample as a whole is 
also slightly larger in the shared frailty model than in the reference model: 37.917 
years and 37.674 years, respectively. 
4.5.3.2 Case 2: With Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
The estimated results of the models with predicted variables are shown in Table 
4.6.2. There is negligible unobserved heterogeneity - observe the near-zero frailty 
variances, and the p - valves for the likelihood ratio test equal to one. The 
estimated coefficients on the covariates are almost exactly the same as those in the 
corresponding model without unobserved heterogeneity. The possible reasons include: 
the model with predicted variables might be mis-specified to estimate the degree of 
duration dependence. In particular, most observations have the same predicted 
earnings and predicted pension incomes, they might easily trade off the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity by themselves on retirement behaviour. 
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Table 4.6.1 Frailty Models without Predicted Variables 
Without Unobserved Heterogeneity With Gamma-Hetero geneity 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Age2 .134 (.130) .223* (.130) 
Age3 .336*** (.127) 422*** (.126) 
Age4 543*** (.143) .640*** (.141) 
Race2 -.099 (.119) -.191 (.119) 
Race3 499*** (.151) -j j -7*** (.148) 
Race4 .1473 (.310) -.168 (.311) 
Edu2 -.330*** (.095) .012 (.101) 
Edu3 -.582*** (.139) -.280* (.145) 
Edu4 812*** (.237) -.524** (.240) 
Married - 373*** (.099) -.190* (.098) 
Health 592*** (.085) 534*** (.085) 
Pension -.117 (.115) .010 (.117) 
Town -.150 (.105) -.067 (.105) 
Rural -.675*** (102) - 594*** (.103) 
Constant -5.263*** (.222) -5.770*** (.432) 
/\n_a 29 j *** (.034) 429*** (.033) 
/\n_the -1.338 (.972) 
a 1.478*** (.050) 1.536*** (.050) 
Ma .676*** (.023) .650*** (.021) 
theta .262 (.254) 
No. of subjects 1732 1732 
No. of retirees 610 610 
Log likelihood -1294.315 -1229.368 
LR chi2(14) 195.45*** 171.18*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < . 10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. In particular, Log-likelihood ratio test of theta = 0: chibar2 
(01) = 129.89, Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000. 
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Table 4.6.2 Frailty Models with Predicted Variables 
Without Unobserved Heterogeneity With Gamma-Heterogeneity 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Age2 .224* (.130) .224* (.130) 
Age3 .408*** (.134) .408*** (134) 
Age4 .567*** (.156) .567*** (.156) 
Race2 -.192 (.119) -.192 (.119) 
Race3 - 555*** (.174) -.555*** (.174) 
Race4 -.173 (.311) -.173 (.311) 
Edu2 .017 (100) .017 (100) 
Edu3 - 429*** (.154) -.429*** (154) 
Edu4 - -
Married -.187* (.098) -.187* (.098) 
Health 523*** (.085) .533*** (.085) 
Pension .012 (.117) .012 (.117) 
Town -.436*** (.109) -.436*** (.109) 
Rural -1.640*** (.130) -1.640*** (.130) 
P-Earnings -.070*** (.005) -.070*** (.005) 
P-Pension .078*** (.010) .078*** (.010) 
Constant -5 451 *** (.300) -5.451*** (.300) 
/\n_a 429*** (.033) 429*** (.033) 
l\Vi_the -23.319 (635.147) 
a 1 537*** (-051) 1.537*** (.051) 
\la .650*** (.022) .650*** (.022) 
theta 7.46e-ll (4.74e-08) 
No. of subjects 1732 1732 
No. of retirees 610 610 
Log likelihood -1223.892 - 1223.892 
LR chi2 (15) 336.29*** 1 82.14*** 
Notes: 
1. The Edu4 variable was dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in the models. 
2. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. However, Log-likelihood ratio test of theta = 0: chibar2 (01) 
= 0.00, Prob>=chibar2 = 1.000. 
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4.5.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Compared to the parametric approach, the advantage of the semi-parametric Cox 
model is that it does not make assumptions about hu(t), and it can estimate /?, more 
accurately without the constant distribution. This analysis, first considered by 
Diamond and Hausman (1984), is derived from Cox's (1972) proportional hazard 
model to examine determinants of retirement behaviour and has become increasingly 
popular in labour economics research. 
Recall the Cox proportional hazard model discussed in Section 4.3.2.2, the 
formulated analysis of employment duration data where no parametric form of the 
hazard function is specified, and yet the effects of the covariates are parameterised to 
alter the baseline hazard function (that for which all covariates are equal to zero) in a 
certain way (Cleves et al, 2004). 
hi(t\xi) = h0(t)cxp(j3'xi). (4.12) 
The baseline hazard h0(t) is simply left unparameterised, and through conditioning 
on failure times, estimates of (3 are obtained anyway. The Cox proportional hazard 
model also considers two different cases, including the model (i) without predicted 
earnings and predicted pension income, (ii) with predicted earnings and predicted 
pension income, as explanatory variables. The estimated results are shown in Tables 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2, which not only estimate the coefficients, but also analyse the hazard 
ratio for multivariable records. If the estimated coefficient /? > 0, the hazard rate of 
retirement increases. I f / ? < 0 , the hazard rate of retirement decreases. If /? = 0, then 
there is no effect on the hazard rate of retirement. If the hazard ratio is greater than 
one, it indicates that the Cox hazard is greater than the baseline hazard, and the hazard 
rate of retirement is higher. If the hazard ratio is less than one, the hazard rate of 
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retirement is lower. 
4.5.4.1 Case 1: Without Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
Table 4.7.1a shows that most estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated 
by the Exponential and Weibull models in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.5.1. The Age3 (aged 60 
to 64), Age4 (aged 65 to 70), Gender, Race3 (Mainlander), and Health variables 
present a strong significant and positive effect on retirement. This means that older 
workers, female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers with poor health have a 
higher hazard rate of retirement. In contrast, the Race2 (Hakka), Edu3 (7 to 12 years 
of schooling), Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling), Married, and Rural variables have a 
significant and negative effect on retirement. This means that Hakka workers, workers 
with better education, married workers, and workers living in rural areas have a lower 
hazard rate of retirement. 
The hazard ratio results in Table 4.7.1b give the ratio of a variable against its 
18 
base dummy. The hazard ratio is computed as follows: 
h(t\Xi = O ) = A 0 ( 0 
h(t I x, = 1) = M0exp(# '*,.) = M/)exp(/? ;.') 
where J3i' are the coefficient values. For example, the relevant effect of gender on 
hazard ratio is calculated from Table 4.7.1a as follows: 
h(t\ Gender = 0) = h0(t) 
h{t | Gender = \) = hQ (r) • exp(l. 120). 
Then, the hazard ratio of Gender is exp (1.120) = 3.065. More exactly, these results 
See Cleves et al (2002), Chapter 9. 
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show that if we constrain the hazard rate of females to a multiplicative constant of the 
hazard rate of males, then that multiplicative constant is estimated to be 3.065. 
Furthermore, the hazard ratio of Race3 (Mainlander) isexp (0.802) = 2.230. This 
shows that, holding other variables constant, the estimated hazard rate of Mainlander 
workers retiring compared to that of Fujianese workers is 2.230 times greater. 
Mainlander workers have a higher hazard rate of retiring than Fujianese workers, 
assuming other variables are constant. Other results include: workers with poor health 
have a hazard rate of retiring equal to 1.755 times that of workers in good health. 
However, workers with higher levels of education have a hazard rate of retiring equal 
to 0.604 times that of workers with informal education. Married workers have a 
hazard rate of retiring equal to 0.844 times that of unmarried workers. Finally, rural 
workers have a hazard rate of retiring equal to 0.535 times that of urban workers. This 
suggests that urban workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement than rural 
workers. 
For gender effects, most estimated coefficients and hazard ratios in Tables 4.7.1a 
and 4.7.1b are similar to those estimated by the Exponential and Weibull models in 
Tables 4.4.1 and 4.5.1. For instance, older people and workers with poor health have a 
higher hazard rate and are more likely to retire, but rural workers have a lower hazard 
rate and are less likely to retire. In contrast, there are some different results for gender. 
For example, male Mainlander workers have a significantly higher hazard rate of 
retirement, but this is insignificant for females. The Pension variable for men has a 
significantly positive effect on retirement, but a negative effect for women. 
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Table 4.7.1a Cox Proportional Hazard Models without Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .176 (.131) .168* (.243) .302* (.159) 
Age3 .286** (.130) .445* (.234) .233 (.163) 
Age4 .457*** (.145) .770*** (.248) .193 (.199) 
Gender 1.120*** (.092) - -
Race2 .244** (.120) -.551*** (.206) -.064 (.148) 
Race3 .802*** (.149) .558*** (.196) .085 (.321) 
Race4 -.225 (.311) -.635 (.731) -.259 (.350) 
Edu2 .022 (.102) -.275* (.164) .210 (.128) 
Edu3 -.266* (.147) -.442** (.208) .163 (.219) 
Edu4 -.505** (.241) -.453 (.303) -.323 (-457) 
Married -.169* (.099) -.473*** (.164) .034 (.127) 
Health .562*** (.086) (.133) .358*** (.114) 
Pension .063 (.118) .465*** (.163) - 732*** (.217) 
Town -.075 (.106) .127 (.157) -.348** (.150) 
Rural -.626*** (.104) -.395** (.159) -.862*** (.140) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -3810.248 -1532.121 -1845.918 
LRchi2(15) 337.99*** 158.70*** 72.45*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05 , *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is LR chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 4.7.1b Cox Proportional Hazard Models without Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. 
Age2 1.192 (.156) 1.183 (.288) 1.352* (.215) 
Age3 1.331** (.173) 1.151* (.365) 1.262 (.206) 
Age4 1.579*** (.230) 2.160*** (.535) 1.213 (.241) 
Gender 3.065*** (.281) - -
Race2 .783** (.094) .576*** (.119) .938 (.139) 
Race3 2.230*** (.333) 1.747*** (.342) 1.089 (.350) 
Race4 .798 (.249) .530 (.388) .772 (.270) 
Edu2 1.022 (.104) .759* (.124) 1.233 (.158) 
Edu3 .766* (.113) .643** (.134) 1.177 (.257) 
Edu4 .604** (.146) .635 (.192) .724 (.331) 
Married .844* (.084) .623*** (.102) 1.035 (.131) 
Health 1.755*** (.151) 2.012*** (.268) 1.431*** (.163) 
Pension 1.065 (.126) 1.592*** (.259) .481*** (.104) 
Town .927 (.099) 1.135 (.178) .706** (.106) 
Rural .535*** (.056) .674** (.107) 422*** (.059) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -3810.248 -1532.121 -1845.91 8 
LR chi2 (15) 337.99*** 158.70*** 72.45*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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4.5.4.2 Case 2: With Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
Table 4.7.2a shows that most estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated 
by the Exponential and Weibull models with predicted variables presented in Tables 
4.4.2 and 4.5.2. In particular, the empirical result highlights that the P-Earaings 
variable is statistically significant in the Cox proportional hazard model, in keeping 
with a priori expectations of a negative effect on retirement hazard. This implies that 
workers with higher predicted earnings might be induced to work longer and earn 
more; consequently, they are more likely to continue working and have a lower hazard 
rate of retirement. In contrast, the P-Pension variable has a significant positive effect 
on retirement hazard. This means higher predicted pension income might reduce the 
incentive for people to work longer and reassure them about financial security in later 
life; so they are more likely to retire and have a higher hazard rate of retirement. 
The other estimated coefficients of Age2, Age3, Age4, Gender, and Health 
variables have significantly positive effects on retirement duration, and the Married, 
Town, and Rural variables have significant negative effects. This means that older 
workers, female workers, and workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement; and married workers, and workers who live in town and rural areas have a 
lower hazard rate of retirement. However, the Race3 and Edu4 variables might have 
some collinearity problems for calculating predicted earnings and predicted pension 
income variables and are dropped. 
For gender effects, firstly, Figure 4.1 shows estimated baseline cumulative 
hazard in the Cox proportional hazard model without predicted earnings and predicted 
pension income variables for women and men. The estimated curve of non-baseline 
cumulative hazard for women is higher than the baseline cumulative hazard curve for 
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men. This indicates that female workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement than 
males. Secondly, Figure 4.2 also shows estimated baseline cumulative hazard in the 
Cox proportional hazard model with predicted earnings and predicted pension income 
variables for women and men. The gap between the two estimated curves in Figure 
4.2 gradually decreases and is smaller than the gap in Figure 4.1. This implies that 
people with higher predicted earnings and predicted pension income have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement, particularly for men. 
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Table 4.7.2a Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .176 (.131) .168 (.243) .302* (-159) 
Age3 .250* (.136) .405* (.240) .188 (.179) 
Age4 .370** (.158) .687*** (.259) .123 (.229) 
Gender 43]*** (.143) - -
Race2 -.244** (.120) -.551*** (.206) -.064 (.148) 
Race3 - - -
Race4 -.225 (.311) -.635 (.731) -.259 (.350) 
Edu2 .022 (.102) -.276* (.164) .210 (.128) 
Edu3 -.277* (.163) -.400** (.204) .292 (.296) 
Edu4 - - -
Married -.169* (.099) -.473*** (.164) .034 (.127) 
Health .562*** (.086) (.133) .358*** (.114) 
Pension .063 (.118) 4^5*** (.163) 732*** (.217) 
Town -.321*** (.114) -.051 (.170) -.393** (.172) 
Rural -1.294*** (.155) -.866*** (.222) 948*** (.287) 
P-Earnings - 045*** (.008) -.032*** (.011) -.006 (.017) 
P-Pension .046*** ( O i l ) .030** (.015) -.001 (.024) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -3810.248 -1532.121 -1845.918 
L R chi2 (15) 337 99*** 158.70*** 72.45*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. The variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in the 
models. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 4.7.2b Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Predicted Variables 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Variables Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. 
Age2 1.192 (.157) 1.183 (.288) 1.352* (.215) 
Age3 1.283* (.175) 1.499* (.359) 1.207 (.217) 
Age4 1.448** (.229) 1.987*** (.516) 1.131 (.259) 
Gender 1.539*** (.220) - -
Race2 .783** (.094) .576*** (.119) .938 (.139) 
Race3 - - -
Race4 .799 (.249) .530 (.388) .772 (.270) 
Edu2 1.022 (.104) .759* (.124) 1.233 (.158) 
Edu3 .758* (.123) .670** (.137) 1.339 (.397) 
Edu4 - - -
Married .844* (.084) .623*** (.102) 1.035 (.131) 
Health 1.755*** (.151) 2.013*** (.268) 1.431*** (.163) 
Pension 1.065 (.126) 1 592*** (.259) 4g]*** (.104) 
Town 725*** (.083) .950 (.161) .675** (.116) 
Rural 274*** (043) 42]*** (.094) .388*** (.111) 
P-Earnings 95^*** (.008) 969*** (.010) .994 (.017) 
P-Pension 1.047*** (012) 1.031** (.016) .999 (.024) 
No. of subjects 1732 1059 673 
No. of retirees 610 271 339 
Log likelihood -3810.248 -1532.1 21 -1845.91 8 
L R chi2 (15) 337 99*** 158.70*** 72.45*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant a t * p < . 1 0 , * * p < . 0 5 , * * * p < . 0 1 . 
2. The variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted variables in the 
models. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is LR chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Note: H1 for women and HO for Men 
Figure 4.1 Estimated Cumulative Hazard in the Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
without Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
I i 
0 20 40 60 
t 
H1 HO 
Note: HI for women and HO for Men 
Figure 4.2 Estimated Cumulative Hazard in the Cox Proportional Hazard Models with 
Predicted Earnings and Predicted Pension Income 
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4.6 Discussions 
In general, this chapter uses the continuous-time parametric models to assess 
individual retirement behaviours. The estimated results of three models without 
considering the effect of unobserved heterogeneity are summarised in Table 4.8. Most 
estimated results on these continuous-time hazard models are similar across cases. For 
example, in Case 1 without predicted variables, the Age2 (aged 55 to 59), Age3 (aged 
60 to 64), Age4 (aged 65 to 70), Gender, Race3 (Mainlander), and Health variables 
have positive and significant effects on retirement hazard, which can confirm that 
older workers, female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers with poor health 
have a higher hazard rate of retirement and are more likely to retire. However, the age 
variable is a continuous time parameterisation such that it might be not suitable to use 
as the basis for a grouped hazard. Therefore, the Age2 (aged 55 to 59), Age3 (aged 60 
to 64), and Age4 (aged 65 to 70) variables have a significant effect on retirement 
hazard in the Exponential and Weibull models, but less significant in the Cox 
proportional hazard model. In contrast, the Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling), Edu4 
(13 to 17 years of schooling), Married, and Rural variables have a negative and 
significant effect on labour force withdrawal, which implies that workers with better 
education, married workers, and rural workers have a lower hazard rate of retirement. 
The result of Case 2 highlights that the variable P-Earnings has a significant 
negative effect on retirement hazard, and the P-Pension variable has a positive effect. 
This confirms that if workers expect to have higher predicted earnings, they are less 
likely to retire; in contrast, if they can have higher predicted pension income, they are 
more likely to retire. This result is consistent with the previous empirical studies 
reported by Mitchell and Fields (1981) and Diamond and Hausman (1984). That is, 
higher wages lead to delayed retirement, and higher pension benefits lead to earlier 
213 
retirement. 
Moreover, for unobserved heterogeneity, the empirical result of the frailty model 
without predicted variables can confirm that a model with unobserved heterogeneity 
may improve the model without unobserved heterogeneity in Table 4.6.1. The 
estimated coefficients of Age2, Age3, Age4, and Race3 are slightly larger in 
magnitude that the corresponding coefficients in the reference model. In particular, 
Weibull models without predicted variables have significant positive duration 
dependence across all years, the estimated values of the a parameter being 
significantly above one. Moreover, the a parameter changes from a = 1.537 in 
Table 4.5.1 to a- 1.478 in Table 4.6.1. Therefore, the unobserved heterogeneity 
may deduct a little effect of duration dependence.19 
However, Table 4.6.2 shows the frailty model with predicted variables that the 
estimated coefficients on the covariates are almost exactly the same as those in the 
corresponding model without unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, Weibull models 
with predicted variables also have same estimated values, a = 1.537 in Table 4.5.2 
and Table 4.6.2. The possible reason for the failure to identify unobserved 
heterogeneity in the hazard model is that the predicted variables might not be suitable 
to be explanatory variables for frailty in an employment duration model. In particular, 
since the predicted variables used a smaller sub-sample to predict the whole sample, it 
might be difficult to find the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, ideally the 
study would use the data on real earnings and real pension benefits to find the effects 
of other unobserved heterogeneity in the employment duration model. 
1 9 See, Nolan (2000) uses a grouped hazard approach and concerns with estimating the tendency for 
duration dependence as well. 
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Table 4.8 Estimated Results of Three Models without Frailty: Summary 
Models Exponential Model Weibull Model Cox PH Model 
Duration Case I Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
Age2 -)-** +* + + 
Age3 * +*** +* 
Age4 _)-*** _(_** 
Gender _)_*** 
Race2 - - - - _** _** 
Race3 (-) (-) (-) 
Race4 - - - - - -
Edu2 - - - + + + 
Edu3 . * - .* - . * _* 
Edu4 _** (-) _** (-) _** (-) 
Married .* . * . * . * . * . * 
Health 
Pension + + + + + + 
Town - . * - _*** -
Rural _*** _*** _*** _*** -*** 
P-Earnings _ * * * _*** -*** 
P-Pension -)-*** _|_* * * 
Constant -*** _*** _*** -*** 
/\n_a _)-* * * 
a _!_*#* 
Ma - 1 - * * * 
Note: 
The estimated results of Case 1 are without predicted variables in the three models, but Case 2 with 
predicted variables. The variables of Race3 and Edu4 are dropped due to collinearity with predicted 
variables in the above three models. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the factors that influence retirement behaviour among 
the middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan, using continuous-time hazard models in a 
sample of individuals aged 50 to 70 years. Both the parametric and semi-parametric 
approaches showed that personal, family, employment opportunity, and economic 
factors are important in individual retirement decisions. For instance, older workers, 
female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers with poor health all have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement. In contrast, workers with better education often have higher 
productivity and more employment opportunities, so have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement. For the family factors, married workers have a greater responsibility to 
earn money for their family, so need to retire later. For the employment opportunity, 
rural workers have a lower hazard rate of retirement because opportunities exist for 
them to be self-employed or to easily find low skilled jobs. 
Further, the results highlight the importance of predicted earnings and predicted 
pension income for explaining retirement decisions. In particular, the information in 
this chapter shows that workers with higher predicted earnings have a lower hazard 
rate of retirement, but workers with higher predicted pension income have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement. In particular, the introduction of the 2005 portable pension 
system is likely to lead to an increase in expected pension incomes and workers might 
have a higher hazard rate of retirement. On the one hand, employees have more 
security for their jobs, particularly where there is a higher frequency of labour 
turnover. On the other hand, employers can also find better employees for their firms, 
particularly with higher productivity. 
Finally, for unobserved heterogeneity, the frailty model without predicted 
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variables supports that a model with unobserved heterogeneity may improve the 
model without unobserved heterogeneity. This has some implications for retirement 
decisions. In adopting a Weibull hazard specification, the estimated values of the a 
parameter being significantly above one, and the a parameter become smaller with 
unobserved heterogeneity. That is, the factors of unobserved heterogeneity may 
deduct a little from the effect of duration dependence. Further, for the frailty model 
with predicted variables, the estimated coefficients on the covariates are almost 
exactly the same as those in the corresponding model without unobserved 
heterogeneity. Hence, there is negligible unobserved heterogeneity. The study could 
be improved by incorporating new data on real earnings and pension income variables 
in employment duration models. 
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4.8 Appendix 
The brief STATA commands for analysing the retirement decisions by the 
employment duration models are given as follows: 
Use "C:\Documents and S e t t i n g s X U s e r \ M y DocumentsXRevised 2007 
SummerVSHLS Data 2007\Chapter 4 Data S e t 082007.dta", 
T a b l e 4.2.1 
gen ey= e a r n i n g s 
r e g ey age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 
r e g ey age3-age4 gender r a c e 3 edu3-edu4 r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
p r e d i c t e y h a t i f h i s t o r y ~ = 0 
sum e y h a t 
T a b l e 4.2.2 
t a b f l 7 g 3 c l 
gen peny= income i f f l 7 g 3 c l = = 3 
t a b peny 
r e p l a c e peny=. i f peny==0 
rec o d e peny 1=5 2=20 3=45 4=80 5=150 
tab peny 
reg peny age3-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n 
r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
r e g peny age3-age4 gender r a c e 3 edu3-edu4 r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
p r e d i c t penyhat i f h i s t o r y ~ = 0 
sum penyhat 
T a b l e 4.3 
sum d u r a t i o n c e n s o r agel-age4 gender r a c e l - r a c e 4 edul-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh 
p e n s i o n r e s i d l - r e s i d 3 ey e y h a t peny penyhat i f d u r a t i o n ~ = . & r e s i d ~ = . & 
r a c e ~ = . & e y h a t ~ = . 
T a b l e 4.4.1 
s t r e g age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f e y h a t ~ = . , d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . & gender==0, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
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s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . & gender==l, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
T a b l e 4.4.2 
s t r e g age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f gender==0, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f gender==l, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( e x p o n e n t i a l ) nohr 
T a b l e 4.5.1 
s t r e g age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f e y h a t ~ = . , d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . & gender==0, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . & gender==l, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
T a b l e 4.5.2 
s t r e g age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f gender==0, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f gender==l, d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
T a b l e 4.6.1 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . , d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
i f e y h a t ~ = . , d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr f r a i l t y ( g a m m a ) s h a r e d ( g e n d e r ) 
T a b l e 4.6.2 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f eyhat~=., d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr 
s t r e g age2-age4 r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 r e s i d 3 
e y h a t penyhat i f e y h a t ~ = . , d i s t r i b u t i o n ( w e i b u l l ) nohr f r a i l t y ( g a m m a ) 
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s h a r e d ( g e n d e r ) 
T a b l e 4.7.1a 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f e y h a t ~ = . , nohr 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f eyhat~=.& gender==0, nohr 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f eyhat~=.& gender==l, nohr 
T a b l e 4.7.1b 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f e y h a t ~ = . 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f eyhat~=.& gender==0 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f eyhat~=.& gender==l 
T a b l e 4.7.2a 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat, nohr 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat i f gender==0, nohr 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat i f gender==l, nohr 
T a b l e 4.7.2b 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat i f gender==0 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat i f gender==l 
F i g u r e 4.1 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 i f e y h a t ~ = . , b a s e c h (HO) 
l i n e HO t , c ( J ) s o r t 
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gen Hl=3.065* HO 
l a b e l v a r i a b l e HO HO 
l i n e HI HO _ t , c ( J J ) s o r t 
F i g u r e 4.2 
s t c o x age2-age4 gender r a c e 2 - r a c e 4 edu2-edu4 m a r r i e d poorh p e n s i o n r e s i d 2 
r e s i d 3 e y h a t penyhat i f e y h a t ~ = . , b a s e c h (HO) 
l i n e HO _ t , c ( J ) s o r t 
gen H l = l . 5 3 9 * HO 
l a b e l v a r i a b l e HO HO 
l i n e HI HO t , c ( J J ) s o r t 
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Chapter 5 
Labour Force Transition 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 used cross-sectional data to analyse labour force participation 
and retirement decisions. The results show that personal, family, employment 
opportunity, and economic factors are important for determining individual labour 
force participation and retirement behaviour. However, cross-sectional data analyses 
are not satisfactory because they either assume the values of the explanatory variables 
to be constant with employment duration, or they do not examine retirement decisions 
with the same observations over the interval period (Slade, 1987). To address these 
deficiencies, this chapter uses panel data for analysis that can have time-varying 
covariates and capture individuals' labour force transition and retirement behaviour. 
Previous studies examined the influence of a number of factors on labour force 
transition (LFT) and retirement, such as health, marital status, pension, and others. 
Regarding the impact of changes in health on LFT, Bound et al. (1999) and Disney et 
al. (2003) showed that "health shocks" greatly influenced the LFT of the elderly. 
Considering the impact of marital status on LFT, Hurd (1988), Blau (1998), and Blau 
and Riphahn (1999) showed that marital status is an important factor for joint 
retirement. Since most Taiwanese marry only once, any changes in their marital status 
may significantly affect their participation in the labour market. For instance, Table 
5.1 shows that only a small percentage of the middle aged and elderly were divorced 
or separated. Most people were married and the percentage of those widowed 
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increased with age. The third factor is pension status. Boskin (1977) and Slade (1987) 
noted that pension factors are important determinants of LFT. In Taiwan, most 
occupational pensions are received in a single payment. I f the retirees deposit this 
pension sum in a designated financial institution, they can receive an interest rate as 
high as 18 percent, thus those elderly people are more likely to retire early to take 
advantage of this special law, and then re-enter the labour market. Finally, the impact 
of changes in residence status can also affect employment opportunities and living 
conditions for the elderly. Elderly workers who move from urban to rural areas may 
have a good living environment; those who move from rural to town may have more 
social benefits or employment opportunities. Therefore, this chapter wi l l provide an 
important baseline for gauging changes in the employment pattern of older workers in 
the future as new policies continue to evolve. Which factors affect labour force 
transition behaviour? What is the role of health and "health shocks", marriage and 
"marriage shocks" in their transition decisions? What are the effects o f unobserved 
heterogeneity, or do the characteristics of individuals affect their decisions? 
To examine the above factors, probit models are first used to estimate the 
probability of LFT, including the probabilities of exit from and re-entry into 
employment. Secondly, the duration models in chapter 4 are going to be extended 
with panel data and add time-varying covariates to capture individuals' LFT and 
retirement behaviour. The exit employment probit model observes the sample of those 
who stop working, including unemployment and retirement, while the duration model 
focuses only on the retirement hazard. 
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Table 5.1 Marital Status of the Middle Aged and Elderly in Taiwan 
Unit: % 
Age 
Groups 
Married Spouse 
Deceased 
Divorced or 
Separated 
Single 
50-54 85.3 5.7 6.3 2.7 
55-59 82.9 9.0 6.1 2.0 
60-64 77.9 15.9 5.1 1.1 
65-69 69.5 26.6 3.1 0.8 
70-74 62.3 33.4 3.0 1.3 
75-79 50.0 45.9 1.6 2.5 
80+ 39.3 57.3 1.7 1.7 
Source: Ministry of the Interior (2005), "An Abstract Analysis for the 2005 Survey of Elderly Condition 
in Taiwan ", Department of Statistics, Taiwan (in Chinese). The website address is as follows: 
http://www.moi.eov.tw/stat/index.asD. 
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To illustrate, two waves of the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Middle 
Aged and Elderly in Taiwan (SHLS) between 1996 and 1999 are merged to create a 
multiple data set. This is a random sample of spells with right censoring but the 
censoring point varies. Estimation of continuous time parametric regression models 
incorporating time-varying covariates (hereafter, TVCs) requires episode splitting.' 
One has to split the survival time for each individual into sub-periods within which 
each TVC is constant. Multiple records are created for each individual, with one 
record per sub-period. Since the likelihood is only evaluated at the times at which 
failures occur in the data, the computation only depends on the risk pools at those 
failure times. Changes in covariates between failure times do not affect estimates for 
an ordinary regression model. Thus, to estimate a model with TVCs, all one has to do 
is define the values of these TVCs at all failure times at which a subject was at risk 
(Collett, 1994). Furthermore, considering the effect of unobserved heterogeneity in 
the duration models without or with TVC is also important for estimating the 
determinants of retirement hazard. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
background of LFT, including some recent changes and specific covariates that vary 
with time. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical framework of LFT, including a review 
of related literature and major hypotheses. Section 5.4 devises the empirical 
specification of LFT, including probit and duration models. Section 5.5 describes the 
data sources and variables used in the analysis. The empirical results and discussion 
are presented in Section 5.6, followed by the conclusions in Section 5.7. 
' See Jenkins (2003) for explanation of episode splitting. 
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5.2 Background to Labour Force Transition 
5.2.1 Changes in Labour Force Participation 
According to the SHLS data, Figure 5.1 shows the trends of labour force 
participation rates by men and women working full-time job between 1996 and 1999, 
respectively. The profiles for men are quite similar in showing a sharp drop between 
aged 54 and 59 in the 1996 wave, with a more fluctuating decline after these ages. 
After three years, the transitions from full-time work sharply declined between aged 
57 and 62 in the 1999 wave. Further, the patterns of female labour force participation 
show a sharp decline between aged 50 and 56 in the 1996 wave and a more gradual 
decline after aged 61. However, this trend of female labour force transition is subject 
to more fluctuation after aged 57 in the 1999 wave. The trends in the two waves imply 
that men always have a higher participation rate in full-time work than women, and 
men also have a higher fluctuation rate than women. 
100 
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• - W o m e n in 1996 
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Men in 1999 
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Source: Author graphic using the 1996 and 1999 SHLS survey. 
Figure 5.1 Proportion Rates of Full-Time Work by Age and Gender 
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Figure 5.2 shows the trends in labour force transitions (LFT) by age. Notice that 
there are two peaks for the LFT of continued working, which occur at aged 54 and 57 
respectively. According to the Labour Standards Law (LSL) in Taiwan, a worker who 
is in one of the following categories may apply for voluntary retirement: (1) at the age 
of 55 after working 15 years; (2) after working more than 25 years. When the worker 
reaches aged 60 or when he/she is incapacitated owing to mental defect or physical 
handicap, retirement is mandatory. Hence, after aged 57, the proportion rates of 
transition from continued working gradually decrease. 
Moving to the LFT for workers exiting the labour force shown in Figure 5.2, it 
shows four peaks, at aged 56, 59, 62 and 65 respectively. The first peak of retirement 
is due to the fact that many workers have completed 25 years of employment, a 
condition that presages retirement. The third peak, at aged 62, is the result of the 
mandatory retirement age for non-government workers. This peak is the largest shown 
in the SHLS survey, which contains approximately 70% non-governmental workers. 
The last peak, at aged 65, derives from the mandatory retirement age for government 
employees. 
Regarding the LFT for workers re-entering the labour market, there is a pattern 
of roughly below 5%, especially for the aged 55, 59, 62 and 66. This could be because 
the three peaks of actual retirement age, at the aged 55, 60 and 65 (as previously 
mentioned and shown in Figure 2.5), have created a group of retirees who are still 
capable of continuing work but are retired. Due to their experience and valuable skills, 
they may re-enter the job market after a brief respite at aged 55 to 65 to further their 
career; some may even have switched to different types of work. 
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The trends of not in the labour force in Figure 5.2 show an increasing propensity 
from about 28 percent by aged 53 to 58 percent by aged 61, and to 79 percent by aged 
69. In particular, more than 60 percent of people were not in the labour force after 
aged 65. 
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Source: Author graphic using the 1999 SHLS data. 
Figure 5.2 Trends in Labour Force Transition by Age 
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5.2.2 A Discussion of Time-Varying Covariates 
According to the SHLS data, the effective sample of duration model only had 
1732 observations, including 610 retired and 1122 continuing work in 1996. After 
three years, the effective sample were changed from 1122 people continuing work in 
1996 to 253 people retired, 713 continuing work, 39 unemployed, and 117 missing for 
moved, deaths, or no answer in 1999. Possible reasons include individual and 
socioeconomic factors changed, such as changes in health, marital status, pension 
entitlement, and residence status factors. These factors can be defined as time-varying 
covariates, which may influence individuals' labour force transition and retirement 
behaviour. The details are described as shown in Table 5.2. 
Comparing workers' health between 1996 and 1999, the SHLS data shows that, 
for the effective sample of the duration model in 1996, 20.6% of workers' health was 
excellent, 22.8% good, 32.6% average, 20.7% not so good, and 3.1% poor. Three 
years later, these workers' health had changed: 20.1% of workers' health was 
excellent, 31.1% good, 32.7% average, 14.5% not so good, and 1.6% poor. The 
proportion of workers with not so good and poor health declined rapidly, possibly 
health has been improved by the National Health Insurance (NHI) programmes from 
1995. The other categories remain similar. 
With regard to changes in the marital status of workers between 1996 and 1999, 
in 1996, 84.1% of workers were married, 2.7% not married, 2.3% divorced, 0.7% 
separated, and 10.2% widowed. Three years later, these workers' marital status 
changed slightly, 86.3% of workers were married, 2.3% not married, 2.3% divorced, 
0.5% separated, and 8.6% widowed. The marital status of the workers in the study did 
not change as much as did their health status in the interim between the two surveys. 
229 
Workers' pension entitlements changed 7.8% between 1996 and 1999; 26.7% of 
individuals had pension entitlements in 1996, but after three years workers' pension 
entitlements fell to 18.9% in 1999. This means that a number of the interviewees had 
already received their pensions in the period between the two surveys, because most 
pensions are given in a single payment in Taiwan. 
Finally, workers' residences changed between 1996 and 1999. In 1996, 38.0% of 
workers lived in urban areas, 23.7% in town areas, and 38.3% in rural areas. Three 
years later, in 1999, this had changed, and 35.6% of workers lived in urban areas, 
32.4% in town areas, and 32.0% in rural areas. There is a significant influx of older 
people from rural and urban areas to towns. The main reason the elderly are moving 
from rural areas to towns is probably for convenience, such as access to medical 
treatment. For those moving from urban areas to towns, this could be because of the 
relatively cheaper cost of living there compared to that in urban areas. 
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Table 5.2 Relative Time-Varying Covariates between 1996 and 1999 
Unit: % 
Year 1996 1999 
Effective sample* 1732 966 
Health status 
Excellent 20.6 20.1 
Good 22.8 31.1 
Average 32.6 32.7 
Not so good 20.9 14.5 
Poor 3.1 1.6 
Marital status 
Married 84.1 86.3 
Not married 2.7 2.3 
Divorced 2.3 2.3 
Separated 0.7 0.5 
Widowed 10.2 8.6 
Pension 
Eligible 26.7 18.9 
Otherwise 73.3 81.1 
Residence status 
Urban 38.0 35.6 
Town 23.7 32.4 
Rural 38.3 32.0 
Note: 
1. The 1996 total sample of SHLS data has 2462 observations, including 1072 people working full-time, 
124 working part-time, 246 unemployed, 610 retired, and 410 never worked. The effective sample of 
duration model only has 1732 observations, including 610 retired (event observations) and 1122 
continuing work (right-censored observations). 
2. Further, the effective sample of duration model were changed from 1732 people in 1996 to 966 
observations in 1999 (including 253 people retired and 713 continuing work), 39 unemployed, and 117 
missing for moved, dead, or no answer. 
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5.3 Theoretical Framework of Labour Force Transition 
A large amount of literature is devoted to understanding labour force transition 
patterns in Western industrialised countries. The theoretical framework for these 
studies conceptualises labour force participation as a trade-off between work and 
leisure within the constraints of economic and non-economic factors. Table 5.3 shows 
that previous studies examined how these are influenced by health shocks (see 
Schoenbaum, 1995; Bound et al, 1999; Disney et al, 2003), by marital changes (Hurd, 
1988; Blau, 1998; Blau and Riphahn, 1999), by pension status (Boskin, 1977; Slade, 
1987), or by other factors (Nickell, 1979; Ham and Rea, 1987). 
Probit analysis (Long and Jones, 1980; Slade, 1982) and duration models (Cox, 
1972; Lancaster, 1990; Collett, 1994) are used here to analyse the LFT of the 
middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan. These models consider a number of variables, 
including time-constant and time-varying covariates that pertain to individual 
transitional behaviour. For example, the time-constant covariates include Gender(G,), 
Race (/?,.) , and Education (£,.) variables. The time-varying covariates include 
H e a l t h [ ^ , w ( / ) ] , Marital Status[^, M ( / ) ] , Pension[X? ( / ) ] , and Res idence[^(z) ] 
variables. The Age (A t ) variable might belong to one of the time-varying covariates, 
but everyone has the same natural increasing process for age in the different periods. 
Hence, this study would assume the Age variable is one of the time-constant 
covariates. The general model takes the form 
L] = L[A,, G,,R,,E,,X? (/), X? (t), AT( / ) ,X\ (/)] ( 5 ] ) 
i = 1,2,--•,/?. 
where n is the total number of observations. Each of these factors is discussed in 
detail, particularly the time-varying covariates. Four different transition factors at 
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varying times, including Health, Marital Status, eligibility for a Pension, and 
Residence Status are considered to examine the decisions involved in LFT behaviour. 
First, the relationship between Health and LFT is a dynamic process that can best 
be examined longitudinally. Health declines with age and this may require adaptation 
or cessation of work activities. For example, Schoenbaum (1995) used the Taiwan 
SHLS data to test the effect of health on LFT among the elderly using four different 
measures.2 He concluded that health is a major determinant of LFT, regardless of 
how it is measured. Individuals in poor health are significantly more likely to retire 
than people in good health. Bound et al. (1999) used the US Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS) data to analyse the dynamic effect of health on LFT, including labour 
force exit, job change and application for disability insurance. Specifically, they 
examined how the timing of health shocks affects LFT. Thus, they concluded that not 
just poor health, but also declining health, can help explain retirement behaviour. 
Disney et al. (2003) applied the analysis from Bound et al. (1999) and used the British 
Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1998 to examine the role of i l l health in 
retirement decisions in the UK. They found that individual health shocks are an 
important predictor of individual retirement behaviour. In summary, health shocks are 
an important consideration in retirement behaviour. 
Second, the relationship between Marital Status and retirement decision is 
attracting growing attention in the field of LFT studies. For example, Hurd (1988) 
examined joint retirement behaviour in the US New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) data 
2 The four types o f health measures considered in his paper include: (1) a summary measure o f 
limitations on activities o f daily living ( A D L ) , such as shopping and l i f t ing; (2) a summary measure o f 
health conditions, such as stroke and dizziness; (3) a summary measure o f mood and depression using 
the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) that can measure how people have 
been feeling in the past week; and (4) health indices, such as crude birth rate, crude death rate, life 
expectancy at birth (years) constructed using an instrumental variables framework. 
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and found a relatively high incidence of such behaviour. Blau (1998) analysed the 
dynamics of joint labour force behaviour of older couples in the United States. He 
used data from an 11-year longitudinal sample of men and unmarried women who 
were aged 58-63 in 1969 by the Retirement History Survey (RHS), and applied 
Hurd's (1988) results on the incidence of joint retirement to examine the determinants 
of joint retirement. He suggested any policy that increased the incentive for one 
member of a married couple to retire would have an additional effect on the LFT of 
the other spouse. Furthermore, Blau and Riphahn (1999) extended this analysis and 
used the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data to examine the labour force 
behaviour of older married couples in Germany. They found that the probability of 
one spouse's retirement was much larger i f the other spouse was not employed than i f 
the other spouse was employed, and an unemployed member of a couple was much 
more likely to enter employment i f the spouse was employed. 
Third, social security or Pension benefits are important determinants of 
retirement among the elderly (see Quinn, 1977; Gordon and Blinder, 1980; Gustman 
and Steinmeier, 1982; Lazear, 1986; Slade, 1987). Previous studies have found that 
eligibility for a social security benefit or pension is associated with earlier retirement. 
In particular, Slade (1987) examined the role of state dependence in explaining 
retirement status among older males in the US. He used data from a 2-year 
longitudinal sample of men aged 58 to 62 collected in 1969 by the US Retirement 
History Study (RHS). He found that the level of the present value of social security 
benefits had a negative and significant effect on retirement and private pension 
eligibility had a positive and significant effect on retirement. However, as noted 
previously, Taiwan's pension system is different from those in Western industrialised 
countries. The government does not provide public or state pensions for the elderly; 
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instead, they focus on compulsory occupational pensions for employees working in 
government or for large companies. Therefore, Chapter 3 noted that the pre-condition 
of being eligible for a pension provides a strong incentive for people to participate in 
work. Chapter 4 also stated that workers eligible for a pension have a higher hazard 
rate of retirement. This chapter further tests the effects of workers' pension status 
change from eligible to ineligible. For instance, Table 5.2 shows that the proportion of 
workers eligible for a pension decreased from 26.7% in 1996 to 18.9% in 1999. In 
particular, most occupational pension benefits in Taiwan are paid in a single payment 
on retirement, and the retirees can receive a higher interest rate from their retirement 
payments. 
Finally, other aspects such as employment opportunity, the level of physical 
demands, and type of skills and training required can affect workers' Residence Status 
and ability to adapt to changing LFT. For example, Nickell (1979) estimated the 
probability of leaving unemployment and used the database of unemployed males 
from the 1972 General Household Survey (GHS) in Britain. He examined the impact 
of local labour demand and how this changes over the course of an unemployment 
spell. Ham and Rea (1987) analysed the hazard rate of unemployment using micro 
data from the Canadian Employment and Immigration Longitudinal Labour Force File 
for the period 1975-1980. They examined the effect of provincial unemployment 
rates on expected unemployment duration. This chapter follows these ideas and 
investigates how a change in workers' residence status affects LFT. Table 5.2 shows 
that the proportion of workers living in town areas increased from 23.7% in 1996 to 
32.4% in 1999, and the proportions of workers living in urban and rural areas both 
decreased during the same period. So, residence status might also be able to influence 
individual retirement behaviour. 
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Table 5.3 Literature Review of Labour Force Transition 
Authors Data Source Models Key Findings 
1. Health Status: 
Schoenbaum (1995) Survey o f Health and Living Status o f the 
Middle Aged and Elderly in Taiwan 
(SHLS). 
Used discrete model to examine the effect 
o f health on LFT among the elderly by four 
different measures. 
Health is a major determinant o f LFT, regardless of how it is 
measured. Individuals in poor health are significantly more 
likely to retire than people in good health. 
Bound, Schoenbaum, 
Stinebrickner, and 
Waidmann (1999) 
US Longitudinal Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS). 
Used multinomial models to analyse the 
dynamic relationship between health status 
and labour force transitions. 
Health is a very important determinant o f labour force patterns 
for older men and women. 
Disney, Emmerson, and 
Wakefield (2003) 
First eight waves o f the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 
1991 to 1998. 
Used ordered probit model to examine the 
role o f i l l health in retirement decisions in 
Britain. 
Found that adverse individual health problems are an important 
predictor o f individual retirement decisions. 
2. Marital Status: 
Hurd(1988) US New Beneficiary Survey (NBS). Used models o f retirement age to examine 
the determinants o f joint retirement. 
The results supported the idea that retirement o f husbands and 
wives is a joint process. 
Blau(1998) US Retirement History Survey (RHS). Used discrete choice model to examine the 
determinants o f joint retirement and the 
effect o f one spouse's labour force status on 
the labour force transitions o f the other 
spouse. 
The results revealed strong associations between the labour 
force transition probabilities of one spouse and the labour force 
status of the other spouse. 
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Blau and Riphahn (1999) German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). 
Used discrete time variant o f competing 
risks hazard model to estimate labour force 
transition probabilities. 
The probability o f one spouse exiting employment was much 
larger i f the other spouse was not employed than i f the other 
spouse was employed. 
3. Pension Status: 
Boskin(1977) US 1968-1972 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics 
Used multi-nominal logistic model to 
estimate the probability o f retirement 
behaviours. 
Found that two key policy parameters of the social security 
system, including the income guarantee and the implicit tax on 
earnings, exert an enormous influence on retirement decisions. 
Slade (1987) US 1969-1971 Longitudinal Retirement 
History Study (RHS). 
Used retirement transition model to 
examine the role o f state dependence in 
explaining the retirement status o f older 
men. 
State dependence is empirically important when there is 
considerable variation in the work sequence, as is the case after 
normal working years and before permanent retirement. 
4. Other Factors: 
Nickell (1979) U K 1970 General Household Survey 
(GHS) 
Used duration model with cross-section 
data to investigate a number o f questions 
concerning unemployment duration. 
The expected duration is significantly influenced by the 
replacement ratio with an elasticity o f about unity. The impact 
o f benefit levels on the conditional probability o f obtaining 
work is significant for the first 20 weeks. 
Ham and Rea(1987) Canadian 1975-1980 Employment and 
Immigration Longitudinal Labour Force 
File (EILLFF) 
Used unemployment duration model to 
examine the influencing factors on the 
probability o f leaving unemployment. 
Entitlement provisions in the unemployment insurance 
programmes and demand conditions are found to have a 
significant effect on the probability o f leaving unemployment. 
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5.4 Empirical Specifications 
The traditional approach to analysing labour force behaviour is based on the 
individual labour supply model. In this model behaviour is determined by 
maximisation of a single utility function subject to their budget constraint in which 
income is pooled (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). This approach has obvious 
limitations that have been widely noted: the individuals may have different 
preferences, making it difficult to justify their preferences; and they may have 
different outside opportunities, making it difficult to justify pooling income (Blau and 
Riphahn, 1999). This section specifies two econometric models, including probit and 
duration models, to examine the decisions to exit employment, re-enter employment, 
and retire. Due to the limitation of SHLS data, the specification only allows for the 
possibility that income is not pooled, and does not assume that the parameters of the 
models can be interpreted as preference parameters. 
5.4.1 Probit Analysis 
The first approach follows Long and Jones (1980) and Slade (1982, 1987) and 
uses Maximum-likelihood probit estimates to examine the labour force transition 
(LFT) equations, including exit and re-entry in the labour market. Each person-year is 
treated as a distinct observation and the probability of LFT can be defined for an 
individual /' of labour force participation. For instance, the empirical specifications 
of exit by probit analysis are described as follows. 
According to the description in Chapter 2, reasons for stopping working at last 
job include: (1) reached mandatory retirement age; (2) health problems, could not 
continue working; (3) work didn't suit, wanted to change work environment; (4) 
company layoffs or relocation, was let go; (5) business failed, poor economy, profits 
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too low; (6) unhappy with income, wanted to earn more; (7) family reasons: got 
married or to take care of children. Terms (1), (2), and (7) can be defined as retirement, 
and terms (3) to (6) belong to unemployment. Hence, the dependent variable of the 
labour force exit equation equals one i f the individual worked in 1996 but did not 
work in 1999 and can be defined as 
f] if individual worked in 1996 and did not work in 1999, 
Exit = \ J (5.1) 
10 if otherwise. 
Then, the dependent variables can be written as a latent variable model 
; ; * = / ? X , + v , , . (5.2) 
11 ' / yl > o> for exit. . , ^ 
where \ J / " / , i = \,...,N, t = \,...Jr 
[0 lj otherwise, jor non-exit. 
i is the individual and / is the time subscript. The set of parameters, J3, captures 
the effect of the vector of explanatory variables, Xit on the labour force exit decision. 
The error term, vit , is an independent realisation of a random variable with 
cumulative distribution function <!>(•). The probability of labour force exit can thus 
be written as 
P{y„ =V = P(yl >0) = ( D ( / ? X ) - (5-3) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are obtained by maximising the 
following likelihood function. In its general form, the likelihood function can be 
written as 
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w i x.„)=nn^xr [i -wx)]' 
1=1 <=i 
(5-4) 
Taking logs to obtain the Log-Likelihood function as follows. 
In L(P' | I , , ) = n n {y„ • In H>(fi'Xu) + (1 - yu) • ln[l - $ ( / ? X , ) J . (5.5) 
A 
The solution for maximum likelihood is obtained when the parameter value of /? is 
obtained by a sequence of iterative processes on the log-likelihood function (5.5). The 
A A 
values of (3 correspond to the maximum log-likelihood by finding parameters (3. 
5.4.2 Duration Analysis 
The second approach follows Blau (1998) and Blau and Riphahn (1999) and uses 
duration models to examine the determinants of retirement behaviour. Recalling the 
exponential model in Chapter 4, the hazard function of employment duration is 
specified as 
h((\Xi) = A = e^+^\ (4.7) 
And from the Weibull model in Chapter 4, the hazard function is defined to be 
h(t\xi) = at"~i -A=ata-] .e(M""\ (4.8) 
When the model adds time-varying covariates (TVCs) to the set of factors 
3 To solve models o f these forms via Maximum Likelihood requires solution o f first-order condition. 
The parameters that maximise the general log likelihood (5.5) are required for the probit model. 
N T, 
dp t r t rw * ( f ) - [ i -<&(/?* , , ) ] 
240 
determining labour force transition behaviour, the exponential function exp(/?.*,.) is 
the relative hazard function, and a non-negative function of covariates x, . By 
generalising this model to situations in which some explanatory variables are 
time-dependent, xit, a vector of explanatory variables can be written with unknown 
coefficients /?. First, the exponential regression model becomes 
h(t\xi,xi,) = A = e^+P!X'^'\ (5.6) 
Second, the Weibull regression model becomes 
h(t\x„ xi,) = at°-]-A = ata-] . e t A + A j f i + / f c * ) . (5.7) 
Furthermore, i f considering the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, the Weibull model 
becomes 
h(t | X.,, x , , u) = ata~] • A = at°'] • e ^ ^ M ( 5 8 ) 
where w is an / individual's unobserved heterogeneity term. 
Third, the Cox model is also used to examine the determinants of retirement 
behaviour. In particular, the Cox hazard model might not be an appropriate 
proportional hazard model now. For instance, recalling the Cox proportional hazard 
model from Chapter 4, the retirement hazard at time of t for the /'* individuals in a 
study can be specified as: 
hi(t\xi) = h0(t)txp(^xi) (4.12) 
where h0(t)is the baseline hazard function, and depends on / . I t summarises the 
pattern of "duration dependence" common to all people. The exponential function 
exp(/? x,) is the relative hazard function, and a non-negative function of covariates 
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xj. By generalising this model to situations in which some explanatory variables are 
time-dependent, xh, a vector of explanatory variables can be written with unknown 
coefficients f3 and the Cox regression model becomes 
h{t\x.„ xu) = //0(/)exp(/? x,. + /?"*,,). (5-9) 
In this model, the baseline hazard function h0(t) is interpreted as the hazard function 
of retirement for an individual for whom all the variables are zero at the time of origin 
and remain at the same time value. It is important to note that the values of the 
variables xit in (5.9) depend on the t ime/, which implies that the relative hazard 
h(( |x„ )//7 0(/) is also time dependent. This means that the hazard of retirement at 
time / is no longer proportional to the baseline hazard. As a result, model (5.9) is no 
longer a proportional hazard model. I f we take the natural logarithm, the hazard rate 
of retirement becomes: 
\nhi(t) = h0(t) + Jjb]xIJ + £b,.xjt) 
j=l r=p+l 
(5.10) 
Time-varying Cnvarialcs 
where n is the total number of observations, and k is the total number of variables, 
including the number of time-constant covariates p and the number of time-varying 
covariates (k-p). In /7, (/) represents the natural logarithm of the hazard rate of 
p 
retirement, h0(t) is the constant hazard baseline, is the effect of the 
time-constant covariates (in the case, taken at the time of the 1999 survey), and 
Is 
^ flrxjr(t) is the effect of the time-varying covariates. 
r~p+\ 
For instance, assume that, for a person / , d represents the duration in 
employment before 1996. I f t < d and health status is 1, that represents health which 
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is excellent before retirement. I f / > d and health status is 5, that represents workers 
being in poor health which may increase their hazard rate of retirement. 
x!'(() = 
\\ if t<d 
15 if t> d. 
(5.11) 
Recall that the log-likelihood contribution for person / in the data structure is 
lnL,=c , ln[A(7; ) ] + ln[S(7;)]. (5.12) 
where i's observed survival time is Ti and the censoring indicator c, = 1 i f i's 
spell is complete (transition observed) and 0 i f the spell is censored. But 
ln[s(r,)] = ln S(d) 
S{d) 
= \n[s(d)]+ln 'S(T,)' 
S(d)i 
(5.13) 
Thus the log of probability of survival until T = (log of the probability of survival to 
timed) + (log of the probability of survival to time 7 ,^ conditional on entry atd). 
Table 5.4 presents the example of episode splitting. Here the multiple data record 
withe, = 0 , t-d (a right censored episode), plus one new record with "delayed 
entry" at time d and censoring indicator ci, has the same value as the original data. 
In the first episode and record, the time-varying covariate (TVC) takes on the value 
X, and the second record the TVC takes on the value X, 1 2 • 
243 
Table 5.4 Example of Episode Splitting 
Data Set Censoring Entry Survival Time-Varying 
Indicator Time Time Covariates 
Single Data Record for / 
1996 Data Set c, = 1 or 0 0 T, -
Multiple Data Records for / 
1996 Data Set c , = 0 0 d 
1999 Data Set c, = 1 or 0 d *2 
Note: 
See Jenkins, S. P. (2003). "Stata Programmes for Survival Analysis." Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, University o f Essex. 
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5.5 Data Description 
This chapter uses data from the second panel of the SHLS survey in 1996 and 
1999. Before estimating the LFT data with the probit model and duration model, the 
different data sets are constructed for these two models. The sample utilised in the 
probit model contains workers who changed employment status: those who exited 
employment or re-entered the labour market between 1996 and 1999. By contrast, the 
sample utilised in the duration models examines the hazard rate of retirement. 
5.5.1 Probit Analysis 
In the probit analysis, two dependent variables are defined as in Section 5.4.1, 
including exit and re-entry variables. Explanatory variables are as follows: The Age 
groups include Agel (aged 53 to 57), Age2 (aged 58 to 62), Age3 (aged 63 to 67), and 
Age4 (aged 68 to 73) in 1999. Next, the Gender variable is coded 1 for women and 0 
for men. The Race variable can be separated into four groups, namely Racel 
(Fujianese), Race2 (Hakka), Race3 (Mainlander), and Race4 (Aboriginal). The 
Education variable is years of schooling, namely Edul (Informal: 0 years of 
schooling), Edu2 (Primary School: 1 to 6 years of schooling), Edu3 (Junior and 
Senior High School: 7 to 12 years of schooling) and Edu4 (College and University: 13 
to 17 years o f schooling). On the other hand, some covariates indicate 1996 values 
(referred to here as "prior" variables). For instance, the Health variable is coded 1 for 
poor health, including "not so good" and "poor" health, and 0 for otherwise. The 
Marital Status variable is coded 1 for married and 0 for otherwise. The eligibility for a 
pension is coded 1 for those eligible and 0 otherwise. The Residence status includes 
workers living in urban, town and rural areas. 
Furthermore, the other covariates prefixed by " A " denote the change in value 
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between 1996 and 1999, such as AHealth, AMarital, ATown, and bRural. The 
^Health variable shows the worker's health becomes poorer. For example, the 
values of the health index include 1 (excellent), 2 (good), 3 (average), 4 (not so good), 
and 5 (poor). I f the 1999 value of the health index minus the 1996 value is larger than 
zero, this means that worker's health becomes poorer. The ^.Marital variable 
represents marital status changes from married in 1996 to unmarried in 1999. 
However, most of the middle aged and elderly only married once. This might affect 
their LFT behaviour directly. The ATown variable shows the worker moves from 
town to non-town areas. The ARural variable represents the worker moving from 
rural to non-rural areas. The ful l definitions of the variables by exit and re-entry cases 
and summary statistics are given in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. 
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Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Exit Case 
Variables Description Mean Std. Err. 
Exit 
AGE1 
AGE2 
AGE3 
AGE4 
GENDER 
RACE1 
RACE2 
RACE3 
RACE4 
EDU1 
EDU2 
EDU3 
EDU4 
PENSION 
HEALTH 
MARRIED 
1 = Individual worked in 1996 and did .278 (.448) 
not work in 1999, 0 = Otherwise. 
1 = Aged 53 to 57, .387 (.487) 
Otherwise. 
Aged 58 to 62, .344 (.475) 
Otherwise. 
Aged 63 to 67, .210 (.407) 
Otherwise. 
Aged 68 to 73, .059 (.236) 
Otherwise. 
Female, .310 (.463) 
Male. 
Fujianese, .720 (.449) 
Otherwise. 
Hakka, .197 (.398) 
Otherwise. 
Mainlander, .067 (.251) 
Otherwise. 
Aboriginal, .016 (.126) 
Otherwise. 
Informal education, .213 (.409) 
Otherwise. 
1 to 6 years of schooling, .481 (.499) 
Otherwise. 
7 to 12 years of schooling, .220 (.415) 
Otherwise. 
1 = 13 to 17 years of schooling, .085 (.279) 
0 = Otherwise. 
1 = Eligible for a pension, . 196 (.397) 
0 = Otherwise. 
1 = Poor health in 1996, . 147 (.354) 
0 = Otherwise. 
1 = Married in 1996, .874 (.332) 
0 = Otherwise. 
0 = ' 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 = 
0 = 
1 • 
0 = 
1 : 
0 = 
1 = 
0: 
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TOWN 1 = Living in town in 1996, .219 (.414) 
0 = Otherwise. 
RURAL 1 = Living in rural in 1996, .412 (.492) 
0 = Otherwise. 
AHEALTH 1 = Health status become poorer from .326 (.469) 
1996 to 1999, 0 = Otherwise. 
A MARRIED 1 = Marital status changed from married .022 (.146) 
in 1996 to unmarried in 1999, 0 = 
Otherwise. 
A TOWN ] = Residence status changed from town .062 (.241) 
in 1996 to non-town areas in 1999, 0 
= Otherwise. 
A RURAL 1 = Residence status changed from rural .129 (.336) 
in 1996 to non-rural areas 1999, 0 = 
Otherwise. 
Note: 
According to the 1999 SHLS data, the overall exit sample has 1053 observations. 
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Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Re-entry Case 
Variables Description Mean Std. Err. 
RE-ENTRY 1 = Individual did not work in 1996 and .071 
worked in 1999, 0 = Otherwise. 
AGE1 1 = Aged 53 to 57, .170 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE2 1 = Aged 58 to 62, .295 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE3 1 = Aged 63 to 67, .340 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE4 1 = Aged 68 to 73, .195 
0 = Otherwise. 
GENDER 1 = Female, .558 
0 = Male. 
RACE1 1 = Fujianese, .732 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE2 l=Hakka, .143 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE3 1 = Mainlander, .109 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE4 1 = Aboriginal, .016 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU1 1 = Informal education, .332 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU2 1 = 1 to 6 years of schooling, .449 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU3 1 = 7 to 12 years of schooling, .171 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU4 1= 13 to 17 years of schooling, .048 
0 = Otherwise. 
PENSION 1 = Eligible in 1996, .269 
0 = Otherwise. 
HEALTH 1 = Poor health in 1996, .339 
0 = Otherwise. 
MARRIED 1 = Married in 1996, .793 
0 = Otherwise. 
(.257) 
(-376) 
(.456) 
(.474) 
(.396) 
(.497) 
(.443) 
(.350) 
(312) 
(.124) 
(.471) 
(.498) 
(.377) 
(.214) 
(.443) 
(.474) 
(.405) 
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TOWN 1 = Living in town in 1996, .239 (.427) 
0 = Otherwise. 
RURAL 1 = Living in rural in 1996, .356 (.479) 
0 = Otherwise. 
AHEALTH 1 = Health status become poorer from .293 (.456) 
1996 to 1999, 0 = Otherwise. 
A MARRIED 1 = Marital status changed from married .045 (.208) 
in 1996 to unmarried in 1999, 0 = 
Otherwise. 
A TOWN 1 = Residence status changed from town .071 (.257) 
in 1996 to non-town areas in 1999, 0 
= Otherwise. 
ARURAL 1 = Residence status changed from rural .123 (.329) 
in 1996 to non-rural areas 1999, 0 = 
Otherwise. 
Note: 
According to the 1999 SHLS data, the overall re-entry sample has 706 observations. 
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5.5.2 Duration Analysis 
The sample utilised in the duration analysis is different from the sample used in 
the previous analysis of exit from employment. The dependent variable is defined as 
the time of duration in employment. First, Table 5.7.1 shows the descriptive statistics 
of variables by cross-sectional data, the effective sample has 966 observations in 
1999. 
Second, Table 5.7.2 shows the descriptive statistics of variables by panel data. 
In particular, data from two waves of the second panel of SHLS survey data are 
merged to create a multiple data set by 1996 and 1999. The multiple data sets can be 
created in STATA.4 The effective sample decreases from 966 (including 253 retirees, 
and 713 continuing work) to 915 observations (including 202 retirees, and 713 
continuing work), and 51 retired observations missing for calculation by episode 
splitting. The average employment duration changes from 23.975 years by duration 
model with the 1999 cross-sectional data to 23.519 years by duration model with 
panel data between 1996 and 1999. The dependent variable is employment duration, 
and the explanatory variables are the same as those used in the previous models. In 
particular, for time-varying covariates such as health status, consider as an example 
the first observation records of all the information on the ID = 40'h worker, who 
retired after 33 years employment, when health changed from 1 (excellent) to 5 
(poor). 
Observation 
Period 
ID Entry 
Time 
Duration 
Employment 
Retired X«(0 
1996-1999 40 th 30 33 1 5 
4 See 5.8 Appendix. 
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Now suppose the data on this particular worker looked like this, 
Observation 
Period 
ID Entry 
Time 
Duration 
Employment 
Retired 
1996-1997 40 t h 30 31 0 I 
1997-1999 40 th 31 33 1 5 
There are now two observations on this worker; these summarize the experiences 
of the worker over employment duration intervals[30,31) and[31,33]. Note that for 
the first observation Retired = 0 as the worker did not retire at employment duration 
of 31 years. So assume that the covariates did not change at employment duration of 
31 years. These two observations for ID = 40lh worker record exactly the same 
information as the single observation did earlier. Continuing in this manner, when 
precisely health status changed, worker would make his/her decision to retire between 
1998 and 1999. Therefore, workers being in poor health may increase their hazard rate 
of retirement. 
Observation 
Period 
ID Entry 
Time 
Duration 
Employment 
Retired Kit) 
1996-1998 40 th 30 32 0 1 
1998-1999 40 th 32 33 1 5 
The descriptive statistics of the sample with panel data and summary statistics 
are given in Table 5.7.2. In this way, comment could have been included to the effect 
that the two sets of descriptive statistics in Table 5.7.1 and Table 5.7.2 are really very 
similar. 
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Table 5.7.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables: Cross-Sectional Data 
Variables Description Mean Std. Err. 
DURATION 1-55 years. 23.975 (14.540) 
CENSOR 1 = Uncensored, 
0 = Censored. 
AGE1 l = Aged53to57, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE2 1 = Aged 58 to 62, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE3 1 = Aged 63 to 67, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE4 1 = Aged 68 to 73, 
0 = Otherwise. 
GENDER 1 = Female, 
0 = Male. 
RACE1 1 = Fujianese, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE2 1 = Hakka, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE3 1 = Mainlander, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE4 1 = Aboriginal, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU1 1 = Informal education, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU2 1 = 1 to 6 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU3 1 = 7 to 12 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU4 1 = 13 to 17 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
HEALTH 1 = Poor health, 
0 = Otherwise. 
MARRIED 1 = Married, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.262 
.394 
.348 
.201 
.057 
.295 
.728 
.192 
.066 
.014 
.208 
.482 
.223 
.087 
.161 
.863 
(.440) 
(.489) 
(.477) 
(.401) 
(.232) 
(.456) 
(.445) 
(.394) 
(.249) 
(.120) 
(.406) 
(.499) 
(.416) 
(.282) 
(.368) 
(.344) 
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PENSION 1 = Eligible, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.189 (.392) 
URBAN 1 = Living in urban areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.356 (.479) 
TOWN 1 = Living in town areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.324 (.468) 
RURAL 1 = Living in rural areas, 
0 = Otherwise. 
.320 (.467) 
Note: 
According to the 1999 SHLS data, the effective sample of duration model has 966 observations, 
including 253 retirees (event observations) and 713 continuing work (right-censored observations). 
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Table 5.7.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables: Panel Data 
Variables Description Mean Std. Err. 
DURATION 1-55 years. 
CENSOR 1 = Uncensored, 
0 = Censored. 
AGE1 1 = Aged 53 to 57, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE2 1 = Aged 58 to 62, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE3 1 - Aged 63 to 67, 
0 = Otherwise. 
AGE4 1 = Aged 68 to 73, 
0 = Otherwise. 
GENDER 1 = Female, 
0 = Male. 
RACE1 1 = Fujianese, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE2 1 = Hakka, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE3 1 = Mainlander, 
0 = Otherwise. 
RACE4 I = Aboriginal, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU1 1 = Informal education, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU2 1 = 1 to 6 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU3 1 = 7 to 12 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
EDU4 1 = 13 to 17 years of schooling, 
0 = Otherwise. 
HEALTH 1 = Poor health, 
0 = Otherwise. 
MARRIED 1 = Married, 
0 = Otherwise. 
PENSION 1 = Eligible, 
0 = Otherwise. 
23.519 
.354 
.380 
.351 
.207 
.063 
.310 
.727 
.184 
.075 
.014 
.216 
.482 
.219 
.083 
.165 
.861 
.201 
(14.608) 
(.478) 
(.485) 
(.478) 
(.405) 
(.242) 
(.463) 
(.446) 
(.388) 
(.264) 
(.116) 
(.411) 
(.499) 
(.414) 
(.277) 
(.371) 
(.346) 
(.401) 
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URBAN 1 = Living in urban areas, .358 (.479) 
0 = Otherwise. 
TOWN 1 = Living in town areas, .316 (.465) 
0 = Otherwise. 
RURAL 1 = Living in rural areas, .321 (.467) 
0 = Otherwise. 
Note: 
As the model using panel data between 1996 and 1999, the effective sample becomes to 915 
observations, including 202 retirees, and 713 continuing work. The details are discussed in page 251. 
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5.6 Empirical Results and Discussions 
This section first uses probit analysis to estimate the probabilities of exit from 
employment and of re-entering the labour market between 1996 and 1999. The second 
subsection uses duration analysis to estimate the hazard rate of retirement with the 
1999 cross-sectional data and the panel data between 1996 and 1999. These two 
analyses also show the empirical transition behaviours for men and women, 
respectively. 
5.6.1 Probit Analysis 
5.6.1.1 Transitions from Work to Non-work 
The estimated result indicates that i f (3i > 0 , the probability of exiting 
employment will increase. I f ft <0 , then the probability of exiting employment will 
decrease. I f (3l. = 0, there is no effect on the probability of exiting employment. 
Note that the estimates in Table 5.8.1 are quite precise. Age2 (aged 58 to 62), 
Age3 (aged 63 to 67), and Age4 (aged 68 to 73) variables have strong positive effects 
on the probability of exiting employment. Older workers have a higher probability of 
leaving the labour force. Furthermore, Table 5.8.2 indicates the marginal effect 
estimates that, holding other variables equal, people who are aged 58 to 62 (Age2) 
have a probability of leaving employment that is about 12.0 percentage points higher 
than those aged 53 to 57 (Agel), and those aged 63 to 67 (Age3) have a 17.7 
percentage points higher probability, while those aged 68 to 73 (Age4) have a 10.8 
percentage points higher probability than those aged 53 to 57 (Agel). Similarly, the 
Gender variable also has a strong positive effect on the probability of exiting 
employment. The marginal effect estimates indicate that female workers have a 
probability of leaving employment that is about 9.5 percentage points higher than 
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males. 
In contrast, the estimated coefficients of Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling) and 
Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling) variables are negative and statistically significant. 
Workers with better educational attainment have a lower probability of leaving the 
labour force. The marginal effect estimates show that workers with Edu3 (7 to 12 
years of schooling) have a probability of leaving employment that is about 11.0 
percentage points lower, and workers with Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling) about 
19.4 percentage points lower than workers with informal education. These findings 
are similar to the results reported in Zimmer and Liu (1999), who suggested that 
people with a better education are more likely to work. 
The demographic variable with by far the largest effect is poor health. Health96 
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of entering early retirement. In 
particular, the ^Health variable has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of retirement transition. Hence, i f workers' health declines, they have a 
higher probability of retirement. These findings are consistent with the results 
reported in Mete and Schultz (2002). To evaluate the other probabilities of exiting 
employment between 1996 and 1999, Table 5.8.1 shows that the coefficients for the 
t^Married and ARural variables are negative, which means that i f a worker's 
marital status changed from married to unmarried, or his/her residence changed from 
rural to non-rural, they have a lower probability of leaving employment, but 
insignificantly so. 
5.6.1.1.1 Gender Effects 
Tables 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 also show the estimated results of male and female labour 
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force transitions from work to non-work, respectively. The Age groups variables are 
strongly significant with a positive sign, implying that for both men and women all 
have a higher probability of leaving employment than the omitted category. For 
instance, the marginal effect estimates indicate that, holding other variables equal, 
men who are aged 58 to 62 (Age2) have a probability of exiting employment that is 
about 8.5 percentage points higher than for those aged 53 to 57 (Agel), and men aged 
63 to 67 (Age3) have a 17.0 percentage points higher probability, and those aged 68 to 
73 (Age4) have a 14.3 percentage points higher probability than men aged 53 to 57 
(Agel). In addition, women who are aged 58 to 62 (Age2) have a probability of 
exiting employment that is about 18.8 percentage points higher than for those aged 53 
to 57 (Agel), and those aged 63 to 67 (Age3) have a 17.8 percentage points higher 
probability, and women aged 68 to 73 (Age4) have a 2.8 percentage points higher 
probability than those aged 53 to 57 (Agel), but the coefficient of Age4 is 
insignificant. An explanation for this result may be that the employment opportunities 
for older workers are relatively limited and they therefore have a higher probability of 
leaving employment. 
For the Race variables, male Hakka (Race2) and male Aboriginals (Race4) 
workers have a lower probability, and male Mainlanders (Race3) have a higher 
probability of exit from employment than male Fujianese (Race!), holding other 
variables equal. But the estimated coefficients are all insignificant. In contrast, female 
Hakka (Race2) and female Mainlanders (Race3) workers have a higher probability, 
and female Aboriginals (Race4) have a lower probability of exiting employment than 
female Fujianese (Racel), holding other variables equal. But the estimated 
coefficients are also all insignificant. 
259 
For the Education variable, the estimated results of men's and women's labour 
force transitions from work to non-work are shown in Tables 5.8.1 and 5.8.2, 
respectively. In general, workers with better education have a lower probability of 
exiting employment. For instance, male workers with primary education (Edu2) have 
a probability of exiting employment that is about 7.4 percentage points lower, Edu3 is 
11.3 percentage points lower, and Edu4 17.3 percentage points lower than workers 
with informal education (Edul), respectively. Furthermore, female workers with 
primary education have a probability of exiting employment that is about 3.5 
percentage points lower, high school education is 16.3 percentage points lower, and 
university is 31.8 percentage points lower than workers with informal education, 
respectively. But only the variables Edu3 and Edu4 for men and Edu4 for women 
have a significant and negative effect on the probability of exiting employment. 
Further, the sign of the Health variable is as expected: it has a positive effect on 
exit from employment. From the marginal effect estimates, holding other variables 
constant, male workers with poor health in 1996 have a probability of exit from 
employment that is about 15.5 percentage points higher than male workers with good 
health; and female workers with poor health in 1996 have a probability of exit from 
employment that is about 9.0 percentage points higher than female workers with good 
health. Moreover, as their health became poorer, they had a higher probability of 
leaving the labour market. In particular, male workers significantly have a probability 
of exit from employment that is about 6.6 percentage points higher than the omitted 
category. However, poor health has significant effects on the probability of exiting 
employment for males but insignificant effects for females. An explanation is that the 
male sample size has 727 observations and female only 326 observations in the probit 
model. Hence, it might partially attribute the statistical insignificance of poor health 
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effects for women to the smaller sample size. 
For the Married variable, Table 5.8.2 shows that married male workers have a 
probability of exit from employment that is about 7.4 percentage points lower than 
unmarried male workers, and i f their marital status changes from married to 
unmarried they also have a probability of exit from employment that is about 19.3 
percentage points lower than the omitted category. In contrast, married female 
workers have a probability of exiting employment that is about 4.8 percentage points 
higher than unmarried female workers, and if their marital status changes from 
married to unmarried they also have a probability of exit from employment that is 
about 4.0 percentage points lower than the omitted category. These results imply that 
men are likely to have greater responsibility for their family and are likely to be the 
sole economic support in the family, and although their marital status changes to 
unmarried, they still have a lower probability of exit from employment. This finding 
is consistent with the results reported in Chan and Stevens (2001). However, the 
coefficients are all insignificant. 
Finally, Residence status can represent some employment opportunity for people. 
In general, workers living in town and rural areas have a lower probability of exit 
from employment. For instance, Table 5.8.2 shows that male workers living in town 
and rural areas respectively have a probability of exiting employment that is about 3.2 
and 1.7 percentage points lower than the omitted category, holding other variables 
constant. But these coefficients are all insignificant, only i f the residence areas 
changed from town to non-town is there a significant probability of exiting 
employment that is about 11.6 percentage points higher than the omitted category. 
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Table 5.8.1 Probit Coefficient Estimates of Exit Cases 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Exit Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .373*** (.107) .284** (.136) .522*** (.180) 
Age3 .548*** (.120) .568*** (.149) .494*** (.208) 
Age4 .335*** (.200) .476** (.235) .076 (.430) 
Gender .295*** (.103) - -
Race2 -.086 (.115) -.235 (.148) .147 (.190) 
Race3 -.024 (.195) -.353 (.233) .729 (.447) 
Race4 -.047 (.353) -.127 (.485) -.184 (.531) 
Edu2 -.155 (.116) -.248 (.168) -.097 (.170) 
Edu3 -.341** (.150) -.376* (.195) -.452 (.301) 
Edu4 -.601*** (.206) -.578** (.245) -.883* (.504) 
Pension .727*** (.113) .798*** (.136) .682*** (.221) 
Health96 .402*** (.122) .518*** (.155) .250 (.206) 
Married96 -.009 (.129) -.246 (.188) .134 (.184) 
Town96 -.123 (.134) -.108 (.167) -.110 (.235) 
RuraI96 -.086 (.117) -.055 (.144) -.161 (.208) 
A Health .207** (.095) .219* (.118) .222 (.168) 
A Married -.219 (.301) -.642 (.553) -.110 (.387) 
A Town .309 (.199) .386* (.231) -.059 (.437) 
A Rural -.223 (.150) -.304 (.197) -.150 (.242) 
Constant -.971*** (.203) -.678** (.271) -.837*** (.270) 
No. of subjects 1053 727 326 
Log likelihood -562.828 -363.552 -191.164 
L R chi2(19) 119.61*** 91.08*** 35.84*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (18), respectively. 
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Table 5.8.2 Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of Exit Cases 
Sample Overall Male Femal e 
Exit Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .120*** (.034) .085** (.041) .188*** (.064) 
Age3 .177*** (.038) .170*** (.045) .178** (.075) 
Age4 .108* (.064) .143** (.070) .028 (.155) 
Gender .095*** (.033) - -
Race2 -.028 (.037) -.070 (.044) .053 (.068) 
Race3 -.008 (.063) -.106 (.070) .263 (.161) 
Race4 -.015 (-114) -.038 (.145) -.066 (.191) 
Edu2 -.050 (.037) -.074 (.050) -.035 (.061) 
Edu3 -.110** (.048) -.113* (.058) -.163 (.108) 
Edu4 -.194*** (.066) -.173** (.073) -.318* (.181) 
Pension .235*** (.036) .239*** (.041) .245*** (.080) 
Health96 .130*** (.039) .155*** (.046) .090 (.074) 
Married96 -.003 (.042) -.074 (.056) .048 (.066) 
Town96 -.040 (.043) -.032 (.050) -.039 (.085) 
Rural96 -.028 (.038) -.017 (.043) -.058 (.075) 
A Health .067** (.031) .066* (.035) .080 (.060) 
A Married -.071 (.097) -.193 (.166) -.040 (.139) 
A Town .100 (.064) .116* (.069) -.021 (.157) 
A Rural -.072 (.049) -.091 (.059) -.054 (.087) 
Predicted 
Probability .257 .225 .325 
Note: 
Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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5.6.1.2 Transitions from Non-work to Work 
One of the important contributions of this thesis is the use o f the SHLS data set 
to estimate the probability of re-entry into employment. The estimation results are 
shown in Table 5.9.1. At the same time, the marginal effect estimates of re-entry for 
the sub-sample by gender are also presented in Table 5.9.2. 
First, the probability of re-entering the labour market for the benchmark 
individual and other individuals with different demographic circumstances can be 
calculated. For instance, assume all explanatory variables take a value of zero, and 
then the benchmark individual in all cases is a Fujianese man aged 53 to 57, who has 
informal education, and we assume his health, marital status, and residence are not 
changed. This benchmark value reflects the constant variable. Table 5.9.1 shows the 
benchmark estimates lead to a probability estimate in the probit model of 
P(dil = 1) = <D(-0.367) = 0.357. 
The effects on the probability of moving from non-work to work for different 
demographic circumstances can be calculated as follows. For example, holding other 
variables constant, the probability of re-entry into employment for workers aged 58 to 
62 (Age2) is 
P(du = 1) = O(-0.367 - 0.631) = 0.159. 
This means that a retired worker aged 58 to 62 has a lower probability of re-entering 
the labour market, holding other variables equal. Furthermore, the Edu3 (7 to 12 years 
of schooling) case can be calculated as 
P{d.u = 1) = O(-0.367 -1.077) = 0.074. 
This means that workers with middle levels o f education have a lower probability of 
re-entry into employment. Therefore, i f the estimated coefficients are negative, the 
probability o f re-entering employment decreases, but i f the estimated coefficients are 
264 
positive, the probability of re-entering employment increases. 
In general, the empirical results in Table 5.9.1 confirm the theoretical 
expectations in Section 5.3, with about half of the regressors being statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficients o f Age2 (aged 58 to 62), Age3 (aged 63 to 67), 
Age4 (aged 68 to 73), and Gender variables are significantly negative. Elderly 
workers and female workers are less likely to re-enter the labour market. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficients o f Edu2 (1 to 6 years of schooling), Edu3 (7 to 12 years of 
schooling), and Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling) variables are also negative and 
statistically significant. Workers with better education have a lower probability of 
re-entering employment. Actually, the elderly have relatively fewer opportunities to 
re-enter the labour market again, although they have better education. The estimated 
coefficients of Race2 (Hakka) and Race3 (Mainlander) variables are positive. That 
means Hakka and Mainlander workers are more likely to re-enter the labour market, 
but all insignificantly so. In particular, there are no observations of Race4 variable in 
the re-entry sample and this is omitted from these regressions. 
Furthermore, Table 5.9.1 shows that the coefficients for AHealth, AMarried, 
and ARural variables have a negative effect. This means that as workers' health 
becomes poorer, workers' marital status changes from married to unmarried, 
particularly divorced and widowed, or residence changes from rural to non-rural areas, 
they have a lower probability o f re-entering employment, but only the coefficient o f 
ARural is significant. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of ATown variable has 
a positive effect on re-entry into the labour market. That means as residence changes 
from town to non-town areas, workers are more likely to re-enter the labour market, 
but the coefficient is insignificant. 
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5.6.1.2.1 Gender Effects 
Table 5.9.2 also shows marginal effect estimates of re-entry for men and women 
respectively. The Age group variables are strongly significant with a negative sign, 
implying that Age3 and Age4 for men, and Age2 and Age3 for women have a lower 
probability of re-entering employment than the omitted category. For instance, the 
marginal effect estimates indicate that, holding other variables equal, men who are 
aged 63 to 67 (Age3) have a probability of re-entering employment that is about 15.4 
percentage points lower than for those aged 53 to 57 (Agel), and men aged 68 to 73 
(Age4) have a probability 18.6 percentage points lower than those aged 53 to 57 
(Agel) . In addition, women who are aged 58 to 62 (Age2) have a probability of 
re-entering employment that is about 8.2 percentage points lower than for those aged 
53 to 57 (Agel), and those aged 63 to 67 (Age3) have a 10.2 percentage points lower 
probability than those aged 53 to 57 (Agel) . Further, there are no responses for the 
Age4, Race3, and Race4 variables in the re-entry cases by female sample. Hence, 
these variables are omitted in these regressions for the probability of re-entry into 
employment. 
For the Education variables, only female workers with primary education (Edu2: 
1 to 6 years o f schooling) have a significantly lower probability o f re-entering 
employment, about 5.2 percentage points lower than the omitted category, but the 
other coefficients of the education variables are insignificant for men. 
For the Pension variable, Table 5.9.2 shows that male workers eligible for a 
pension have a lower probability of re-entering employment, about 3.6 percentage 
points lower than the omitted category. In contrast, female workers eligible for a 
pension have a higher probability o f re-entering employment, about 3.8 percentage 
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points higher than the omitted category. However, the above estimates o f the Pension 
variables are all insignificant for men and women. 
Further, the sign of the Health variable is as expected: it has a negative effect on 
the probability of re-entering employment. From the marginal effect estimates, 
holding other variables constant, male workers with poor health in 1996 have a 
probability of re-entering employment that is about 1.8 percentage points lower than 
male workers with good health; and female workers with poor health in 1996 have a 
probability of re-entering employment that is about 3.2 percentage points lower than 
female workers with good health. Moreover, as their health declines, male workers 
have a higher probability of re-entering employment, about 1.6 percentage points 
higher than the omitted category; female workers have a lower probability of 
re-entering employment, about 0.4 percentage points lower than the omitted category. 
But the estimates o f the Health variables are all insignificant for men and women. 
Finally, the Married, Town, Rural, /^Married, ATown, and ARural variables 
are all insignificant for men and women (Table 5.9.2). An explanation is that some 
variables in the 1999 SHLS survey missing for "don't know" or "not answer", such as 
the Race4, Town96, and Rural96 variables. The male samples were decreased from 
310 to 263 observations, and female samples were decreased from 385 to 285 
observations, so the above variables might be insufficient to identify a statistically 
significant effect on the re-entry cases. 
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Table 5.9.1 Probit Coefficient Estimates of Re-entry Cases 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Exit Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 -.631*** (.209) -.479 (.312) -.938*** (.325) 
Age3 -1.048*** (.235) -1.007*** (.330) -1.165*** (.364) 
Age4 -1.447*** (.341) -1.216*** (.410) -
Gender -.850*** (.193) - -
Race2 .013 (.264) -.503 (.578) .269 (.333) 
Race3 .014 (.351) .091 (.395) -
Race4 - - -
Edu2 -.416** (.192) -.203 (.290) -.597** (.298) 
Edu3 -1.077*** (.322) -.691* (.392) -
Edu4 -.851* (.451) -.557 (.518) -
Pension -.032 (.234) -.235 (.304) .439 (.433) 
Health96 -.225 (.193) -.118 (.269) -.364 (.310) 
Married96 -.190 (.207) .001 (.309) -.473 (.313) 
Town96 -.286 (.244) -.324 (.313) -.355 (.446) 
Rural96 -.007 (.205) -.098 (.297) .143 (.313) 
A Health -.002 (.188) .104 (.264) -.050 (.302) 
A Married -.065 (.481) - .086 (.527) 
A Town .176 (.341) .262 (.418) .266 (.655) 
A Rural -1.068** (.436) - -.783 (.543) 
Constant -.367 (.362) -.010 (.515) -.103 (.428) 
No. of subjects 695 263 285 
Log likelihood -147.850 -81.435 -60.045 
L R chi2 (18) 63.80*** 27.89** 19.52 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Due to some variables in the 1999 SHLS survey missing for 
"don't know" or "not answer", such as the Race4, Town96, and Rural96 variables, so the male sample 
was decreased from 310 to 263 observations and the L R chi2 of male is L R chi2 (15). The female 
sample was decreased from 385 to 285 observations and the L R chi2 of female is L R chi2 (13). 
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Table 5.9.2 Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of Re-entry Cases 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Exit Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 -.053*** (.019) -.073 (.049) -.082*** (.029) 
Age3 -.089*** (.021) -.154*** (.052) -.102*** (.031) 
Age4 -.123*** (.029) -.186** (.063) -
Gender -.072*** (.017) - -
Race2 .001 (.022) -.077 (.087) .023 (.029) 
Race3 .001 (.030) .014 (.060) -
Race4 - - -
Edu2 -.035** (.016) -.031 (.045) -.052** (.025) 
Edu3 -.091*** (.026) -.106 (.058) -
Edu4 -.072* (.038) -.085 (.079) -
Pension -.003 (.020) -.036 (.046) .038 (-037) 
Health96 -.019 (.016) -.018 (.041) -.032 (.027) 
Married96 -.016 (.017) .001 (.047) -.041 (.027) 
Town96 -.024 (.021) -.050 (.048) -.031 (.039) 
Rural96 .001 (.017) -.015 (.046) .013 (.027) 
A Health -.001 (.016) .016 (.040) -.004 (.026) 
A Married -.006 (.041) - -.008 (.046) 
A Town .015 (.029) .040 (.064) .023 (.057) 
A Rural -.091*** (.035) - -.068 (.045) 
Predicted 
Probability .039 .083 .041 
Note: 
Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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5.6.2 Duration Analysis 
This section presents a detailed empirical analysis o f labour force transition 
behaviour. First, using the 1999 cross-sectional data, the hazard rate of retirement can 
be estimated by the exponential model, Weibull model, and Cox hazard model. 
Second, the duration models can be extended with panel data and add time-varying 
covariates to capture individuals' retirement behaviour. The above analyses also 
consider the empirical transition behaviours for men and women, and the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
5.6.2.1 Exponential and Weibull Models: Cross-Sectional Data 
Recall from the analysis in Chapter 4 that the hazard functions o f employment 
duration in the exponential and Weibull models are specified respectively as 
h(t \ x,) = A = el*>**Xi). (4.7) 
h{t | xt) = ata-1 • X = ata~] • (4.8) 
The estimated result indicates that i f /? > 0 , the hazard rate of retirement wil l 
increase. I f /£? < 0 , then the hazard rate of retirement wi l l decrease. I f $ = 0 , there 
is no effect on the hazard rate o f retirement. Furthermore, the hazard function in the 
Weibull model increases in duration i f a > 1, decreases i f a < 1, and remains 
constant i f a = 1. The last, equality, is exactly the same as the exponential case. 
First, comparing the estimated results of two cross-sectional data analyses, for 
the Exponential model, most estimated results of the 1999 SHLS data in Table 5.10.1 
are similar and consistent with the reports of the 1996 SHLS data in Table 4.4.1. For 
instance, the estimated coefficients of Age2 (aged 58 to 62), Age3 (aged 63 to 67), 
Gender, and Race3 (Mainlander) variables are significantly positive. Older workers, 
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female workers, and Mainlander workers are more likely to retire than otherwise. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficients of Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling) and Edu4 (13 
to 17 years of schooling) variables have a significant negative effect on retirement 
hazard. This means that workers with better educational attainment have a lower 
hazard rate for retirement. However, there is also a little change for a few variables 
between these two waves. For example, the Race2 and Married variables change from 
a negative effect on the retirement hazard to a positive significant effect, but 
insignificantly. This implies that Hakka workers and married workers might gradually 
change their retirement decisions after three years, but the coefficients are 
insignificant. The Health variable significantly has a higher retirement hazard in 1996, 
but insignificantly in 1999. This suggests that workers with poor health have a higher 
hazard rate for retirement initially. After three years, they might give more 
consideration to other factors, so the coefficient became insignificant. In contrast, the 
Pension variable insignificantly has a higher retirement hazard in 1996, but 
significantly in 1999. This means that workers gradually reached retirement age after 
three years, so the pension variable might have a significant positive effect on 
retirement. 
Second, extending the Exponential model to the Weibull model, most estimated 
results of the 1999 SHLS data in Table 5.10.2 are similar and consistent with the 
reports of the 1996 SHLS data in Table 4.5.1. Especially, the hazard rates of the 
Weibull model all have positive duration dependence, in 1996, a = 1.537 > 1; and in 
1999, a = 1.350. This seems to prove that the hazard rate is increasing over elapsed 
employment duration. As employment duration gets longer, the hazard rate increases 
and workers are more likely to retire. 
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Next, comparing the estimated results o f gender effects with previous analyses in 
Table 4.4.1, some results are similar, but some results are different. For instance, 
Table 5.10.1 shows the sample o f women that the estimated coefficients of Age2 
(aged 58 to 62) and Age3 (aged 63 to 67) variables have a significantly positive effect, 
and the variables o f Town and Rural have a negative effect on retirement hazard by 
the Exponential model. This means that older female workers were still more likely to 
retire, and female workers living in town and rural areas were also less likely to retire. 
However, some variables have been changed. For example, the estimated coefficient 
o f Health variable by women had a significantly positive effect in Table 4.4.1 and 
changed to insignificantly negative effect in Table 5.10.1. This implies that female 
workers with poor health were more likely to retire in 1996, after three years, they 
became to be less likely to retire. In particular, the Taiwanese government provided 
the National Health Insurance (NHI) programmes for people from 1995. Women 
might expect more supports from the NHI for their health and delay their retirement 
behaviour. In contrast, the estimated coefficient o f Pension variable by women had a 
significantly negative effect in Table 4.4.1 and changed to have a significantly 
positive effect in Table 5.10.1. This implies that female workers eligible for a pension 
were less likely to retire in 1996, after three years, they were more likely to retire. 
Perhaps, female workers looked forward to receiving a new National Pension 
Programmes from 2000.5 
Other interesting results are shown in Tables 5.10.1 and 5.10.2, which use 
sub-samples for men and women to estimate the hazard rate of retirement. For women, 
Table 5.10.1 shows that the estimated coefficients of Age2 (aged 58 to 62), Age3 
5 New National Pension Programmes was promoted from 1990s. However, Taiwan had a biggest 
earthquake in 1999, so the government delayed this programmes until now. 
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(aged 63 to 67), Race2 (Hakka), Race3 (Mainlander), and Pension variables have a 
significantly positive effect on retirement hazard by the Exponential model. This 
means that older female workers, female Hakka workers, female Mainlander workers, 
and female workers eligible for a pension were more likely to retire. However, there 
are also some different effects between males and females. For example, the Health 
variable has a positive effect on retirement hazard for males and a negative effect for 
females, but all insignificantly. A possible explanation is that females might do more 
unpaid housework and other family-related work and they might not like to complain 
i f their health declines with age. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the Race2 
(Hakka) variable has a negative effect for men, and a positive effect for women. That 
means female Hakka workers are more likely to retire than males, but only the 
coefficient of female Hakka is significant. Further, the estimated coefficients of Town 
and Rural variables have a negative effect for men and women, but only the 
coefficient of female rural workers is significant. It seems that female workers living 
in rural areas have more job opportunities and are less likely to retire than those living 
in non-rural areas. 
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Table 5.10.1 Exponential Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .288* (.167) .177 (.221) .503* (.260) 
Age3 .421** (.180) .275 (.233) .639** (.301) 
Age4 .334 (.274) .415 (.328) .166 (.569) 
Gender 727*** (.150) - -
Race2 .012 (.166) -.302 (.226) .505* (.258) 
Race3 .478* (.258) .203 (.307) .962* (.508) 
Race4 -.002 (-592) -.015 (.734) -.182 (1.030) 
Edu2 -.225 (.162) -.148 (.239) -.463* (.239) 
Edu3 -.551** (.219) -.430 (.286) -.619 (.407) 
Edu4 -.725** (.298) -.463 (.351) -1.971* (1.019) 
Health .210 (.157) .261 (.196) -.027 (.275) 
Married .081 (.184) -.201 (.274) .229 (.252) 
Pension 1.114*** (.148) 1.212*** (.182) .899*** (.276) 
Town -.061 (.163) -.036 (.207) -.028 (.274) 
Rural -.189 (.165) -.038 (.205) -.475* (.288) 
Constant -5.017*** (.296) -4.794*** (.413) -4.364*** (.354) 
No. of subjects 966 681 285 
No. of retirees 253 160 93 
Log likelihood -670.742 -414.547 -248.673 
LRchi2(15) 111.86*** 68.52*** 36.26** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 5.10.2 Weibull Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .228 (.168) .070 (.223) .494* (.260) 
Age3 .306* (.183) .011 (.237) .627** (.302) 
Age4 .271 (.273) .291 (.323) .152 (.571) 
Gender .813*** (.152) - -
Race2 .009 (.166) -.330 (.227) .509** (.259) 
Race3 .606** (.259) .491 (.307) .972* (.509) 
Race4 .044 (.593) .035 (.739) -.165 (1.031) 
Edu2 -.229 (-163) -.170 (.240) -.467* (.240) 
Edu3 -.582*** (.220) -.439 (.289) -.631 (.407) 
Edu4 -.753** (.297) -.420 (.351) -2.007** (1.021) 
Health .184 (.157) .212 (.199) -.032 (.276) 
Married .081 (.185) -.271 (.275) .233 (.253) 
Pension 1.215*** (.150) 1.328*** (.184) .925*** (.279) 
Town -.059 (.164) -.013 (.209) -.029 (.275) 
Rural -.241 (.166) -.079 (.205) -.492* (.290) 
Constant -6.171*** (.382) -6.953*** (.557) -4.530*** (.451) 
/ lnjz .300*** (.053) .513*** (.067) .054 (.088) 
a 1.350*** (.072) 1.670*** (.113) 1.055 (.093) 
1/a .741*** (.039) 599*** (.040) .948 (.083) 
No. of subjects 966 681 285 
No. of retirees 253 160 93 
Log likelihood -656.753 -390.816 -248.490 
LRchi2(15) 124.31 79.14*** 36.61*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p <. 10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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5.6.2.2 Frailty Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
This section uses the 1999 cross-sectional data for examining the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity on retirement behaviour. First, without unobserved 
heterogeneity, most results have the expected effects on retirement as shown in Table 
5.10.3. The estimated coefficients of those with Race3 and Pension variables are 
positive and statistically significant and have higher hazard rates ceteris paribus. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficients for Edu2, Edu3, Edu4, and Rural variables are 
significantly negative. The estimate for the shape parameter is a = 1.313 suggesting 
an increasing hazard over time. 
Second, the frailty model is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with mean 1 
and variance equal to theta ( 0 ) . The estimate of theta is 0.144 and it is significant at 
the 10% significance level. The likelihood ratio test for the inclusion of theta is 
provided at the bottom of the output and yields a chi-square value of 19.21 with 1 
degree of freedom yielding a highly significant p-value of 0.000. Further, the 
estimated coefficients on the regressors Race3, Edu3, Edu4, and Pension are a little 
bit larger in magnitude than the corresponding coefficients in the reference model. In 
particular, the estimated coefficients of Race3 and Pension have a significantly 
positive effect on retirement duration, other things being equal. This implies that 
Mainlander workers and workers with eligible pension have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. In contrast, the coefficients of Edu3 and Edu4 variables have a 
significantly negative effect on retirement duration. This means that workers with 
better education have a lower hazard rate of retirement. Finally, the Weibull 
distribution shape parameter a = 1.347 is also a little bit larger in the frailty model 
than a = 1.313 in the reference model. Hence, the neglected heterogeneity may let 
the bias underestimates duration dependence. 
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Table 5.10.3 Frailty Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Without Unobserved Heterogeneity With Gamma-Heterogeneity 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Age2 .122 (.166) .221 (.167) 
Age3 .146 (.180) .294 (.181) 
Age4 .132 (.271) .259 (.272) 
Race2 .041 (.165) .012 (.166) 
Race3 .518** (.258) .600** (.257) 
Race4 .129 (.593) .051 (.593) 
Edu2 ..494*** (.153) -.248 (.163) 
Edu3 -.893*** (.209) -.606*** (.220) 
Edu4 -1.062*** (.289) -.776*** (.297) 
Married -.174 (.179) .062 (.185) 
Health .173 (.157) .183 (.157) 
Pension 1.153*** (.149) 1.209*** (.148) 
Town -.095 (.163) -.062 (.163) 
Rural -.290* (.164) -.244 (.165) 
Constant -5.234*** (.332) -5.650*** (.435) 
/ln_a .272*** (.053) .297*** (.051) 
/Inthe -1.939* (1.049) 
a 1.313*** (.070) 1.347*** (.069) 
1/a .761*** (.041) .742*** (.038) 
theta .144* (.151) 
No. of subjects 966 966 
No. of retirees 253 253 
Log likelihood -670.345 •660.739 
L R chi2 (14) 97.13*** 97.98 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. In particular, Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar 2 (01) 
= 19.21, Prob>= chibar2 = 0.000. 
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5.6.2.3 Exponential and Weibull Models: Panel Data 
Bringing time-varying covariates (TVCs) into our duration models, the 
exponential regression model becomes 
h{t | x,, xit) = X = e { ) . (5 . 8 ) 
And the Weibull regression model becomes 
h(t | , x„) = at-1 • A = ata~l • e<A+A*i^"*. >. (5.9) 
The estimation results o f the exponential and Weibull hazard models are reported in 
Tables 5.10.4 and 5.10.5. A positive coefficient means that this particular variable has 
positive effects on retirement, while a negative coefficient implies that a worker 
works longer, postponing retirement. 
First, for the exponential model, Table 5.10.4 shows that the estimated 
coefficients of Gender, and Race3 (Mainlander) variables are significantly positive. 
Female workers and Mainlander workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement than 
otherwise. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling) 
and Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling) variables are negative; workers with better 
educational attainment have a lower hazard rate of retirement. These are similar to the 
results reported in the cross-section analysis in 1999. 
Further, for the time-varying covariates, the estimated coefficient o f the 
Health(t) variable has a positive significant effect on retirement. That implies that a 
worker being in poor health increases the hazard rate of retirement other things being 
equal. This is consistent with the results reported in Bound et al. (1999), who used 
ordered probit models to examine how the timing of "health shocks" affects 
retirement, particularly for elderly people retiring in the US. They found that 
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declining health was an explanation for this retirement behaviour. In addition, Disney 
et al. (2003) applied a two-stage method to examine the role o f ill health on retirement. 
They also found that poor health reduced the probability of continuing to work and a 
change in health was a major determinant of retirement in the UK. 
The estimated coefficient of the Pension{t) variable also has a positive 
significant effect on retirement. That means workers whose pension status becomes 
realisable have a higher hazard rate of retirement. This is consistent with the results 
reported in Chapter 4 using the cross-section analysis. In particular, most workers 
have a strong incentive to receive their pension benefits earlier and invest this lump 
sum retirement payment at a high interest rate. 
Moreover, the variable Married(t) also has a positive effect on retirement 
hazard. That means workers whose marital status becomes unmarried have a higher 
hazard rate of retirement, but the estimated coefficient is insignificant for retirement. 
Comparing the results reported in Blau (1998) and Blau and Riphahn (1999), Blau 
(1998) analysed the dynamics of joint labour force behaviour o f older married couples 
in the US and found that married couples tended toward joint retirement as there 
would no longer be an incentive for one spouse to remain employed. Blau and 
Riphahn (1999) analysed the dynamic effects on retirement of older workers and 
found that one member of a couple is more likely to enter employment i f their spouse 
is employed than i f their spouse is not employed. 
In contrast, the estimated coefficients o f Town{t) and Rural{t) variables have 
a negative effect on retirement, meaning that workers living in town and rural areas 
have a lower hazard rate of retirement than otherwise, but again the coefficients are 
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insignificant under an exponential hazard. 
Second, for the Weibull model, Table 5.10.5 shows that most of the parameter 
values resemble the results reported in the exponential model. For example, the 
estimated coefficients of Gender and Race3 (Mainlander) variables show significantly 
positive effects on retirement. Female workers and Mainlander workers are more 
likely to retire than otherwise. For the time-varying covariates analysis, the estimated 
coefficients of Health(t) and Pension(t) variables have positive and significant 
effects on retirement. That is, workers being in poor health and whose pension 
becomes realisable have a higher hazard rate of retirement other things being equal. In 
addition, the estimated coefficients of Married{t) and Town{t) variables also have 
a positive but insignificant effect on retirement hazard. In particular, a = 1.336 > 1 
and 1 < t < 55 , which indicates hazard rates have positive duration dependence, 
dh(t)l dt > 0 . This means that as employment duration gets longer, hazard rates may 
increase and workers are more likely to retire. 
5.6.2.2.1 Gender Effects 
Tables 5.10.4 and 5.10.5 report the results for males and females o f the 
Exponential and Weibull models. In particular, some estimated coefficients for 
females have a significant effect on retirement hazard, but insignificant for males. For 
instance, Table 5.10.4 shows that the estimated coefficients o f Age2 (aged 58 to 62), 
Age3 (aged 63 to 67), and Race3 (Mainlander) variables for females are significantly 
positive, but insignificant for males. This means that female workers prefer to retire 
earlier, significantly between ages 58 and 67, and male workers might retire later. In 
addition, the female Mainlander worker variable has a more significant positive effect 
on retirement than that of males. This is different from the result reported in Chapter 4. 
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Furthermore, the estimated results ofHealth(t) and Pension{t) variables for the 
male sample have a positive significant effect on retirement. In contrast, the 
Health{t) variable for female sample has a negative insignificant effect, and the 
Pension{t) variable for female sample has a positive significant effect. This might be 
because the numbers of males with poor health are less than the female sample, or 
who eligible for a pension are greater than the female sample. These two speculations 
can be proved by consideration of appropriate sample means. That is, the sample 
mean of males with poor health is (20.4%) less than females (27.3%), and the sample 
mean of males eligible for a pension is (29.9%) and greater than females (9.7%). 
Finally, for the Weibull model, Table 5.10.5 shows that most of the parameter 
values resemble the results reported in the Exponential model in Table 5.10.4. The 
estimated coefficients for females have a more significant effect on retirement hazard 
than for males. For example, the estimated coefficients of Age2 (aged 58 to 62), Age3 
(aged 63 to 67), Race3 (Mainlander), and Edu4 (13 to 17 years of schooling) variables 
for females have a significant effect on retirement, but insignificant for males. In 
contrast, the duration dependence is significantly positive for males, a = 1.693; but 
insignificant for females, a = 1.029. Therefore, as employment duration gets longer, 
hazard rates may increase, that males might have a larger and significant effect on the 
retirement hazard than females. 
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Table 5.10.4 Exponential Model: Panel Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
T C C 
Age2 .283 (.186) .105 (.250) .570** (.284) 
Age3 .326 (.204) .157 (.267) .578* (.329) 
Age4 .348 (.307) .481 (.380) .096 (.607) 
Gender .885*** (.167) - -
Race2 -.169 (.194) -.425 (.272) .241 (.295) 
Race3 .579** (.286) .165 (.346) 1.347** (.607) 
Race4 -.278 (.724) -.678 (1.026) -.184 (1.034) 
Edu2 -.186 (.182) -.135 (.275) -.299 (.263) 
Edu3 -.529** (.241) -.460 (.324) -.558 (.421) 
Edu4 -.751** (.333) -.525 (.395) -1.844* (1.022) 
T V C 
Health(t) .338** (.174) .488** (.215) -.044 (.303) 
Married(t) .156 (.207) -.130 (.317) .221 (.281) 
Pension(t) 1.339*** (.164) 1.562*** (.201) Cp ] * * * (.325) 
Town(t) -.001 (.178) -.037 (.229) .109 (.293) 
Rural(t) -.253 (.189) -.178 (.239) -.453 (.316) 
Constant -5.359*** (.326) -5.101 *** (.462) -4.527*** (.389) 
No. of subjects 915 644 271 
No. of retirees 202 123 79 
Log likelihood -559.698 -329.229 -222.896 
LRchi2(15) 121.79*** 87.39*** 26.91 ** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the LR chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 5.10.5 Weibull Model: Panel Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
T C C 
Age2 .227 (.186) -.006 (.252) .567** (.284) 
Age3 .217 (.206) -.124 (.273) .572* (.329) 
Age4 .302 (.306) .373 (.371) .085 (.610) 
Gender .962*** (.169) - -
Race2 -.184 (.194) -.447 (.274) .240 (.295) 
Race3 .707** (.287) .468 (.345) 1.357** (.610) 
Race4 -.262 (.725) -.687 (1.028) -.178 (1.034) 
Edu2 -.177 (.183) -.144 (.276) -.298 (-264) 
Edu3 -.545** (.241) -.458 (.328) -.562 (.421) 
Edu4 -.767** (.331) -.478 (.395) -1.859* (1.023) 
T V C 
Health(t) .315* (.175) .424* (.218) -.047 (.303) 
Married(t) .148 (.208) -.219 (318) .224 (.282) 
Pension(t) 1.426*** (.166) 1.695*** (.203) .930*** (.326) 
Town(t) .007 (.179) -.002 (.231) .108 (.293) 
Rural(t) -.299 (.190) -.226 (.240) -.461 (-317) 
Constant -6.472*** (.424) -7.333*** (.631) -4.616*** (.495) 
/ln_<x .290*** (.060) .526*** (.077) .028 (.096) 
a 1.336*** (.080) 1.693*** (.130) 1.029 (.099) 
1/a .748*** (.045) .591*** (.045) .972 (.093) 
No. of subjects 915 644 271 
No. of retirees 202 123 79 
Log likelihood -549.273 -309.990 -222.852 
L R chi2 (15) 132.60* ** 99.84*' 26.98 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p<A0, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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5.6.2.4 Frailty Model: Panel Data 
This section considers a "frailty" component included in the model with the 
panel data between 1996 and 1999. The main estimated results are shown in Table 
5.10.6a. First, without unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated coefficient o f those 
with Race3 variable is positive and statistically significant and has higher hazard rates 
ceteris paribus. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of Edu2, Edu3, and Edu4 
variables are significantly negative. In particular, for the TVCs, the estimated 
coefficients of Health(t) and Pension(t) variables are positive and statistically 
significant and have increasing hazard rates over time ceteris paribus. Furthermore, 
the estimate for the shape parameter is a -1.297 suggesting an increasing hazard 
over time. 
Second, the frailty model with TVCs is assumed to follow a gamma distribution 
with mean 1 and variance equal to theta ( # ) . The estimate o f theta is 0.199, but it is 
insignificant. A variance of zero (theta = 0) would indicate that the frailty component 
does not contribute to the model. A likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis theta = 0 is 
shown directly below the parameter estimates and indicates a chi-square value of 
22.53 with 1 degree o f freedom yielding a highly significant p-value of 0.000. Further, 
compared to the 1996 result in Table 4.6.1 that the estimate for theta fell from 0.262 to 
0.199. This confirms that the model with TVCs can reduce the influence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Moreover, for the time-constant covariates, the estimated coefficients on the 
regressors Race3, Edu3, and Edu4 are a little bit larger in magnitude that the 
corresponding coefficients in the reference model. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient of Race3 has a significantly positive effect on employment duration, other 
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things being equal. This implies that Mainlander workers have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. In contrast, the coefficients o f Edu3 and Edu4 variables have a 
significantly negative effect on employment duration. This means that workers with 
better education have a lower hazard rate of retirement. For the time-varying 
covariates, the estimated coefficient of Health(t) is a little bit smaller, but the 
Pension(t) variable is a little bit larger in magnitude than the corresponding 
coefficients in the reference model. These two variables all have a significantly 
positive effect on employment duration, other things being equal. This implies that 
workers with poorer health and people with a realised pension have a higher hazard 
rate of retirement. The Weibull distribution shape parameter a = 1.333 is also a little 
bit larger in the frailty model than a = 1.297 in the reference model. Therefore, the 
neglected heterogeneity may let the bias underestimates duration dependence. 
Finally, the unobserved factors may contribute an extra layer of heterogeneity, 
leading to greater variability in duration o f employment than might be expected under 
the model without the frailty component, and the effect of unobserved heterogeneity 
might gradually be reduced for the model with TVCs. For example, in Table 5.10.6b, 
we can see a significant frailty effect. The variance (theta) decreased from 0.206 in 
the frailty model without TVCs (i.e. poor health variable) to 0.199 in the model with 
A 
TVCs, a decreased from 1.337 to 1.333, and most estimated coefficients are also 
decreased from the frailty model without TVCs to with TVCs. Therefore, the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity can be reduced for the model with TVCs. 
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Table 5.10.6a Frailty Model: Panel Data 
Without Unobserved Heterogeneity With Gamma-Heterogeneity 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
T C C 
Age2 .082 (.184) .217 (.186) 
Age3 .051 (.204) .206 (.204) 
Age4 .202 (.302) .294 (.305) 
Race2 -.146 (.193) -.180 (.194) 
Race3 .540* (.283) .696** (.285) 
Race4 -.183 (.726) -.256 (.724) 
Edu2 -.481*** (.172) -.196 (.183) 
Edu3 -.878*** (.230) -.567** (.241) 
Edu4 -1.096*** (.323) -.789** (.331) 
T V C 
Health(t) .350** (.173) .317* (.174) 
Married(t) -.165 (.199) .127 (.208) 
Pension(t) 1.321*** (.163) 1.418*** (.164) 
Town(t) -.033 (.178) .003 (.179) 
Rural(t) -.349* (.187) -.302 (.189) 
Constant -5.368*** (.366) -5.845*** (.492) 
/In_a .260*** (.060) .287*** (.058) 
/ln_the -1.610 (1.029) 
a 1.297*** (.078) 1.333*** (.077) 
1/a .771*** (.046) .749*** (.043) 
theta .199 (.205) 
No. of subjects 915 915 
No. of retirees 202 202 
Log likelihood -564.646 553.384 
LRchi2(14) 101.86*** 106.32*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. In particular, Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar 2 (01) 
= 22.53, Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000. 
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Table 5.10.6b Frailty Models with or without TVCs: Panel Data 
With T V C s Without T V C s 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
T C C 
Age2 .217 (.186) .241 (.185) 
Age3 .206 (.204) .220 (.204) 
Age4 .294 (.305) .320 (.305) 
Race2 -.180 (.194) -.171 (.194) 
Race 3 .696** (.285) .695** (.286) 
Race4 -.256 (.724) -.208 (.724) 
Edu2 -.196 (.183) -.176 (.183) 
Edu3 -.567** (.241) -.563** (.241) 
Edu4 -.789** (.331) -.804** (.331) 
T V C 
Health(t) .317* (.174) -
Married(t) .127 (.208) .158 (.208) 
Pension(t) 1.418*** (.164) 1.428*** (.164) 
Town(t) .003 (.179) .031 (.178) 
Rural(t) -.302 (.189) -.241 (.187) 
Constant -5.845*** (.492) -5.873*** (.496) 
/ln_a .287*** (.058) .291*** (.058) 
/ln_the -1.610 (1.029) -1.581 (1.027) 
a 1.333*** (.077) 1.337*** (.077) 
l /a .749*** (.043) .748*** (.043) 
theta .199 (.205) .206 (.211) 
No. of subjects 915 915 
No. of retirees 202 202 
Log likelihood 553.384 554.961 
LRchi2(14) 106.32*** 103.17*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. The L R chi2 (13) is 103.17 in the frailty model without poor health variable. 
3. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. In particular, Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar 2 (01) 
= 23.23, Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000. 
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5.6.2.5 Cox Hazard Model 
The Cox hazard estimates for the retirement model are given in Tables 5.11.2 and 
5.11.4. Specially, the results derive from the duration model using panel data with 
time-varying covariates (TVCs) affecting individual hazard rates of retirement. The 
Cox hazard regression (5.11) becomes 
\nhl(t) = ho{t) + fi0Jxu + X PMt). (5.11) 
j=\ r=p+\ 
A positive coefficient means that this particular variable has positive effects on 
retirement, while a negative coefficient implies that a worker works longer, 
postponing retirement. At the same time, the hazard rates of retirement for the 
sub-sample by gender are also presented in Tables 5.11.2 and 5.11.4. 
5.6.2.5.1 Cox Hazard Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Table 5.11.1 first shows test statistics and p-values for the Cox hazard model 
with cross-sectional data by the log-rank test and generalised Wilcoxon test in 1999. 
The variables o f Gender, Race3 (Mainlander), Edul (informal education), Pension, 
Urban, and Rural are significant to estimate the employment survival function for 
retirement behaviour. This implies that the above variables may affect the retirement 
hazard. However, the other variables may also be important factors, but insignificant 
for influencing retirement behaviour. 
Tables 5.11.2a and 5.11.2b show that for the Cox hazard model with the 1999 
cross-sectional data. Most estimated coefficients are similar to their counterparts from 
the exponential and Weibull models. For instance, the estimated coefficients of 
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Gender, Race3 (Mainlander), and Pension variables have a significantly positive 
effect on retirement implying that female workers, Mainlander workers, and workers 
eligible for a pension have a higher hazard rate of retirement. In contrast, the 
estimated coefficients of Edu3 (7 to 12 years of schooling) and Edu4 (13 to 17 years 
of schooling) have a significant negative effect on retirement meaning that workers 
with a better education have a lower hazard rate of retirement. However, the Cox 
hazard model has some different effects from the exponential and Weibull models. For 
example, the Age4 (aged 68 to 73), Race2 (Hakka) and Race4 (Aboriginal) variables 
have a positive effect on retirement hazard for the exponential and Weibull models, 
and negative effect for the Cox hazard model, but all insignificantly. Furthermore, the 
coefficients of Age2 (aged 58 to 62) and Age3 (aged 63 to 67) variables have positive 
effects on retirement, but also insignificant. These results might relate to the Cox 
hazard model lacking a negative constant term. 
Further, for gender effects, the estimated results of the Cox hazard model with 
the 1999 cross-sectional data for men and women are shown in Tables 5.11.2a and 
5.11.2b. For men and women, the estimated coefficients of Race3 and Pension 
variables have a significantly positive effect on retirement implying that Mainlander 
workers and workers eligible for a pension have a higher hazard rate o f retirement. 
However, due to their traditional culture, the estimated coefficient o f the Race2 
variable for men has a significantly negative effect and for women has a significantly 
positive effect on retirement. This implies that male Hakka workers are less likely to 
retire and female Hakka workers are more likely to retire. 
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Table 5.11.1 Test Statistics for the Cox Hazard Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Variables Log-rank Test Generalised Wilcoxon Test 
Value p- Value Value p- Value 
Agel* 2.93 0.086 4.81 0.028 
Age2 2.29 0.130 0.57 0.451 
Age3 0.00 0.976 1.37 0.241 
Age4 0.05 0.819 1.00 0.317 
Gender*** 32.25 0.000 39.12 0.000 
Racel 0.84 0.360 2.43 0.118 
Race2 1.80 0.179 0.40 0.525 
Race3*** 27.13 0.000 19.66 0.000 
Race4 0.01 0.933 0.27 0.606 
Edul*** 10.36 0.001 14.91 0.000 
Edu2 2.68 0.101 1.50 0.220 
Edu3 0.81 0.369 2.62 0.105 
Edu4 0.24 0.621 0.79 0.375 
Poor Health 2.26 0.133 2.56 0.109 
Married 1.81 0.178 2.21 0.136 
Pension*** 89.11 0.000 55.24 0.000 
Urban** 5.16 0.023 2.48 0.115 
Town 0.13 0.718 1.45 0.228 
Rural* 3.09 0.078 7.57 0.005 
Notes: 
1. According to the 1999 SHLS data, the effective sample of duration model has 966 observations, 
including 253 retirees and 713 continuing work. 
2. Effects by Log-rank Test are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
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Table 5.11.2a Cox Hazard Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age2 .197 (.168) .021 (.224) .463* (.260) 
Age3 .039 (.192) -.342 (.252) .455 (.313) 
Age4 -.181 (.284) -.391 (.348) .166 (.560) 
Gender .863*** (.155) - -
Race2 -.061 (.168) -.408* (.229) .515** (.262) 
Race3 .699*** (.258) .633** (.309) .957* (.505) 
Race4 -.011 (.594) -.036 (.741) -.202 (1.031) 
Edu2 -.229 (.165) -.209 (.242) -.438* (.241) 
Edu3 -.453** (.221) -.337 (.291) -.519 (.408) 
Edu4 -.606** (.298) -.323 (.355) -1.886* (1.023) 
Health .146 (.158) .159 (.200) -.024 (.276) 
Married .104 (.186) -.299 (.278) .275 (.255) 
Pension 1.321*** (.153) ] 474*** (.188) .914*** (.284) 
Town -.051 (.165) .039 (.211) -.052 (.275) 
Rural -.206 (.167) -.044 (.206) -.425 (.291) 
No. of subjects 966 681 285 
No. of retirees 253 160 93 
Log likelihood -1450.884 -845.157 440.298 
L R chi2 (15) 129.16*** 87.73*** 32.32*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at *p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 5.11.2b Cox Hazard Model: Cross-Sectional Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. 
Age2 1.218 (.205) 1.021 (.228) 1.590* (.414) 
Age3 1.040 (.199) .710 (.179) 1.577 (.493) 
Age4 .835 (.237) .676 (.235) 1.181 (.661) 
Gender 2.371*** (.367) - -
Race2 .941 (.158) .665* (.152) 1.674** (.439) 
Race3 2.011*** (.519) 1.883** (.582) 2.605* (1.315) 
Race4 .989 (.588) .964 (.714) .817 (.842) 
Edu2 .796 (.131) .812 (.197) .645* (.156) 
Edu3 .636** (.140) .714 (.208) .595 (.243) 
Edu4 .545** (.163) .724 (.257) .152* (.155) 
Health 1.157 (.183) 1.172 (.235) .976 (.270) 
Married 1.110 (.206) .741 (.206) 1.317 (.336) 
Pension 3.747*** (.572) 4.368*** (.820) 2.494*** (.709) 
Town .950 (.157) 1.040 (.220) .950 (.262) 
Rural .814 (.136) .957 (.198) .654 (.191) 
No. of subjects 966 681 285 
No. of retirees 253 160 93 
Log likelihood -1450.884 -845.157 -440.298 
L R chi2(I5) 129.16*** 87.73*** 32.32*** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05 , * * * / ? < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis. Considering the 
Gender variable, the LR chi2 of male and female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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5.6.2.5.2 Cox Hazard Model: Panel Data 
Table 5.11.3 shows the log-rank test, generalised Wilcoxon test, and p-values for 
the Cox hazard model with panel data between 1996 and 1999. Comparing with the 
cross-sectional data analysis in Table 5.11.1, the tested results have a special change, 
including the variables o f Health and Married. This implies that poor health and 
married variables may change to affect the retirement hazard during this period. 
Therefore, these two time-varying covariates may be more important for investigating 
the retirement behaviour. 
Tables 5.11.4a and 5.11.4b show the Cox hazard model with panel data. First, the 
estimated coefficients of time constant covariates, including Gender, Race3, Edu3, 
and Edu4 variables have the same effects as the Cox model in Table 5.11.1a. Second, 
for the time-varying covariates, the estimated coefficients of Health(t), 
Married(t), Pension{t), and Town{t) variables have a positive effect on retirement, 
but only the coefficient of Pension^) variable is significant. This means that workers 
able to claim their pension have higher hazard rates of retirement other things being 
equal. Most occupational pensions in Taiwan are received as a lump sum payment. 
Compared to the 1996 result, workers eligible for a pension have a higher hazard rate 
of retirement. This is consistent with the results reported in Slade (1987), who found 
that workers with pensions had a higher hazard rate of retirement. Finally, the 
coefficient of Rural(t) variable has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect 
on retirement. 
For the hazard ratio, the Gender variable is 2.861. This means that, other 
variables being constant, the estimated hazard ratio o f female workers compared to 
that o f male workers is 2.861 times greater. Other results can be described as follows: 
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the estimated hazard rate o f Mainlander workers compared to that of Fujianese 
workers is 2.406 times higher. The estimated hazard ratio of workers with high 
education is only 0.5] 1 times that of workers with informal education. The estimated 
hazard ratio o f workers eligible for a pension is 4.777 times greater than for those 
ineligible. 
Tables 5.11.4a and 5.11.4b also report the results for males and females. Some 
effects are different. For example, the estimated coefficient of the Health(t) variable 
for males is positive on retirement and negative for females. That implies male 
workers in poor health increase the hazard rate of retirement, and female workers in 
poor health decrease the hazard rate of retirement, other things being equal, but 
insignificantly. Further, the estimated coefficient o f the Married(t) variable for 
males has a negative effect and for females has positive effect on retirement. This 
means that male married workers have a lower hazard rate of retirement and female 
married workers have a higher hazard rate of retirement, but this is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 5.11.3 Test Statistics for the Cox Hazard Model: Panel Data 
Variables Log-rank Test Generalised Wilcoxon Test 
Value p- Value Value p-Value 
Agel 2.36 0.124 4.70 0.030 
Age2 1.00 0.316 0.05 0.816 
Age3 0.01 0.941 2.91 0.088 
Age4 0.53 0.467 1.37 0.241 
Gender*** 31.32 0.000 35.63 0.000 
Race I 0.42 0.519 1.21 0.272 
Race2* 3.10 0.078 1.29 0.256 
Race3*** 30.69 0.000 21.85 0.000 
Race4 0.06 0.801 1.36 0.243 
Edul*** 7.39 0.006 8.32 0.003 
Edu2 1.86 0.172 0.46 0.496 
Edu3 0.57 0.450 2.38 0.122 
Edu4 0.19 0.660 0.31 0.576 
Poor Health* 3.21 0.073 1.97 0.160 
Married* 3.03 0.082 3.90 0.048 
Pension*** 103.03 0.000 60.75 0.000 
Urban** 4.22 0.040 2.02 0.155 
Town 0.03 0.868 1.45 0.227 
Rural** 4.12 0.042 6.25 0.012 
Notes: 
1. As the model with panel data between 1996 and 1999, the effective sample becomes to 915 
observations, including 202 retirees, and 713 continuing work. 
2. Effects by log-rank test are significant at * p < . 10 , * * / ? < .05, *** p < .01. 
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Table 5.11.4a Cox Hazard Model: Panel Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
T C C 
Age2 .193 (.187) -.041 (.253) .522* (.285) 
Age3 -.062 (.217) -.472 (.291) .371 (.343) 
Age4 -.149 (.318) -.340 (.403) .089 (.589) 
Gender 1.051*** (.173) - -
Race2 -.226 (.196) -.521* (.275) .257 (.299) 
Race3 .878*** (.288) .694** (.343) 1.393** (.589) 
Race4 -.312 (.726) -.714 (1.032) -.186 (1.035) 
Edu2 -.170 (.185) -.178 (.279) -.271 (.265) 
Edu3 -.442* (.243) -.342 (.330) -.491 (.421) 
Edu4 -.671** (.333) -.416 (.402) -1.806* (1.025) 
T V C 
Health(t) .257 (.176) .301 (.223) -.026 (.305) 
Married(t) .181 (.209) -.299 (.320) .322 (.285) 
Pension(t) 1.564*** (.169) 1.814*** (.207) 1.051*** (.328) 
Town(t) .012 (.180) .099 (.235) .044 (.292) 
Rural(t) -.272 (.191) -.145 (.242) -.450 (•317) 
No. of subjects 915 644 271 
No. of retirees 202 123 79 
Log likelihood -1134.687 - 527.901 -369.608 
L R chi2(15) 140.52*** 105.73*** 25.70** 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are 0 at the 0.01 level. Considering the Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and 
female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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Table 5.11.4b Cox Hazard Model: Panel Data 
Sample Overall Male Female 
Duration Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Haz. Ratio Std. Err. 
T C C 
Age2 1.212 (.227) .960 (.242) 1.685* (.480) 
Age3 .940 (.204) .624 (.182) 1.449 (.497) 
Age4 .861 (.274) .712 (.287) 1.092 (.644) 
Gender 2.861 • ** (.495) - -
Race2 .798 (.156) .594* (.163) 1.293 (.386) 
Race3 2.406 *** (.692) 2.002** (.687) 4.028** (2.373) 
Race4 .732 (.532) .490 (.505) .830 (.860) 
Edu2 .844 (.156) .837 (.234) .763 (.202) 
Edu3 .643* (.156) .710 (.234) .612 (.258) 
Edu4 .511* (.170) .659 (.265) .164* (.168) 
T V C 
Health(t) 1.293 (.228) 1.352 (-301) .974 (.297) 
Married(t) 1.198 (.250) .741 (.237) 1.379 (.393) 
Pension(t) 4.777 (.806) 6.136*** (1.269) 2.861*** (.939) 
Town(t) 1.012 (.182) 1.104 (.259) 1.045 (.306) 
Rural(t) .762 (.146) .865 (.209) .638 (.202) 
No. of subjects 915 644 271 
No. of retirees 202 123 79 
Log likelihood - 1134.687 -627.901 -369.608 
LRchi2(15) 1 40.52* ** 105.73* ** 25.70 
Notes: 
1. Effects are significant at * p < . 10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
2. Goodness of fit: the result of Log-likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis. Considering the 
Gender variable, the L R chi2 of male and female samples is L R chi2 (14), respectively. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter aims at contributing to the understanding the influences of labour 
force transition by the different specification models, including probit models to 
investigate the probabilities of exit from and re-entry into employment between 1996 
and 1999, and duration models without or with time-varying covariates (TVCs) to 
estimate the hazard o f retirement behaviour. In particular, this chapter has paid special 
attention to examining the frailty models without or with TVCs of labour force 
transition. 
The first main results by probit models estimate the probability of labour force 
transition behaviour, including the probabilities of exit from and re-entry into 
employment between 1996 and 1999. Most results can confirm that older workers, 
female workers, workers eligible for a pension, workers with poor health in 1996, and 
those whose health becomes poorer have higher exit rates from employment. In 
contrast, workers with better education have lower exit rates from employment. 
Furthermore, older workers and female workers have lower re-entry rates into 
employment. Interestingly, workers with formal education also have lower re-entry 
rates into employment. Perhaps, they have reached retirement age and do not wish to 
re-enter the labour market. 
The second main results by duration models are used to estimate the hazard rate 
of retirement. In the duration models without time-varying covariates, most results are 
consistent with the results reported in Chapter 4. That is, older workers, female 
workers, Mainlander workers, and workers with eligible pension have higher hazard 
rates o f retirement, and workers with better education have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement. Further, bringing unobserved heterogeneity into the frailty model, most 
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estimated coefficients on the regressors are larger in magnitude than the 
corresponding coefficients in the reference model, but only Race3 and Pension 
variables have a significant positive effect, and Edu3 and Edu4 variables have a 
significant negative effect on retirement hazard. 
Moreover, for the duration models with TVCs, the empirical results indicate that 
workers with poor health have a higher hazard rate of retirement, in particular as 
workers being in poor health increase the hazard rates of retirement, other things 
being equal. For examining the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on retirement 
behaviour, most estimated coefficients of the frailty models are larger in magnitude 
that the corresponding coefficients in the reference model. Comparing to the 1996 
results in Table 4.6.1, the estimated theta has reduced from 0.262 to 0.199 by the 
model with TVCs in Table 5.10.6. This implies that unobserved heterogeneity might 
be expected to be less serious once TVCs are included in the hazard model. 
Lastly, because the SHLS survey has limited information about income and 
wealth, this chapter does not discuss changes in income and wealth which assuredly 
affect retirement behaviour. A possible later analysis could include more time-varying 
factors that deeply affect retirement behaviour, such as changes in financial health. 
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5.8 Appendix 
The brief STATA commands for analysing the labour force transition are given as 
follows: 
Table 5.2 
use "C:\Documents and Settings\User\My Documents\Revised 2007 Summer\SHLS 
Data 2007\Chapter 4 Data Set 082007.dta" 
sum heall- hea!5 maritl- marit5 pension residl-resid3 i f duration—. & resid~=. & 
race~=. & eyhat~=. 
use "C:\Documents and Settings\User\My Documents\Revised 2007 Summer\SHLS 
Data 2007M999 (3) Data Set 082007.dta" 
sum heal91- heal95 marit91- marit95 pen9 resid91- resid93 i f cen~= . & resid~=. 
Table 5.5 
use "C:\Documents and Settings\User\My Documents\Revised 2007 Summer\SHLS 
Data 2007M999 (3) Data Set 082007.dta" 
sum exit age91- age94 gender racel- race4 edul- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 resid62 
resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f history6=8 & resid6~=. 
Table 5.6 
sum reentry age91-age94 gender racel-race4 edul-edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 
resid62 resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s tory6=l & resid6—. 
Table 5.7.1 (without TVC) 
stset dur, failure( cen) 
sum dur cen age91- age94 gender racel- race4 edul- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 
resid91-resid93 i f dur~=. & resid~=. 
Table 5.7.2 (with TVC) 
expand 2 i f cen==l 
sort id 
by id: gen count=_n 
gen const=l 
by id: egen total = sum(const) 
drop const 
gen died=l i f c e n = l 
replace died=0 i f c o u n t = l & to ta l=2 
replace poorh9= poorh6 i f c o u n t = I & to ta l=2 
300 
replace married9= married6 i f count==l & total==2 
replace pen9= pen6 i f count==l & to ta l=2 
replace resid92= resid62 i f c o u n t = l & total==2 
replace resid93= resid63 i f c o u n t = l & total==2 
replace dur= dur619 i f count==l & to ta l=2 
stset dur, id(id) failure( died) 
sum dur cen age91- age94 gender racel- race4 edul- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 
resid91-resid93 i f _t~=. & resid~=. 
Table 5.8.1 
probit exit age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 
resid62 resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6=8 
probit exit age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 resid62 
resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6=8 & gender=0 
probit exit age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 resid62 
resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6==8 & gender=l 
Table 5.8.2 
probit exit age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 
resid62 resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6=8 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
probit exit age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 resid62 
resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6==8 & gender=0 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
probit exit age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 married6 poorh6 resid62 
resid63 maritc healthcp resid2cc resid3cc i f history6=8 & gender=l 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
Table 5.9.1 
probit reentry age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 
resid62 resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s tory6=l 
probit reentry age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 resid62 
resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f history6==l & gender=0 
probit reentry age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 resid62 
resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s tory6=l & gender=l 
Table 5.9.2 
probit reentry age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 
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resid62 resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s tory6=l 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
probit reentry age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 resid62 
resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s to ry6=l & gender=0 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
probit reentry age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 pen9 poorh6 married6 resid62 
resid63 healthcp maritc resid2cc resid3cc i f h i s tory6=l & gender=l 
mfx compute, nodiscrete 
Duration Models without JVC analysis 
use "C:\Documents and Settings\User\My Documents\Revised 2007 Summer\SHLS 
Data 2007M999 (3) Data Set 082007.dta" 
stset dur, failure( cen) 
Table 5.10.1 
streg age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93, distribution (exponential) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==0, distribution (exponential) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l, distribution (exponential) nohr 
Table 5.10.2 
streg age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93, distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=0, distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l, distribution (weibull) nohr 
Table 5.10.3 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93, 
distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93, 
distribution (weibull) nohr frailty (gamma) shared (gender) 
Table 5.11.1a 
stcox age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
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resid93, nohr 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==0, nohr 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l, nohr 
Table 5.11.1b 
stcox age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==0 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l 
Duration Models with TVC analysis 
stset dur, id(id) failure( died) 
Table 5.10.4 
streg age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93, distribution (exponential) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=0, distribution (exponential) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l, distribution (exponential) nohr 
Table 5.10.5 
streg age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93, distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=0, distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender= l , distribution (weibull) nohr 
Table 5.10.6 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93, 
distribution (weibull) nohr 
streg age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93, 
distribution (weibull) nohr frailty (gamma) shared (gender) 
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Table 5.11.2a 
stcox age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93, nohr 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=0, nohr 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender==l, nohr 
Table 5.11.2b 
stcox age92- age94 gender race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 
resid93 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=0 
stcox age92- age94 race2- race4 edu2- edu4 poorh9 married9 pen9 resid92 resid93 i f 
gender=l 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
This study has investigated the determinants of retirement behaviour, using data 
from the second panel o f the SHLS survey of the middle-aged and elderly in Taiwan. 
In doing so, we examined three broad fields of labour economics: labour force 
participation, retirement, and labour force transition. Although the SHLS survey has 
been used for analysing the living arrangements o f the elderly (Chen, 1994; Chang, 
1999), the economic well being o f the elderly (Hermalin et al, 1999), and health status 
and health-care utilisation of the elderly (Chen, 1999), this is the first time SHLS data 
has been used for the economic analysis of retirement issues. In particular, the 
empirical work focuses on duration models in analysing retirement behaviour. First, 
how people make their decisions to enter the labour market or work was discussed in 
Chapter 3. Second, how people make their decisions to exit the labour market or retire 
in Chapter 4. Third, how people make their transition decisions to exit from or 
re-enter into the labour market in Chapter 5. 
In general, the empirical results in this study confirm theoretical expectations. 
First, for the Age variables, older workers have a lower probability of labour force 
participation as shown in Chapter 3 and have a higher hazard rate of retirement as 
discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, workers retire at around ages 55, 60 and 65. This 
is consistent with the results reported in Shih (1999). The hazard rate of retirement 
increases rapidly after age 50. This is because o f the unique "duration" retirement 
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concept. As the workers are relatively young when they first retire, many may find a 
second job before they retire again. However, as workers age, their health declines 
and they retire. This is the key result in the time-varying covariate analysis in Chapter 
5. 
Second, with respect to the Gender variable, female workers tend to retire earlier. 
This is evident from the nonparametric estimation in Chapter 2. In particular, female 
workers have a lower probability of labour force participation according to the probit 
analysis in Chapter 3, have a higher hazard rate of retirement from the duration model 
in Chapter 4, and also have a higher hazard rate o f retirement from the duration 
models in Chapter 5. These confirm the results reported in Blau and Riphahn (1999), 
who found that wives have a lower probability of labour force participation than 
husbands between aged 50 and 70. Single women, however, are more likely to 
continue work for longer. 
Third, for the Race variables, Mainlander workers have a lower probability of 
employment as discussed in Chapter 3 and have a higher hazard rate of retirement as 
shown in Chapter 4. In contrast, Hakka workers have a higher probability of labour 
force participation as seen in Chapter 3 and have a lower hazard rate of retirement as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Comparing the 1999 SHLS data, these results have not 
changed as demonstrated in Chapter 5. These are consistent with the results reported 
in Shih (1999), who found that Mainlander workers had a higher hazard rate of 
retirement. 
Fourth, with respect to the effects o f Education, workers with better educational 
attainments have a higher probability of employment as demonstrated in Chapter 3 
306 
and have a lower hazard rate of retirement as seen in Chapter 4. These results are 
similar to those reported in Chang (1999), who found that the education status of the 
elderly is an important factor in determining their economic independence and health 
status in Taiwan. Comparing the 1999 SHLS data, this factor has remained the same, 
so elderly workers have a lower hazard rate of retirement, as shown in Chapter 5, but 
the coefficients are insignificant. 
Fifth, for the Health variables, workers with poor health have a lower probability 
of participation in work as demonstrated in Chapter 3 and have a higher hazard rate of 
retirement as discussed in Chapter 4, consistent with the results reported in Diamond 
and Hausman (1984), who found that the demographic variable with by far the largest 
effect is bad health and workers in poor health have a higher hazard rate o f retirement. 
Comparing the 1999 SHLS data, workers being in poor health increased their hazard 
rate of retirement, other things being equal, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Sixth, with respect to the effects of Marital Status, married workers have a higher 
probability of employment as shown in Chapter 3 and have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement as discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, married male workers have a 
higher probability o f participation in work than unmarried males, but married female 
workers have a lower probability of employment than unmarried females. These 
results are consistent with those reported in Chan and Stevens (2001), who noted that 
married female workers have a lower probability of entry-to-work and a higher 
probability of exit-from-work. Comparing to the 1999 SHLS data, changes in marital 
status have a higher but insignificant hazard rate of retirement as seen in Chapter 5. 
Seventh, this study indicates that the Pension variable has a conditional effect on 
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retirement behaviour. That is, a pre-condition for being eligible for a pension can 
provide a strong incentive for people to participate in work before working 35 years 
as shown in Chapter 3. Workers eligible for a pension also have a lower hazard rate of 
retirement after working 35 years as described in Chapter 4. However, male workers 
eligible for a pension generally have a low participation rate and a higher hazard rate 
of retirement after working 17 years. Furthermore, i f workers expect to have a higher 
pension income then they have a higher hazard rate of retirement. These results are 
somewhat different from those reported in Diamond and Hausman (1984), who noted 
that both pension and social security have an expected strong positive effect on 
retirement behaviour. Comparing the 1999 SHLS data, pension reliability shows a 
higher and significant effect on the retirement. 
Eighth, with respect to the Residence effect, town and rural workers have a 
higher probability o f employment, as discussed in Chapter 3, and have a lower hazard 
rate of retirement as shown in Chapter 4. These results differ from those reported in 
Gunderson (1977), who argued that rural workers have a lower participation rate, 
assuming urban residence could provide more employment opportunities for workers 
than rural areas. However, when town and rural workers change their residence status, 
they show a lower, but also insignificantly different hazard rate o f retirement, as seen 
in Chapter 5. 
Finally, examining the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on retirement 
behaviour, most estimated coefficients o f the frailty models are larger in magnitude 
than the corresponding coefficients in the reference model. In particular, the model 
with time-varying covariates might be expected to reduce the effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity on the retirement hazard. 
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6.2 Policy Implications 
This study documents the work-to-retirement processes of the middle-aged and 
elderly in Taiwan. Despite low levels of pension for retirees, the determinants of 
retirement decisions are similar to those found in Western industrial countries. For 
example, older workers, female workers, and workers with poor health significantly 
have higher hazard rates of retirement. In contrast, workers with better educational 
attainments and workers living in rural areas have significantly lower hazard rates o f 
retirement. 
Pension is one of the key factors in the labour force analysis (Lazear, 1986). The 
empirical results discussed in Chapter 3 showed that workers eligible for a pension 
have a higher incentive to continue working, but the duration analysis in Chapter 4 
showed that workers with higher predicted pension incomes are more likely to retire. 
These are consistent with the preliminary results reported in Chapter 2 whereby, 
before 35 years employment duration, workers eligible for a pension have a higher 
incentive to participate in work; and after 35 years employment duration, workers 
eligible for a pension have a higher incentive to retirement. This seems to be 
contradictory for individual decisions. Actually, this presents a good case for 
re-thinking Taiwan's pension policies: for example, the current Labour Standards Law 
(LSL) in Taiwan, state that no employee is eligible to receive a retirement pension 
until the employee has worked 25 years for the same employer or is over age 55. 
Hence, this study suggests that the current occupational pension system may extend 
the employment duration to 35 years or until the worker is over age 65. On the one 
hand, workers can pay longer contributions (for 35 years) and then they would receive 
more benefits for their later life than the current pension system (for 25 years). On the 
other hand, the current pension system easily induces those workers eligible for a 
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pension to retire early and receive their pension benefits. In particular, for interest 
payments on the pension benefits, most workers eligible for a pension are 
governmental employees. When they retire and receive their lump sum pension 
benefits they can deposit part of this amount with financial institutions, which are 
legally required to pay the market interest rate.1 Further, i f the government employees 
retired after working only 25 years, or aged 55, they might easily return to work again. 
Younger potential workers would be crowded out lessening their opportunity and 
increasing their difficulty in finding a job or entering into the labour market. This is 
really not good for the development of the labour force. 
The empirical results presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate that workers with 
higher predicted earnings have a lower hazard rate o f retirement, and workers with 
higher predicted pension incomes have a higher hazard rate o f retirement. In particular, 
under the new portable pension policy operating from 2005, workers have an 
individual retirement account, employers and employees wi l l pay defined 
contributions during the employee's working life, and they wil l have higher pension 
incomes than before. Hence, the portable pension system is likely to lead to an 
increase in expected pension incomes and workers might have a higher hazard rate o f 
retirement in the future. 
Chapter 5, considering time-varying covariates, highlights that workers with 
poor health have a higher hazard rate o f retirement, in particular as workers being in 
poor health increases the hazard rate of retirement other things being equal. Hence, 
the result suggests that the Taiwanese government should invest more in the health 
care industry and National Health Insurance. The first is for improving people's health, 
' It is estimated that the interest rate is 18 percentage points. 
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and the second to help workers extend their time in the labour market. 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
Retirement decisions are dependent on many factors, including individual 
decisions from labour supply aspects, employers' decisions from labour demand 
aspects, and government pension policy from the social security system. However, the 
main limitation o f this study is the survey data. The SHLS questionnaires mainly 
focused on individual employment histories and collected limited data on employer 
responses and government social welfare programmes. Further, the response rates on 
wages, income, and assets were low, reflecting the reluctance of participants to 
divulge their true income. More detailed micro-data for retirement behaviour similar 
to the Retirement History Survey and the Health and Retirement Study in the US and 
the Retirement Survey in the UK simply do not exist for Taiwan. One more hidden 
danger o f the SHLS data is the unknown accuracy o f the responses given by the 
participants. No obvious means of verifying these responses exists. 
The second problem is the lack o f information about Taiwan's social security 
system or programmes from the SHLS data sets. There is a lack of analysis o f pension 
policies. Moreover, until now the definitions of defined benefit and defined 
contribution have not been properly stated. Furthermore, the important issue of the 
types of state pensions, occupational pensions or personal pensions for the elderly are 
not fully covered in the survey. Lastly, the patterns of pension benefits paid and 
whether pensions should be taxed are matters that have not been settled. Issues 
relating to the social security system in Taiwan are currently under debate, and 
suitable occupational pension systems are expected to be developed in the near future. 
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The third problem is the limited information about the employers' labour demand 
effects from the SHLS data sets. For example, the productivity o f middle-aged and 
elderly workers declines as they grow older, unless they acquire new skills to improve 
their abilities. In particular, they might take more time for caring for their family or 
for finding a second job to earn more money; their loyalty would be relatively lower 
than before. On the other hand, their wages and pension benefits w i l l increase along 
with their years of employment. Both situations are detrimental to employers' 
businesses. The former w i l l decrease productivity and revenues, and the latter wi l l 
increase costs and expenditures. Therefore, senior employees are more likely to lose 
their job than their younger colleagues. None o f this is reflected in the SHLS data sets. 
This issue is important in Taiwan because most private employers are small and 
medium sized enterprises. 
6.4 Prospects for Future Research 
The study has made important inroads into examining the determinants of labour 
force participation, retirement, and labour force transition of the middle-aged and 
elderly in Taiwan, but there are many issues left for future research. First, it would be 
useful to analyse joint retirement decisions by spouses. This is because most families 
depend on double salaries for their modern lives. The partners usually have similar 
ages and retirement situations. An et al. (1999) revealed a strong association between 
the retirement probabilities of spouses. They found the effects of wages were 
significant and asymmetric by gender. I f we can collect more information about this, 
joint retirement decisions in Taiwan can be studied. 
Second, it would be interesting to analyse retirement phases in Taiwan. Many 
workers retire after 25 years of working, but often wish to re-enter the labour market 
312 
either full-time or part-time. This situation provides a good opportunity for examining 
determinants o f retirement. The government has recently attempted to change the 
retirement rules for compulsory occupational pension policies from 75 to 85,2 to take 
into account the longer life span of Taiwanese in recent years, as documented in 
chapters 1 and 2. For example, comparing the sample of SHLS data aged 50 and older 
in 1996, those people are same generation as shown in Table 1.2 in 2011. That is, the 
life expectancy of male is 76.2 years and female 82.8 years. I f workers only work and 
pay 25 years of pension contributions but can receive more than 25 years of pension 
benefits, a pension fund deficit is almost certainly going to emerge. Therefore, i f 
people can work longer, pay more pension contributions, or retire later that may solve 
the problem of finance crisis in the future. 
Third, it would be useful to analyse financial management for retirees' later life 
in Taiwan, as most research focuses on living arrangements for the elderly (Chen, 
1994; Chang, 1999) and health-care utilisation (Chen, 1999). Further research should 
focus on the financial management o f elderly retirement plans. The financial 
management o f bequests can be investigated. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Mencius, "If you believe everything in a book, throw the book away.'''' 
Different societies confront different situations and have enacted different 
polices. Taiwan could learn from the social security systems of advanced countries 
and provide a better social welfare system for its citizens. These advanced countries 
have their own problems, including population ageing and financial crises, and they 
2 That is, the retirement condition of workers aged 50 and having worked for 25 years (rule 75) will 
change to workers aged 60 who must have worked for 25 years (rule 85). 
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have started considering how to solve these problems by possibly delaying retirement 
age, and changing pension systems from defined benefits to defined contributions. 
The Taiwanese government should note whether these countries tackle the above 
mentioned problems successfully, as this information wi l l be helpful. 
This thesis has produced some valuable results on retirement behaviour. The 
implications are useful for policymakers, especially since the government needs to 
construct a social security system for the elderly. In particular, the social security 
system not only provides an occupational pension for employees, but also takes into 
account public pensions and personal pensions for individuals. Further, the social 
security system needs to manage pension funds for defined contributions or taxing o f 
defined benefits, and decide how to pay the benefits. Whether a pension benefit is 
paid one-off, per month or per year, has yet to be ironed out. Moreover, portable 
pensions might be suitable for workers because of frequent changes in jobs. People 
should be able to open individual accounts, pay contributions from their earnings, and 
get pension benefits after their retirement. 
Finally, another specific recommendation is for policymakers. This concerns the 
survey data. The government could construct detailed panel surveys for employment 
and retirement. This is very important for investigating human resource management, 
including the decisions o f labour force participation, retirement, and labour force 
transition. 
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